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PREFACE 
 
The decision to send a team of earthquake engineering researchers and seismologists half way 
around the world to investigate a tragic earthquake was indeed a difficult one to make considering 
the circumstances.  Logistical problems, from obtaining visas to transporting large equipment 
packages to mobilization in the field, were enough by themselves to find every reason for not 
having a reconnaissance effort.  Moreover, risks posed by health and safety of investigators in the 
disaster region, along with the myriad of political issues and high costs associated with an 
international study of this degree, required much contemplation before a decision was made to 
deploy a team of investigators.   However, an affirmative decision was made because of the 
benefits that the investigation would have with regard to the Center’s emphasis on earthquake 
loss reduction in the Central United States.   Whereas no two earthquakes and their resulting 
consequences are identical, similarities between the New Madrid and Bhuj earthquakes, as noted 
is this report, were sufficient to justify sending a team.   
The Republic Day Earthquake 
The earthquake occurred at 8:47 am (Indian time) on Friday, January 26, 2001, an Indian national 
holiday known as Republic Day.  The epicenter was approximately 50 kilometers northeast of the 
town of Bhuj in the northwestern part of the Indian state of Gujarat near the Rann of Kachchh 
(also spelled “Kutch”).  The moment magnitude of the earthquake was recorded at 7.7 making it 
the largest earthquake in this region since the Alah Bund earthquake of 1819.   
The official death toll was reported at 35,000 with over 300,000 injuries.  Unofficial reports gave 
estimates exceeding 100,000 fatalities making this the highest death toll since the 1976 Tangshan 
earthquake. A periodical (Indian Today, February 12, 2001) reported approximate numbers of 
casualties at 12,000 in Bhuj, 10,000 in Anjar, 10,000 in Bachau, 12,000 in Jamnagar and 1,000 in 
the city of Ahmedabad, 255 km from epicenter.  The primary cause of death was the collapse of 
building structures, many of which were older unreinforced stone masonry dwellings, or 
conversely, modern high-rise reinforced concrete frame buildings.  
Direct economic losses were estimated in the range of $5 billion, an order of magnitude less than 
that anticipated for a repeat of one of the New Madrid earthquakes.  The limited loss was because 
the epicentral region was sparsely populated with few industrial facilities.  Damage to local salt-
processing plants was substantial, and losses to the port of Kandla were significant at 
approximately $33 million.  Building damage in Surat resulted in interruptions to the diamond 
industry at $4.5 million per day.  Real estate prices in Ahmedabad declined from 25% to 50% 
soon after the earthquake because of fears with respect to seismic safety of high-rise residential 
construction with soft ground-level stories.  
Though much closer to a plate boundary than the New Madrid seismic zone, the Bhuj earthquake 
occurred in a stable continental region classifying it as an intraplate event much like those 
observed in the central United States. The epicentral area was between a series of recognized 
faults: the Kutch Mainland Fault, the Katrot-Bhuj Fault, and the North Kathicwar Fault. The 
Rann is a desert-like plain susceptible to flooding in the summer but very dry during January; 
however, signs of ground water percolation were evident. Fountains of water as tall as two meters 
were observed following the earthquake across wide areas.  Signs of sand blows and lateral 
spreading in soils were predominant in the epicentral region. These highly pronounced 
liquefaction features of the Bhuj earthquake were reminiscent of those reported in 1811 and 1812 
as a result of the New Madrid earthquakes.  
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Much of the building construction that collapsed within 50 kilometers of the epicenter was non-
engineered, unreinforced masonry. Either stone rubble or cut stone was predominant for low-rise 
residential construction in villages or towns. Whereas much of the ancient unreinforced masonry 
construction in the city of Ahmedabad survived the earthquake, many recently constructed frame 
buildings (five to ten stories) suffered collapse despite peak ground accelerations as small as 0.1g. 
This was attributable to a rapid growth in construction over the last decade and local codes 
restricting building size. A significantly large number of engineered, reinforced-concrete frame 
structures with masonry infills collapsed as a result of soft ground-level stories with severe lateral 
stiffness and strength discontinuities at the base story.  Masonry infill panels were typically not 
placed at these base stories to provide an open space for parking and to permit larger building 
footprints relative to the lot size per a local municipal ordinance. Though Indian standards for 
earthquake resistant construction are on a par with modern building codes in other parts of the 
world, often construction quality was impaired because of the lack of third-party design reviews 
and/or inspection.  
In addition to correlations in seismicity and ground failures, pre-event attitudes of the Gujarati 
people with regard to an impeding earthquake hazard were similar to that of the populace of the 
central United States.  Much like the limited concern of Midwesterners to a repeat of the New 
Madrid earthquakes, the Gujaratis had mostly forgotten about the 1819 Alah Bund earthquake 
that caused extensive damage in the town of Bhuj and the surrounding area.  Industries in the area 
were typically not insured against earthquake loss, and less than 12% of the population had 
earthquake insurance.  Damage to insured property was on the order of $100 million, or 2% of the 
total direct loss. Immediately following the earthquake, many people were insuring against future 
earthquake losses as well as mitigating effects of future hazards through seismic rehabilitation of 
their buildings.   
The MAE Center Investigation  
The synergy of the MAE Center’s engineering and seismological teams provided a unique 
opportunity to study relations between damage distributions and ground motion characteristics.  
Anomalies in damage-distance relations, such as towns with little damage close to the epicenter 
or towns with much damage far from the epicenter, were identified through cross-disciplinary 
discoveries of the epicentral location and apparent pockets of damage.  Findings such as these are 
important for assessing the degree of uncertainty related to synthesizing damage across regions in 
other parts of the world, including Mid-America.  
The MAE Center reconnaissance team convened in Mumbai (formerly Bombay) on Friday, 
February 9, 2001.  Two teams, a group of engineers led by Dan Abrams and a group of 
seismologists led by Arch Johnston, met with local hosts, Ramesh Raiker of Strutwel Designers 
in Mumbai and Kirit Budhbhatti, a professor at the Institute of Science and Technology for 
Advanced Studies and Research (ISTAR) in Vidyanagar, Gujarat to share information, develop 
final strategies and review reporting assignments.  Soon afterwards, the engineering team flew to 
Ahmedabad to explore damage in this major urban area with a population of over 4.8 million, and 
to coordinate reconnaissance efforts with other teams including the Earthquake Engineering 
Research Institute’s team that was just returning from Bhuj to Ahmedabad.  Each evening the 
MAE engineering team consisting of Dan Abrams, Mark Aschheim, David Frost, S.K. Ghosh, 
Apurva Parikh, Ramesh Raikar, Tiziana Rossetto, and James Wilcoski shared information with 
other teams staying at the Fortune Landmark Hotel, including a highly informative video 
presentation of an aerial survey of the damaged area conducted by the EERI team. The MAE 
engineering team left Ahmedabad on the morning of February 13 and traveled via land transport 
toward Bhuj stopping at several sites along the way to observe relative degrees of damage. The 
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engineering team set up camp at the Garha Safari Lodge near the Rudramata dam, 15 kilometers 
north of Bhuj, for a four-day period to meet with the seismological team and visit damage sites in 
the surrounding area.   They returned from Bhuj to Mumbai on Friday, February 16 to disembark 
India.  
The MAE seismological team, led by Arch Johnston and consisting of Steve Horton, Paul Bodin 
and Gary Patterson, flew to Bhuj early on the morning of February 10 to set up a central 
command post at the Budhabhatti garage in central Bhuj, from which they deployed an array of 
instrumentation stations for measuring ground motions due to aftershocks. Nearly two-thousand 
pounds of ground-motion instrumentation were shipped from CERI in Memphis to Mumbai and 
then transported via truck to Bhuj.  Seven stations were established in the epicentral region 
between the village of Lodai and the town of Bhachau. Steve Horton and Paul Bodin remained in 
Bhuj for an additional week following February 16 to maintain their instrumentation stations 
before being relieved by CERI researchers Jim Bollwerk and Paul Rydelek. Approximately 90 
aftershocks were recorded per day over a 17 day period, including a magnitude 5.1 shock on 
February 15 and a magnitude 5.3 shock on February 20.  On February 28, the aftershock array 
was removed from the field, and repackaged for shipment back to Memphis. Martitia Tuttle 
joined the CERI team to investigate liquefaction features with local assistance provided by C.P. 
and Kusala Rajendran and Mahesh Thakkar.   
Contents of Report 
This report consists of twelve chapters each independently authored by a member of the MAE 
Center investigative team.  Each chapter was intended to be a stand-alone summary on a 
particular aspect of the Bhuj earthquake.  Little or no editing was done other than to assign figure 
and page numbers.  Opinions and findings expressed in each chapter are those of the respective 
author(s) and not necessarily those of the Mid-America Earthquake Center, the Center for 
Research and Information, or the National Science Foundation.  The first three chapters address 
seismological features of the earthquake explaining prior seismic activity, main-shock rupture and 
aftershock measurements.  Liquefaction features and other geotechnical observations are 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  A summary of current Indian standards for seismically resistant 
building construction is given in Chapter 6 followed by summaries of building damage and 
performance of engineered buildings in Chapters 7 and 8.   Performance of lifelines and industrial 
facilities is reported on in Chapter 9, followed by a discussion of seismic vulnerability predictions 
for reinforced concrete structures in Chapter 10.   Socio-economic aspects of the tragedy are 
presented in Chapter 11.  The report concludes with a discussion of correlations with Mid-
American seismology in Chapter 12.  
Acknowledgments 
Much of the reconnaissance investigation described in this report was funded by the Mid-
America Earthquake Center, which is supported primarily by the Earthquake Engineering 
Research Centers Program of the National Science Foundation under Award Number EEC-
9701785.    
Contributions from authors of each of the twelve chapters in this report are gratefully 
acknowledged.  The support and teamwork of the University of Memphis Center for Earthquake 
Research and Information, under the direction of Arch Johnston, was essential to make this study 
a reality. Much appreciation is extended to Mr. Ramesh Raikar of Strutwel Consultants in 
Mumbai, friend and colleague of team member S.K. Ghosh of Northbrook, Illinois, and Kirit 
Budhbhatti of ISTAR for their generous assistance with the MAE investigation. A special note of 
  vi 
thanks is given to Mr. Apurva Parikh, a structural engineer with Multi-Media Engineers in 
Ahmedabad and alumnus of the University of Illinois, for his never-ending generosity in assisting 
the MAE Center engineering team in and around Ahmedabad.   Appreciation is also extended to 
Professor Sudhir Sapre of the School of Architecture, Building Science and Construction 
Technology of the Center for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) in Ahmedabad for 
escorting the MAE team to damage sites for a day in Ahmedabad, as well as Mr. Nayan Parikh, 
an extremely knowledgeable Gujarati bridge engineer, for advising the engineering team on 
bridge damage before their deployment to the field.  Gratitude is also extended to FEDEX for 
shipping seismic instrumentation to India from Memphis and its return.  Sue Dotson and Sandy 
Shannon are thanked for formatting and producing this report. 
It is impossible to express sufficient appreciation to the general populace of Gujarat for their kind 
graciousness and remarkable sense of resilience in this time of their tragedy. Through their 
cooperation, valuable information and insights were accessible that would otherwise be lost. But 
more importantly, their spirit and friendliness instilled within our team members the enthusiasm 
and strength to conduct a highly energetic and rewarding investigation.  
        
 
Daniel P. Abrams 
       Lead Investigator 
 
 1
Chapter 1: Prior Seismic Activity 
 
by 
 
Paul Bodin1 
Assistant Research Professor 
Center for Earthquake Research and Information 
The University of Memphis 
 
1. Summary 
 
The most interesting seismological aspects of the Bhuj earthquake are: (1) its apparent depth, (2) 
its apparent lack of surface rupture, (3) its potential to understand the scaling of continental 
intraplate earthquakes, (4) its relationship to the regional tectonics, and (5) its comparison to New 
Madrid.  The most important engineering seismology aspects may be the nature of ground motion 
produced by the combination of: (1) the source characteristics, (2) crustal propagation 
characteristics, and (3) site response characteristics.  In studying all of these aspects, it is usual to 
do so with reference to the seismic history of a region. 
 
The seismic history of the Kachchh Peninsula, site 
of the 26 January, 2001, Bhuj Earthquake, is poorly 
known.  Our ignorance is a consequence of two 
related phenomena: a low rate of seismicity (relative 
to plate boundary regions), and inattention by 
seismologists (who have tended to study the more 
active areas).  Following convention, we divide the 
topic into three periods: Paleoseismic (generally 
based on geological examination of faults or 
earthquake effects), Historical (based on historical 
accounts of damage and ground motion intensity) 
and Instrumental (in which seismographs recorded 
ground motions of earthquakes).  The paleoseismic 
record is so sparse that we will simply mention what 
is known in passing in the section about historical 
seismicity. 
 
2. Historical Seismicity 
 
The seismic history of Kachchh is dominated by the 
Great Rann of Kachchh (Kutch, Cutch, Kuchchh 
and Kachh, are all variants to be found in the 
literature) earthquake on 16 June, 1819.  This 
earthquake was the subject of a classic study by 
R.D. Oldham, and forms one of the great 
touchpoints of modern earthquake investigations.  
As well as being contemporaneous with the 1811-
12 New Madrid earthquakes, the 1819 Great Rann 
of Kachchh earthquake plays a role in Kachchh 
                                                          
1 PB, CERI, 3890 Central Avenue, St. 1, Memphis, TN 38152-3050 USA, 
email: bodin@ceri.memphis.edu 
Figure 1-1: Fort Sindri, on the footwall 
of the 1819 Great Rann of Kachchh 
earthquake rupture, before (top) and 
after (bottom) the earthquake 
 2
seismic hazard that is the correlative of the great New Madrid earthquakes.  Interestingly, seismic 
hazard in Gujarat was dominated by thinking of a return time for the Great Rann of Kachchh 
earthquake.  This ‘second coming’ the Bhuj earthquake was not, but it has rather opened the 
doors for a deeper understanding of regional seismic hazard.   
 
The source fault of the 1819 earthquake is known about largely because of its enormous surface 
effects.  The Fort at Sindri (Figure 1-1), presumably built on a local hill, was observed to have 
foundered, and sank relative to sea level such that only the remains of the tower protruded above 
the sea surface during monsoon inundation.  Nearby a large natural structure was formed (or 
perhaps increased in height—there is debate on this point), the Allah Bundh (or Dam of God, to 
distinguish it from man-made stream diversions). 
 
Work on the Great Rann of Kachchh earthquake of 1819 intensified during the past decade.  A 
series of papers have reconsidered historical geodetic surveys and macroseismic effects (damage 
and felt reports), and analyzed geomorphological and geological observations of the Allah Bundh.  
A very brief summary of these studies is that the 1819 earthquake was probably of moment 
magnitude, Mw, between 7.6 and 7.8, that while shallow enough to deform the surface along the 
Allah Bundh, there may have been no actual ground rupture.  The Allah Bundh is apparently a 
fault-generated fold above a “blind thrust”.  Moreover, there is paleoseismic evidence in the form 
of soft-surface deformation for a previous large event, possibly coinciding with a historical 
account of a large earthquake in the region during the 11th century. 
 
The 1819 earthquake was followed by extensive aftershocks.  The region reverberated with 
moderately large earthquakes in 1844 and 1845 (Rajendran and Rajendran, 2000) and again in 
1857 (Bilham and Gaur, 2000).  Given the scant historical accounts of these earthquakes, we can 
at present only speculate about whether they were aftershocks of the Great Rann earthquake.  Of 
course it is now abundantly clear that there are other seismic source zones within Kachchh than 
the Allah Bundh.   
 
3. Instrumental Seismicity 
 
We entered the era of observational seismology about the same time we entered the 20th century, 
so we have about one hundred years of seismological observations of earthquakes large enough to 
be recorded by global seismic stations.  For about the past 40 years, a standardized global 
network capable of recording any earthquake of magnitude about M=5 (and possibly down to 
M~4.5) in Gujarat has been in operation.  Drawing on compilations of Quittmeyer and Jacob 
(1979), and on the global seismicity catalogs of the NEIC, we can make a map of the instrumental 
seismicity prior to the Bhuj earthquake (Figure 1-1).  The global data do not well constrain the 
depth of events, except that it would appear they are crustal earthquakes (not extremely deep), 
and epicentral uncertainties on the order of 10s of kilometers are to be expected.   
 
There is only one instrumental earthquake in Kachchh that stands out—the Mw=6.1 “Anjar” 
earthquake of 1956.  This earthquake was large enough (it was responsible for at least 113 
fatalities) to invite modeling of its waveforms.  Chung and Gao (1992) did so, and constrained the 
Anjar earthquake’s location and focal mechanism to be as shown in Figure 1-2 (reverse slip on an 
East-striking fault, similar to the Bhuj earthquake), and estimated its focal depth to have been 10 
km.   
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Another prior earthquake worthy of special mention was an event that preceded the Bhuj 
earthquake by about one month.  On 24 December, 2000, an earthquake was felt widely 
northwest of the Bhuj aftershock zone.  The PDE lists this event as M=4.6.  Given the rarity of 
earthquakes in the region, it is tempting to regard this Christmas time earthquake as a “foreshock” 
to the Bhuj earthquake.  It seems, however, that it was on a different fault.  Interestingly, it is 
possible that a number of small earthquakes recorded on the LBR1 station of the MAEC/ISTAR 
temporary aftershock (including a series of events with extremely similar waveforms) were small 
aftershocks of this event (Figure 1-3). 
 
The rate and spatial distribution of earthquakes smaller than about M4-4.5 is totally conjectural.  
This contrasts with the central US, where a 25-year observation period of small earthquakes on 
local networks permits us to focus on some clearly microseismically active structures. 
 
One study, published in an Indian journal, suggests that the most seismically active belt in 
Kachchh is associated with an approximately 100-km long segment of the Katrol Hills Fault 
(Sohoni et al, 1999).  It is not made clear what observations support this conclusion.   
 
From the instrumental seismicity, we conclude that the region is subject to a rather low rate of 
M>4.5 earthquakes (without doing the computation, it is likely that the volume-averaged seismic 
moment release rate is similar to or less than the New Madrid Seismic Zone).  Aside from the 
above mentioned study pointing at the Katrol Hills fault, the prior seismicity do not clearly  
Figure 1-2:  Historic and instrumental seismicity of Kachchh prior to the 
2001 Bhuj earthquake.  Stars are the locations of historical earthquakes 
from Gowd et al. (1995), along with the year of their occurrence and the 
peak intensity.  Gray circles are instrumental epicenters in the period 
1914-2000.  Sources are: Quittmeyer and Jacob (1979) through 1975, and 
from the NEIC catalog.  Epicenters scaled by magnitude (smallest M~4, 
largest M~5).  Smaller focal mechanism is for the 1956 Anjar earthquake 
(from Chung and Gao, 1995), Larger is the Harvard CMT for the 2001 
Bhuj earthquake 
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delineate any of the surface faults as being source zones.  Only the Anjar earthquake might 
qualify as a prior indicator that a major blind thrust fault threatened Kachchh, and more work is 
required to clarify the spatial association of these two earthquakes. 
 
4. A Question of Depth… 
 
In the aftermath of the Bhuj earthquake, one of the questions that haunts seismologists is whether 
the prior seismicity (often called background seismicity, to distinguish it from very large 
earthquakes and their aftershocks) was as deep as the Bhuj earthquake and its aftershocks. 
 
Such deep mainshock rupture as indicated by the profound depth distribution of aftershocks (see 
Chapter 2.3)—and even the nucleation of aftershocks apparently throughout the crust—is 
surprising.  It calls into questions commonly held beliefs about to what depth tectonic stress can 
be stored in the crust and the mechanics of earthquake rupture itself.  Common understanding is 
that only the upper crust (say 10-20 km) of typical continental crust is usually seismogenic).  At 
greater depths (generally corresponding to about 300° C, depending on the composition of the 
crustal rocks, e.g. Scholz, 1992) the rocks are thought to deform in a more ductile fashion, and 
fault mechanics tends to discourage the abrupt stick-slip behavior that gives rise to earthquakes.  
What little we have been able to piece together about the composition and thermal regime of the 
Kachchhi crust does not help to resolve this problem.   Kachchh crust is likely to have rather 
elevated heat flow (e.g. Roy and Rao, 2000), and the composition of the deep crust is entirely a 
matter of conjecture.   
 
If prior seismicity was distributed deeply, that would suggest the existence of thermo-mechanical 
properties that just happen to create a seismogenic lower crust in Kachchh.  This would be 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-3:  Earthquakes near India Bridge (location shown in inset 
maps—from the work of J. Gomberg, USGS, personal 
communication).  These may be aftershocks of the 24 December, 
2000 earthquake, alternatively they may be evidence of background 
seismicity 
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interesting and important—a rather rare find.2  On the other hand, if background seismicity is 
distributed in depth like most other parts of the world—with a seismogenic upper crust and a 
ductile lower crust, then the Bhuj earthquake would present the possibility to gain deep insight 
with profound seismic hazard implications for the central US.  That would mean the operation of 
deformation mechanisms that permit deep rupture during large earthquakes, yet not nucleation of 
small earthquakes in “usual” times, but only during the period of rapid strain rates that must 
inevitably follow a large rupture.  It would imply that the active seismicity we see in the central 
US, which extends to about 15 km deep, might be only the “tip of the iceberg” and only 
represents the top half of what could rupture in large earthquakes, like 1811-12.  Much more 
potential seismic moment release could be packed into shorter active faults than would ever be 
possible on faults in the mobile crustal rocks that form the majority of the world’s observations 
and inform the theories of earthquake rupture mechanics.  A test of this possibility would be if the 
aftershocks of the Bhuj earthquake get shallower with time. 
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Chapter 2: Mainshock Rupture 
 
by 
 
Paul Bodin1 
Assistant Research Professor 
Center for Earthquake Research and Information 
The University of Memphis 
 
1. Summary 
 
A frustrating enigma of the Bhuj earthquake is that the properties we most seek to understand—
its rupture location, source processes, and nearfield ground motions—are subject to very little 
direct observational constraint.  Instead of ground motions being recorded by strong motion 
accelerographs, we have only the ambiguous testimony of the damage and geological effects to 
infer what ground motions were.  Instead of a surface rupture making manifest which fault (and 
how much of it) ruptured, we have widespread secondary effects of lateral spreads.  Instead of 
clear images of surface deformation from Interferometric Radar images, or satellite geodetic 
surface displacement vectors, we are left clutching at straws.  The Bhuj earthquake was the 21st 
century, first really important earthquake, and yet in many ways many of our modern tools to 
understand the details of such events were frustrated for various reasons.  That gloomy statement 
made, we can say some preliminary things about the rupture now, and future studies of existing 
observations should permit us to constrain the source processes in ways we cannot at present.  
But this will take time.  Future developments hinge on analyzing regional seismograms (recorded 
at Indian network stations) of the mainshock and the larger aftershocks. 
                                                          
1 PB, CERI, 2890 Central Avenue, St. 1, Memphis, TN 38152-3050 USA, 
email: bodin@ceri.memphis.edu 
 
Figure 2-1:  Aftershock distribution in map and cross-section (inset).  Locations shown on inset are 
JHD relocations of the best-recorded aftershocks in the set.  Surface mapped faults are shown 
schematically 
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What we would really like to know about 
the mainshock is where the rupture took 
place, how much it slipped, how much 
strain it took to drive it.  The observations 
we have available so far are intensity data, 
teleseismic observations, and aftershock 
occurrence—all observations nearly half a 
century old.  Fortunately recently 
developed analytical methods and cheap 
fast computers permit us to present some 
preliminary estimates of the processes we 
want to model. 
 
2. Aftershock Observations 
 
In the absence of surface rupture and 
geodetic deformation, aftershock data 
provide evidence to suggest source location 
and orientation.  Stations from the 
MAEC/ISTAR temporary seismic network 
were well-distributed with respect to the 
aftershocks, and provide a reasonable 
picture of the aftershock distribution.  
Figure 2-1 reveals the distribution of 
aftershocks recorded by our temporary 
network.  Only about 300 aftershocks of the 
estimated total of ~2200 that were recorded 
on enough stations to locate are shown in 
the figure.  The aftershocks highlight an 
area that does not coincide with a mapped 
fault.  Although the epicenter lies close to 
the surface trace of the Kachchh Mainland 
fault, the aftershocks dip strongly 
southward (along section b-b’ in Figure 2-
1); a surface projection of the aftershock 
cloud would daylight somewhere south of 
the Island Belt fault zone.  The aftershocks 
are distributed through a volume, but the 
densest part of the cloud lies between 10 
km deep and 35 km deep, suggesting that 
perhaps fault slip was largest in this depth 
range.  The mainshock hypocenter, derived 
from teleseismic seismograms, is in the 
center of the aftershock swarm at a depth of 
about 20 km. 
 
Figure 2-2 illustrates that there are strong 
concentrations of aftershocks along two trends—one east of the epicenter, and one several 10s of 
km to the west.  The epicenter is relocated to lie in a quiescent zone for the larger aftershocks  
 
Figure 2-2:  Relocated epicenters of the 
largest aftershocks (circles) and the 
mainshock (star).  The relocations are by 
Engdahl and Bergman (personal 
communication) and are joint “relative” 
relocations, using MAEC/ISTAR portable 
aftershock data for the overlapping events as 
constraints 
Figure 2-3:  Harvard centroid moment 
tensor solution for the Bhuj earthquake.  
The solution uses long-period mantle 
waves of GSN stations to estimate the 
overall size and orientation of the Bhuj 
earthquake rupture  
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that are shown on the figure.  One possible 
interpretation of these observations is that 
from its initiation, the rupture proceeded 
both up-dip, and down-dip, as well as to 
the east and to the west.  The eastward 
propagation stopped relatively quickly, 
while the westward propagation continued 
a bit farther before it was stopped.  The 
down-dip propagation may have converged 
a bit—making a bit of a “point” at the 
bottom of the rupture.  The up-dip 
propagation climbed to at least 10-5 km.  
The resulting rupture plane would have a 
sort of triangular aspect, some 50-60 km 
across the top and tapering down to 10 km 
or so at the deep point.   
 
3. Teleseismic Observations  
 
The Bhuj earthquake was well-recorded by 
the seismograph stations of the Global 
Seismographic Network.  The waveforms 
so recorded were analyzed very quickly, 
and a moment tensor calculated by Harvard 
for the Centroid Moment Tensor (CMT) 
catalog (Figure 2-3).  The resulting CMT 
indicated a deep crustal rupture, on one of 
two possible roughly E-W striking fault 
planes, dipping about 50° - 55°.  The 
seismic moment was estimated to be about 
3.6 X 1027 Dyne-cm. 
 
Once a fault plane has been chosen, models 
of slip on the fault can be generated.  All 
such models use the fit of synthetic 
seismograms to observed teleseismic 
phases in order to find the best-fitting 
model (e.g. Figure 2-4).  For the Bhuj 
earthquake, the earliest model we are 
aware of, and illustrated in Figures 2-4 
through 2-6, was offered by researchers at 
the University of Tokyo (Yagi and 
Kikuchi, 2001).  Figure 2-5 illustrates the 
overall slip model they compute for the 
southward-dipping nodal plane, and Figure 
2-6 shows a snapshot of how the slip was 
modeled to have proceeded in time.  We 
show these images as examples of 
teleseismic waveform-constrained  
models of the mainshock source processes, 
not because we believe them to be the 
 
Figure 2-4:  Illustration of fits to teleseismic 
body waveforms (from Yagi and Kikuchi, 
2001) 
Figure 2-5:  Slip distribution on south dipping 
plane (from Yagi and Kikuchi, 2001) 
Figure 2-6:  1-second “snapshots” of slipping 
area on model rupture.  Final slip model shown 
in figure 2-5.  (from Yagi and Kikuchi, 2001) 
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“true” picture.  In fact the resolution of such models needs to be evaluated quite carefully, 
combined with sensitivity analyses, and compared with the results from other methods before a 
sense of how well the data are resolving real slip on a fault can be stated. 
 
An additional source of information about the mainshock comes from the best-fitting source-time 
function (or moment release rate function, Figure 2-7).  We show a source time function 
computed by Larry Ruff at U. of Michigan.  The source time function tells us how the rate of 
moment release changed in time.  The Bhuj earthquake source-time 
function is very simple for an earthquake of its size.  Larger 
earthquakes tend to have more complex source-time functions as, 
presumably, fault slip speeds up and slows down, and is affected by 
geometrical irregularities on a large rupture plane. 
 
All such analyses are based on teleseismic waveforms and while they 
may use different phases or analytical techniques, their results have 
common elements (See also Antolik and Draeger, 2001).  The 
rupture started at mid-crustal depths, 20-25 km.  It propagated to the 
west, where the largest slip (a patch with 9-12 m of slip) occurred.  
Within this patch, slip velocities of nearly 200 cm/s took place, 
which corresponds to quite high dynamic stress drops (Ruff (2001) 
estimates a dynamic stress drops of 10,5 MPa).  Different models 
suggest different things about how deep slip took place.  The Yagi and Kikuchi model suggests 
up to 3 m of slip occurred at depths below about 25-30 km.  Antolik and Draeger (2001), 
however, suggest that little slip took place at depths greater than the mainshock. 
 
4. Common Threads and Future Work 
 
Pictures of the Bhuj mainshock derived from teleseismic models and aftershock locations have 
some common features.  Primarily, the rupture was unusually deep.  The rupture area was small 
compared for the seismic moment released, and the average stress drop and slip was high.  
Moreover, it appears that most of the moment was released in a relatively small patch to the 
northwest of the epicenter.   
 
Future work on the rupture processes of the Bhuj earthquake will include refinements and 
sensitivity tests of the sort of model discussed in this chapter.  However, we may anticipate that 
mainshock and large aftershock seismograms recorded at regional distances (i.e. from Indian 
broadband seismic stations) will permit us to add important observational constraints that are 
currently unavailable.  
 
5. References 
 
Antolik, M. and D. Draeger (2001) Preliminary Source Inversion of the 26 January Bhuj, India, 
Earthquake American Geophysical Union Spring Meeting, Boston, MA. 
 
Ruff, L. (2001) http://www.geo.lsa.umich.edu/SeismoObs/STF.html 
 
Yagi and Kikuchi (2001) http://wwweic.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/yuji/southindia/index.html 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7:  Moment 
release rate function of 
the Bhuj mainshock, 
(by Ruff, 2001) 
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Chapter 3: Aftershock Measurements 
 
by 
 
Stephen Horton1 (Research Scientist), Paul Bodin2 (Assistant Research Professor)  
and Mitch Withers3 (Seismic Networks Director) 
Center for Earthquake Research and Information, University of Memphis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We deployed seismic instruments to record aftershocks of the Mw=7.7 Republic Day (26 
January) 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India. We recorded nearly 2000 events during the 18 day 
deployment. The largest aftershock has mb=5.2 (PDE), and several have mb>4.0. The largest 
acceleration recorded by our network was 108.8 cm/s2 (0.11 g) at a station 20 km from a mb=4.7 
(PDE) earthquake. 
 
In this report we present pertinent details regarding the seismic network and instrumentation, and 
then results of our preliminary analysis of the aftershocks. The analysis of aftershock data occurs 
in stages. Our analysis to date is fairly routine. We have located a subset of the aftershocks, we 
have obtained a reasonable velocity model for the region, and we have generated first motion 
focal mechanisms. We are in the early stages of estimating magnitude of the recorded 
aftershocks, and we recently began to model waveforms. The analysis is ongoing and will address 
other issues in the future. 
 
2. Seismic Instrumentation 
 
We deployed 8 Kinemetrics K2 digital recorders near the main shock epicenter. A typical field 
set-up is shown in the picture below. Each K2 included an internal triaxial force-balance 
accelerometer set to full scale of 2 g and a built-in GPS timing system. An external velocity 
sensor (Mark Products triaxial L-28) was also attached to each K2 to insure detection of weak 
ground motion. All six channels were recorded at 200 samples per second. An external battery 
and solar panel provided power. Each K2 was operated in a STA/LTA triggered mode with a 
trigger ratio of 4 on all channels. Pre-event time was 10 s, and post event time was 20 s. 
           
  
 
Figure 3-1:  
Seismic 
instruments 
deployed at 
station 
L1Q1 
                                                          
1 SH, 687 Loeb St., Memphis, TN 38111 USA, 
email: horton@ceri.memphis.edu 
2 PB, CERI, 3890 Central Avenue, St. 1, Memphis TN 38152-3050 USA, 
email bodin@ceri.memphis.edu 
3 MW, CERI, 3890 Central Avenue, St. 1, Memphis, TN 38152-3050 USA, 
email: bodin@ceri.memphis.edu, withers@ceri.memphis.edu  
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Event data were stored on an internal 182MB PCMCIA card. Each site was visited about every 
48 hours to transfer data from the PCMCIA card to a PC. Data was ultimately written to CD for 
storage and transportation to the US. At CERI, data were converted into ah format to be 
compatible with the regional processing software, and into mseed format for incorporation into 
the IRIS database. Event association was performed based on trigger times at station KHA1. 
Events were declared when at least 3 other stations triggered within a 30 s window around trigger 
times at KHA1. We have nearly 2000 events satisfying this criteria. 
 
The 8 station network was designed primarily for aftershock location. The figure below shows the 
location of stations and the main shock epicenter. The general intent was to surround the area of 
aftershock activity. The network configuration was moderately impacted by logistical constraints 
imposed by the location of our base of operations in Bhuj (LOT1 on map) and by the local road 
system. Travel time limited the extension of the network to the east. Available roads limited 
access to northern areas. 
 
 
Figure 3-2:  Network configuration during the aftershock deployment.  
Seismic stations are denoted by pink triangles. The epicenter of the main  
shock is shown by the focal mechanism (Harvard CMT). Colored areas  
are rock. White indicates deep sediments  
 
Most stations were sited on sandstone, basalt or on a thin veneer of soil overlying sedimentary 
rock. LIQ1 is a notable exception. Intentionally located at the site of a large sand-blow, sediment 
thickness at LIQ1 is thought to be around 500 m. The thickness of sediments at KHA1 and DUD1 
is also unknown. 
 
3. Results 
 
Approximately 300 events that triggered 6 or more stations have been located to date. XPICK 
was used to pick P-wave and S-wave arrival times. PQL was used to apply a 1Hz low-pass filter 
to waveforms for verifying or modifying arrival times. HYPOELLIPSE was used to locate the 
earthquakes. 
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We initially located 257 aftershocks using a velocity model purportedly used by the Indian 
Meteorological Department to locate regional events in Gujarat. For each event the velocity 
model is used by HYPOELLIPSE to calculate travel times of P-waves and S-waves to each 
station. HYPOELLIPSE then performs an iterative inversion to find the earthquake location and 
origin time that minimizes the root-mean-square of the travel-time residuals (observed minus 
predicted). 
 
We averaged the travel-time residuals for each station over the 257 events. Stations close to the 
epicenter were found to have negative average residuals while stations at large distance were 
found to have positive residuals on average. This suggests the velocity model is too fast near the 
surface and too slow at depth, and that the velocity model should be modified. 
 
We inferred a new velocity model from arrival time curves for both P- and S-waves. The figure 
on the left below shows our starting and favored velocity models. The aftershocks were grouped 
into 5 km depth bins, and the observed and predicted travel times plotted against epicentral 
distance, as in the adjacent figure. Predicted S-wave travel times are early at close distances, 
while both P-wave and S-wave travel times are late at long distances. This suggests the velocity 
model is too fast near the surface and too slow at depth. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3:  The starting velocity model (dashed 
lines) and the favored model (solid lines) are 
shown 
 
 
Figure 3-4:  For aftershocks with depths 
between 20 and 25 km, predicted (circle) and 
observed (period) travel times are plotted 
 
For each depth bin, we fit a 3rd order polynomial to the observed travel times, and take the 
derivative with respect to time. The resulting curves have units of slowness (s/km). The inverse, 
velocity (km/s), is plotted against epicentral distance in figure 3-5 for one depth bin. Apparent 
P-wave and S-wave velocities are large near the source (rays leave the source near vertical) 
reaching a minimum at a distance where rays leave the source horizontally. The minimum in each 
curve is the velocity at the depth of the source. At larger epicentral distances, rays leave the 
source going down and are turned at a higher velocity. 
 
This method was used to produce the favored velocity model. Aftershocks occurred over a large 
depth range from around 5 to 40 km. The aftershocks were binned in 5 km depth intervals, and 
the velocity for that interval was obtained from the velocity curve minimum. The favored model 
is faster than the starting model at depth, and slower near the surface. (The slow velocity layer 
near the surface is discussed below.) We relocated the 257 events using the favored model and 
plotted predicted and observed travel times as a function of distance. An example is shown in the 
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figure 3-6. The systematic differences observed in the starting model are no longer observed. 
(Verification of the velocity model through waveform modeling is discussed later.) 
 
 
Figure 3-5:  Plot of velocity obtained from 
observed travel times for depth range 20 to 25 
km 
 
Figure 3-6:  For aftershocks with depths 
between 20 and 25 km, predicted (circle) and 
observed (period) travel times are plotted 
 
The geologic cross-section below shows that the top of the Precambrian is generally shallow in 
the study area varying in depth from about 1 to 3 km beneath the surface. The shallow depth to 
Precambrian rock explains the generally high velocities in our model. The Precambrian surface is 
overlain by a relatively thin veneer of unconsolidated sediment, sedimentary rock or basalt.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-7:  North-South geologic cross-section of the study area. The section location is shown 
in the epicenter figure later in this section. The section illustrates that Precambrian basement is 
quite shallow beneath Kachchh, overlain by one to two kilometers of indurated Mesozoic 
sediment, and with shallow basins of Tertiary unconsolidated sediment 
 
The method used to determine velocity above was not applicable to the upper 5 km since 
aftershocks did not occur in this depth range. However, an apparent converted phase observed at 
most stations in the network indicates a low velocity layer at the surface overlying a much faster 
layer. Figure 3-8 shows an example of this converted phase at station DUD1. In this example the 
S-P conversion arrives 0.9 s before the S-wave arrival. The timing of the converted phase varies 
for each station, but it is consistent between earthquakes at any given station. The overall 
character of the converted phase suggests that vertical S-wave motion is converted to a P-wave at 
the top of the Precambrian. This energy travels at the P-wave velocity through the upper layer and 
so arrives earlier than the S-wave. A preliminary screening of this phase gave an average 
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advancement of about 0.7 s over the network. We adjusted the thickness and velocity of the 
surface layer accordingly. 
 
 
Figure 3-8:  Seismograms at DUDI show an 
arrival on the vertical component 0.9s before the 
S-wave arrival on the horizontal components 
 
Figure 3-9 shows the location of approximately 300 aftershocks. The epicenter of the main shock 
lies close to the center of aftershock activity. These epicenters lie well south of the Island Belt 
fault, and just north of the Kachchh Mainland fault. The distribution of epicenters suggests a 
nearly east-west fault plane approximately 40-50 km in length and would be consistent with 
either main shock nodal plane. 
 
                 
Figure 3-9:  Epicenters (small circles) are shown on a shaded  relief map. Triangles are 
locations of seismic stations. Prominent faults are labeled. Shallow geology along a-a’ is 
shown two figures above. Depth distribution of aftershocks along b-b’ is shown below 
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A north-south cross section below shows the depth of aftershocks. The depth distribution of 
aftershocks suggests a south dipping fault plane of 20-30 km down-dip length. These earthquakes 
are unusually deep with depths ranging from 5 to 35 km. 
 
 
Figure 3-10:  Cross section along b-b' in 
figure above showing hypocenters projected 
onto vertical plane 
 
Focal mechanisms were generated for the 300 aftershocks using FPFIT. The focal mechanisms 
are plotted in figure 3-11. A large variety of fault mechanisms are observed. These mechanisms 
were constrained by first motions at 8 or fewer stations, and have not been evaluated in detail to 
determine stability. However, the focal mechanism shown in the next figure (waveform 
modeling) is fairly well constrained with 5 observations. The size of the focal sphere reflects a 
relative magnitude scale adopted for this study. The magnitude is determined from S-wave 
amplitude averaged across the network. We are attempting to tie the relative scale to Mw through 
waveform modeling. This work is in the beginning stage. 
 
             
Figure 3-11:  Focal mechanisms of aftershocks. These are lower 
hemisphere projections with the tension quadrant colored red 
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Waveform modeling has been started for several of the larger aftershocks. An example of the 
observed and synthetic waveforms is shown in the figure below. The synthetics were generated 
using the focal mechanism produced by FPFIT. The uncertainty in strike and dip is 13° and 
uncertainty in rake is 10°. The waveforms fit the general sense of motion at most stations well. 
The synthetics were generated using a discrete wave-number integration program with the 
favored velocity model discussed above. In general, timing of arrivals is good indicating the 
velocity model is reasonable.  
 
In addition, the absolute amplitudes of the observed and synthetic waveforms agree very well 
with the exception of LIQ1. Although this event has an mb=4.5 (PDE) and a relative magnitude 
size of 4.6, the Mw used to generate the synthetics is 4.0. Using Mw=4.5 generates synthetics that 
are obviously too large at all stations, while using Mw=3.5 generates synthetics that are obviously 
too small. Refinement of this work will likely produce synthetics that constrain Mw to within 
0.25 Mw units at least for the larger events. 
 
At LIQ1 the observed waveform is significantly larger and later in arrival than the predicted. This 
suggests a slower surface velocity is needed for this station. Since LIQ1 lies atop approximately 
500 m of unconsolidated sediment, it would be reasonable to introduce a lower near-surface 
velocity for this station. A slower surface velocity would delay the S-wave arrival time and 
increase its amplitude. 
 
 
            
 
Figure 3-12:  Observed and synthetic waveforms for mb=4.5 aftershock. The focal mechanism is 
fairly well constrained with 5 observations. The synthetics were generated for a Mw=4.0 
earthquake with a 50 bar stress drop. Both synthetic and observed waveforms are bandpass 
filtered around 1Hz. The observed waveforms are the solid blue lines and the synthetic are the red 
dashed lines. The waveforms are plotted in proximity to the station location on the focal sphere 
 
 
  18
4. Summary 
 
We present preliminary analysis of aftershocks of the Mw=7.7 Republic Day (26 January) 2001 
earthquake in Gujarat, India, recorded on a network of 8 portable digital event recorders. During 
the 18 day deployment, this network recorded nearly 2000 earthquakes, almost exclusively M<5 
events within about 100 km of all stations. 
 
Approximately 300 aftershocks have been located to date. The distribution of epicenters suggests 
a nearly east-west fault plane ~40-50 km in length. The depth distribution of aftershocks suggests 
a south dipping fault plane of 20-30 km down-dip length. These earthquakes are unusually deep 
with depths ranging from 5 to 35 km. 
 
We infer a velocity model from the arrival time curve for both P- and S-waves. The model with 
significant station corrections is currently used in location. Verification of the model through 
waveform modeling is just beginning. 
 
First motion focal mechanisms have been generated. No preferred orientation is observed for 
aftershock focal mechanisms.  
 
We are testing several options for determining earthquake size. At this point S-wave amplitude 
and RMS values averaged over the network are used to suggest relative size. We are attempting 
to use waveform modeling to determine Mw for the aftershocks. 
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Chapter 4:  Liquefaction Features 
 
by 
 
Martitia P. Tuttle1 
M. Tuttle & Associates 
 
1. Abstract 
 
The Mw 7.7 Republic Day earthquake in the Kachchh region of northwestern India induced 
liquefaction and related ground failures over an area >15,000 km2 and possibly up to 250 to 300 
km from its epicenter.  Surface manifestations of liquefaction include sand blows, sand-blow 
craters, and lateral spreading.  Lateral spreading was responsible for significant damage to water 
wells and pipelines in the epicentral area as well as to port facilities along the Gulf of Kachchh.  
In general, liquefaction features induced by the Republic Day earthquake are smaller than those 
produced by the 1811-1812 New Madrid earthquakes, which may be due to differences in ground 
motion and site conditions.  Much remains to be learned from the Republic Day earthquake that 
would contribute to our understanding of earthquake hazards in intraplate settings, prediction of 
liquefaction and ground failure potential, and use of liquefaction features in paleoseismology. 
 
2. Introduction 
 
The Kachchh region of northwestern India was the location of a major earthquake in 1819.  The 
1819 event, known as the Kachchh earthquake, is one of the larger events to occur in an intraplate 
setting and produced widespread liquefaction (MacMurdo, 1824; Oldham, 1926; Johnston and 
Kanter, 1990).  The recent Republic Day earthquake of moment magnitude, Mw, 7.7 also 
occurred in the Kachchh region.  Aerial reconnaissance conducted soon after the event (Lettis and 
Hengesh, 2001), followed by a field survey and evaluation of satellite imagery conducted by the 
Mid-America Earthquake Center, has found evidence for liquefaction over an area >15,000 km2 
including parts of the Banni Plain, Great Rann, Little Rann, and Gulf of Kachchh (Figure 4-1).  
 
The Rann of Kachchh and Banni Plain are low-lying areas underlain by a Holocene sedimentary 
sequence of sand, silt, and clay related to deltaic and estuarine deposition into an arm of the 
Arabian Sea (Malik et al., 1999).  Today the Rann is flooded during the monsoon as the result of 
runoff from several large rivers as well as inundation by the Arabian Sea driven up the tidal 
estuaries of Kori Creek and the Gulf of Kachchh by strong onshore winds (Gupta, 1975).  During 
the dry season, the surface of the Rann becomes encrusted with salt from evaporation of esturine 
brine. The Gulf of Kachchh is a present-day arm of the Arabian Sea and is characterized by 
extensive mudflats and salt pans along its margins. 
 
According to many residents in the Kachchh region, fountains of water ranging from 1 to 2 m in 
height formed during and immediately following the earthquake.   So much water vented to the 
surface in the Banni Plain and Great Rann that temporary streams of water flowed in previously 
dry channels.  These streams, as well as the larger sand blows, are clearly visible on satellite 
imagery taken after the earthquake (Figure 4-2).  Satellite imagery also suggests that liquefaction 
occurred near Naliya and Lakhpat along the coast about 180 km west of the epicenter.  In 
addition, there are reports of ground failure indicative of liquefaction as far away as Ahmadabad, 
250 km east of the earthquake epicenter, and even near Hyderabad, Pakistan, about 300 km 
northwest of the epicenter.   
                                                          
1 MT, 128 Tibbetts Lane, Georgetown, MD 04548 
email: mptuttle@eros.com 
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Figure 4-1:  Map of the Gujarat region showing locations of documented liquefaction features relative to epicenter of January 26, 2001 earthquake 
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Figure 4-2:  Satellite image (Thematic Mapper 7, RGB composite) of area of inset map shown  
in Figure 4-1.  Temporary streams of vented water are purple in color and especially obvious 
along southern edge of Great Rann.  Sand blow deposits are gray in color and often associated 
with temporary streams 
 
There is considerable interest in the Republic Day earthquake as a modern analogue for the New 
Madrid earthquakes in the central United States.  Like the very large 1811-1812 New Madrid 
earthquakes (e.g., Fuller, 1912; Kelson et al., 1996) and 1819 Kachchh earthquake (e.g., Oldham, 
1926; Rajendran and Rajendran, 2001), the Republic Day earthquake induced widespread 
liquefaction, but apparently did not produce surface rupture.  The New Madrid and Katchchh 
regions are underlain by rift basins that are currently under compressional stress.  Both regions 
occur at more than 200 km from an active plate boundary and in stable continental crust 
characterized by low attenuation of ground motions (Johnston and Kanter, 1900).   
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The Republic Day earthquake offers a rare opportunity to study liquefaction and related ground 
failures generated by a large intraplate earthquake whose location and magnitude are well-known.  
This paper summarizes the results of a post-earthquake survey sponsored by the Mid-America 
Earthquake Center of liquefaction features and related ground failures in the Kachchh region. 
 
3. Liquefaction Features in the Meizoseismal Area 
 
During the post-earthquake survey, sand blows, sand-blow craters, and lateral spreads were 
documented in the epicentral area of the Republic Day earthquake, in the Banni Plain north of 
Bhuj, in the Great Rann of Kachchh near Gangta Bet and Khadir, near the Allah Bund and 
Pakistan Border, in the Little Rann near Suraj Bari, and along the Gulf of Kachchh near Kandla 
(Figure 4-1).  The goal of the survey was to characterize the range in type, size, and orientation of 
liquefaction-related features in the meizoseismal area.  The liquefaction survey was by no means 
comprehensive.  However, an attempt was made to document liquefaction sites along N-S and E-
W transects roughly perpendicular to and along the strike of the fault inferred from the focal 
mechanism of the mainshock and distribution of the aftershocks.  For each site, the geomorphic 
setting was noted and liquefaction features measured including the length, width, orientations, 
and thickness (measured near vents) of sand blows; the length, width, orientations, and depth of 
sand-blow craters; and length, width, and amount and bearing of horizontal and/or vertical 
displacement of lateral spreads (Figure 4-3; Appendix).  Several examples are described below. 
 
Sand Blows 
 
Sand blows, or constructional cones of predominantly sand vented to the ground surface through 
ground fissures, are the most common liquefaction features observed in the meizoseismal area.  
The sand blows in the Kachchh region range from 10s of centimeters to 10s of meters in length 
and up to a couple of decimeters in thickness.   Review of satellite images suggests that a few 
sand blows larger than those documented during the field survey occur north of the epicenter in 
the Great Rann. 
 
Along the boundary between the Banni Plain and the Great Rann, where temporary streams 
flowed during and immediately following the earthquake, many moderate-size sand blows formed 
(Figure 4-3).  For example, about 20 km north of the epicenter, sand blow deposits are abundant 
along a 70 m-wide zone that water had occupied after the earthquake and was still wet a month 
after the earthquake.  Sand blows in this area range up to 60 m in length, 12 m in width, and 14 
cm in thickness (Figure 4-4). 
 
Farther north in the Great Rann, near Gangta Bet and Khadir Island, sand blows are considerably 
smaller (Figure 4-3).  For example, 50 km north-northwest of the epicenter and just a few 
kilometers southwest of Khadir Island, sand and silt blows range up to 13 m in length, 12 m in 
width, and 5 cm in thickness (Figure 4-5).  The sand and silt blows documented in this area occur 
close to the northernmost surface projection of the seismogenic fault inferred from mainshock 
and aftershock data and are likely to occur on the footwall of the fault.  
 
South of the Banni Plain in the Rocky Mainland, small sand blows, on the order of 2 to 4 m in 
length, occur in association with lateral spreads within 20 km of the epicenter and along river 
channels at greater distances (Figure 4-3).  Sand blows within lateral spreads typically formed 
along fissures oriented parallel to head-scarp grabens and roughly perpendicular to the downslope 
direction (Figure 4-6). 
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Figure 4-3:  Locations of documented liquefaction features and other deformation structures 
superimposed on satellite image of area of inset map shown in Figure 4-1.  Size and orientation of 
sand blows and sand-blow craters as well as direction of lateral spreading are indicated 
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Figure 4-4: Moderate-size sand blow in Great Rann northwest of Chobari  
 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Silt blow in Great Rann southwest of Khadir Island.  Recent deposition of  
salt marks area covered by vented water following the earthquake  
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Figure 4-6:  Small sand blows within lateral spread at near Budharmora about 14 km  
from earthquake epicenter.  Camera lens for scale  
 
 
 
Figure 4-7:  Sand blow, 12 m long, 7 m wide, and 14 cm thick, that formed in mud flats  
used for salt production near Kandla.  Multiple vents are aligned along ground fissure  
through which water and sand vented.  Lens cap for scale   
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About 50 km south of the epicenter, many small to moderate-size sand blows formed in the 
mudflats and salt pans along the northern margin of the Gulf of Kachchh (Figure 4-7).  The 
largest sand blow documented near Kandla is 15 m long, 10 m wide, and 20 cm thick.  Many of 
the sand blows in this area had similar orientations between N20°E to N50°E, subparallel to the 
axis of the Gulf of Kachchh.  The formation of the sand blows may be related to extension 
perpendicular to the Gulf.  Other sand blows at Kandla Port clearly formed in association with 
lateral spreads.  
 
Sand-Blow Craters 
 
Like sand blows, sand-blow craters are characterized by constructional sand aprons.  Unlike sand 
blows, they have large central craters formed by the removal of surface soil and sediment.  Sand-
blow craters are not as common as sand blows and only a few sand-blow craters have been 
documented in the meizoseismal area so far.  Their sand aprons are similar in size to those of 
sand blows and their central craters range from about 1.5 m to 10 m across.  The largest sand-
blow crater documented is located near Umedpur about 45 km west-northwest of the epicenter 
(Figure 4-8).  The central crater, which was still filled with water a month after the earthquake, is 
10 m by 5 m in plan view.  The vented sand deposit is 33 m long, 32 m wide, and 26 cm thick 
(Figure 4-9).  
 
Also at the Umedpur site, two unusual craters formed that are 2.4 m by 1.8 m and 1.6 m by 1.5 m 
in plan view and about 1.4 m deep (Figure 4-10).  The craters walls are dry and irregular and did 
not appear to have formed by or been filled with water (Figure 4-10).  A round hole dipping at 
about a 45° angle towards the east occurs near the base of one of the craters.  The ground surface 
adjacent to the craters is broken and a field of ejected clasts extends 26 m towards the west. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8:  Large sand-blow crater near Umedpur.  Channels incised in sand apron filled  
with late phase deposition of silty clay.  Back pack for scale  
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Figure 4-9:  Excavation of vented sand deposit adjacent to large crater at Umedpur.   
Deposit is composed of medium to coarse sand containing small clasts of clay  
overlain by interbedded coarse, medium, and fine sand.  Hand trough for scale  
 
 
 
Figure 4-10:  Unusual craters and broken ground at Umedpur site.  Craters may have  
formed by some mechanism other than venting of water from liquefied deposit below   
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A silty clay deposit, interpreted as a distal portion or late phase of the vented deposit associated 
with nearby sand blows, was broken by the dry craters.  In addition, the ejected clasts formed 
impact craters in the silty clay.  A thin layer of silty clay was also deposited over the clasts.  
These observations suggest that the craters formed after liquefaction and venting of subsurface 
sediment but while silty water was still ponded on the surface.  The mechanism of formation of 
these unusual features is uncertain at this time.  One hypothesis is that natural gas in a reservoir at 
depth was released during the earthquake.  This would be similar to the release of gas along 
fractures associated with the Clarendon-Linden fault in western New York State triggered by the 
1988 Saguenay, Quebec, earthquake (Jacobi and Fountain, 1993). 
 
Lateral Spreads 
 
Lateral spreading occurred on gentle slopes (1 to 2°) in the epicentral area and along rivers and 
bays at greater distances.  In the epicentral area, lateral spreading was responsible for damage to 
many water wells and pipelines.  One such example occurs near the village of Budharmora.   At 
the site, there is a disturbed area 140 m across and at least 400 long that trends N70 to 85°W.  The 
pre-event ground surface slopes about 1° towards the north.  A water pipe, that is roughly parallel 
to the downslope direction, is broken and displaced in several places.  In the upslope portion of 
the disturbed area, ground deformation includes 0.35-m and 1-m wide grabens, extensional cracks 
and back-rotated blocks, and sand blows up to 3.5 m long, 50 cm wide, and 4 cm (Figures 4-11 
and 4-12).  The water pipe is broken and separated laterally in a N30 to 35°E direction across the 
two grabens.  In contrast, sseveral uplifted linear features and related cracks occur in the 
downslope portion of the disturbed area.  Here, the water pipe is broken and overlapping both 
laterally and vertically by at least 0.8 m.  The disturbed area is clearly a lateral spread with 
extensional features at the head scarp and compressional features at the toe of the failure.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-11:  Graben in upslope portion of lateral spread near Budharmora.  Water  
pipe, exposed in base of graben, broken and displaced by 1 m  
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Figure 4-12:  Small sand blows in upslope portion of lateral spread at Budharmora.  
Local residents described 1-m-high water spouts issuing from ground fissures  
immediately following earthquake 
   
 
 
Figure 4-13:  House within graben south of Manfara titled as result of ground failure 
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In the epicentral area, there are numerous ground fissures and associated grabens that are 
associated with liquefaction features.  This sort of ground deformation may be related to lateral 
spreading.  For example, a 12-m-wide zone of N80°E oriented fissures and intervening conjugate 
cracks occurs south of the village of Manfara.  The ground surface, which slopes about 1° toward 
the north-northwest, is displaced downward by 10-15 cm on the north side of the fissures and 
cracks within the zone, forming a stepped graben (Figure 4-13). According to local residents, 
water and sand had vented in the field south of the zone.  Small sand blows are still present there.  
A trench excavated across the zone revealed sand dikes filling the fissures and cracks below the 
surface.  Liquefaction clearly was involved in ground failure at this site.  However, the 
orientations of the fissures and cracks suggest that roughly N-S oriented compressive stress may 
have played a role in the ground failure. Lettis and Hengesh (2001) attributed an east-northeast 
trending zone of ground cracks, bulges, and associated sand blows in the epicentral area to lateral 
spreading, possibly resulting from coseismic warping on the north flank of the Bauchau anticline. 
 
4. Discussion of Observations  
 
There is considerable variability in the size of sand blows across the meizoseismal area (Figure 4-
3).  However, sand blows at similar distances may be larger on the hanging wall side of the fault 
than on the footwall.  For example, sand blows near Kandla and Lodai, on the hanging wall, are 
larger than sand blows near Khadir and Gangta Bet, presumably on the footwall.  Could this 
apparent size difference be an artifact of sampling?  Additional data is needed to test this 
possibility.  If the characterization holds up with additional data, the question arises whether the 
size distribution of liquefaction features is related to ground motions or to liquefaction 
susceptibility of subsurface deposits.   
 
The relatively large size of liquefaction features located west-northwest of the epicenter is 
intriguing (Figure 4-3).  These large features include the sand blow-crater and dry craters at the 
Umedpur site described above.  The large liquefaction features appear to occur in the fan-delta 
plains of the Kaswali and Pur Rivers.  Deltaic deposits are thought to be especially susceptible to 
liquefaction (Youd and Perkins, 1987).  Could the size of the features be related to the 
characteristics of the deposits that liquefied?  In addition, the large features occur along the trend 
of one of the nodal planes of the mainshock focal mechanism.  Could directivity of seismic waves 
have played a role in liquefaction in this area? 
 
In general, sand blows appear to decrease in size with epicentral distance.  For example, sand 
blows near Khadir are smaller than sand blows near Chobari and sand blows near the Pakistan 
border are smaller than the sand blows near Khadir (Appendix).  Even less data is available for 
sand-blow craters, however, the largest one, 10 m by 5 m, is at Umedpur; whereas, sand blow 
craters near the Pakistan Border are the order of 4 m in diameter.  Does the size of liquefaction 
features decrease in some fashion with epicentral or fault distance? Under what conditions do 
sand-blow craters form?  What determines the size of the crater?   
 
Only a few examples of lateral spreading and ground fissuring have been studied so far.  In these 
cases, surface topography appears to have played an important role in their formation.  However, 
conjugate cracks within zones of fissuring suggest that compressive force also may have 
influenced ground failure.  Can orientations of sand dikes be used to make inferences regarding 
ground motions?  In the geologic record, how would one differentiate sand dikes that formed as 
the result of gravity driven slope failures and those that reflect ground failure resulting from 
dynamic stress? 
 
 31 
 
Liquefaction features have been verified in the field up to 150 km from the epicenter and there 
are reports of liquefaction 250 km, and possibly 300 km, from the epicenter.  The maximum 
distance of liquefaction features induced by the Mw 7.7 Republic Day earthquake serves to 
calibrate magnitude-distance relations (Ambraseys, 1988), liquefaction severity index (Youd and 
Perkins, 1987), and other relations for intraplate earthquakes (Figure 4-14).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-14:  Relation between earthquake magnitude and maximum epicentral distance to 
surface manifestation of liquefaction (Ambraseys, 1988) shown with distances to documented and 
reported sites of liqufaction 
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5. Comparison of Kachchh and New Madrid Liquefaction Features 
 
In general, the liquefaction features in the Kachchh region appear to be smaller than features in 
the New Madrid region.  Most of the Kachchh sand blows are less than 60 m long, 10 m wide, 
and 15 cm thick.  In contrast, sand blows in the New Madrid region that formed during the 1811-
1812 earthquakes are commonly 100 m long, 30 m wide, and 0.5 to 1 m thick (Tuttle and 
Barstow, 1996).  The New Madrid sand blows are unusually thick because they are compound 
structures composed of multiple sedimentary units related to several earthquakes (Saucier, 1989; 
Tuttle, 1999).  Nevertheless, individual units often range from 30-60 cm in thickness.  Feeder 
dikes of the Kachchh sand blows are typically 0.2 to 10 cm wide, occasionally ranging up to 25 
cm.  There are likely to be a few sand dikes on the order of 1 m in width related to lateral 
spreading in the epicentral area.  In contrast, feeder dikes of New Madrid sand blows are 
commonly 0.5 to 2 m wide and can range up to 10 m.  During the Kachchh earthquake, a number 
of sand-blow craters formed.  Sand-blow craters such as these are not common in the New 
Madrid region but did form during the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina, earthquake of Mw 7.3 
(Dutton, 1890).  The Kachchh and Charleston regions both occur in the coastal zone. Perhaps the 
similarity in environments of deposition and resulting subsurface geology contributes to the 
formation of sand-blow craters during the venting of water from liquefied subsurface deposits. 
 
Little is known about the liquefaction susceptibility of the subsurface sediments in the Kachchh 
region.  However, Holocene river channel, alluvial fan and plain, delta and fan-delta, and esturine 
deposits like those in the Kachchh region are thought to have a moderate to high likelihood of 
liquefaction during strong ground shaking (Youd and Perkins, 1978).  The water table, which 
affects liquefaction susceptibility of cohesionless sediment, is close to the surface of the mudflats 
of the Gulf of Kachchh, the Rann, and the Banni Plain, which occur at and slightly above sea 
level.   
 
The New Madrid region occurs in the northern part of the Mississippi embayment.  Late 
Quaternary sediments in the embayment are 30 to 60 m thick and are predominately Wisconsin 
valley train and Holocene meander belt deposits of the Mississippi, St. Francis, and White Rivers 
(e.g., Saucier, 1994).  In general, fluvial channel deposits of this age are thought to be have a low 
to high likelihood of liquefaction; whereas flood plain deposits have a low to moderate 
liquefaction susceptibility (Youd and Perkins, 1978).  In the New Madrid region, this is supported 
by borehole data collected for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the purpose of drainage 
ditch design (Saucier, 1977; Obermeier, 1989) and by recent geotechnical investigations at sites 
of earthquake-induced liquefaction (Schneider et al., 1999).  Prior to drainage of the Mississippi 
embayment during the 20th century, the water table was close to the ground surface much of the 
year.   
 
In general, sediments in low-lying areas of the Kachchh region are probably more susceptible to 
liquefaction than sediments in the New Madrid region.  Why then are sedimentary units 
attributable to one earthquake in New Madrid larger than sand blows resulting from the Republic 
Day earthquake?  One possibility is the relative magnitude of the events.  Although their 
magnitudes are still debated, the three largest earthquakes in the New Madrid sequence of 1811-
1812 have been estimated to be of Mw 8.1 + 0.31, Mw 7.8 + 0.33, and Mw 8.0 + 0.33 (Johnston, 
1996).  If these estimates are correct, the New Madrid earthquakes were larger than the Republic 
Day earthquake, and therefore, may have led to more intense liquefaction.  Another possibility is 
the character of the deposits that liquefied.  Fluvial deposits in the New Madrid region are 
characterized by thick (>20 m) units of channel sands overlain by silty and clayey overbank 
deposits (e.g., Saucier, 1994).  In the Kachchh region, there may be more vertical and lateral 
variability of sandy units due to interfingering of marine, deltaic, esturine, and alluvial deposits.  
 33 
 
A comparison of liquefaction induced by the Kachchh and New Madrid earthquakes would 
benefit from mapping of geologic deposits and geotechnical testing of liquefaction sites. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The Mw 7.7 Republic Day earthquake produced liquefaction and related ground failures in 
Holocene alluvial, esturine, and deltaic deposits from at least the Pakistan Border on the north to 
the Gulf of Kachchh on the south and from the Little Rann on the east to possibly Kori Creek on 
the west (Figure 4-1).  Accounts of liquefaction near Ahmadabad and Hyderabad, Pakistan, 
suggest that there may be more distant sites of liquefaction.  Surface manifestations of 
liquefaction in the meizoseismal area of the earthquake include sand blows, sand-blow craters, 
and lateral spreading.  The latter, with displacements of >1 m, was responsible for significant 
damage to water wells and pipelines in the epicentral area and to port and other coastal facilities 
along the Gulf of Kachchh. 
 
The Republic Day earthquake offers a unique opportunity to study a very large earthquake in an 
intraplate setting that induced liquefaction but apparently did not produce surface rupture.  This 
event underscores the potential usefulness of liquefaction features in paleoseismology. Only a 
relatively small amount of data pertaining to liquefaction resulting from the Republic Day 
earthquake has been collected to date.  Nevertheless, initial observations regarding the size, 
orientation, and spatial distribution of liquefaction-related features suggest certain trends and 
raise a number of questions worthy of additional research.  Additional study of the Republic Day 
earthquake could provide valuable insights relevant to the assessment of liquefaction and ground 
failure potential and the interpretation of paleoliquefaction feature in the New Madrid seismic 
zone, the Kachchh region, and elsewhere around the world.   
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8. Appendix 
 
Liquefaction features and deformation structures related to  
the Republic Day earthquake. 
 
Site Name Latitude N 
(degrees) 
 
Longitude E 
(degrees) 
Type of 
Deformation 
Structure 
Length, Width, 
Amount of 
Displacement2 (m) 
Length,Width, 
Thickness  
or Depth3 (m) 
Structural 
Trend or 
Slip 
Direction4  
Geomorphic 
Setting 
Bachasar 
Reservoir 
23.53881 70.36751 Slump >30, >10, ~ 1H  ~W Banni Plain 
Baniari 
North 
23.42578 70.15440 Sand blows  25.2, 7.5, 0.06 N55°E Banni Plain 
Baniari 23.40771 70.15693 Sand blows  14, 0.84, 0.03  
11, 2, 0.06 
N50°W 
N65°E 
Great Rann/ 
Banni Plain 
Baniari 
Village 
23.40130 70.16465 Sand blows  15.2, 3, 0.08 N46°W Banni Plain 
Bharodia 23.57308 70.41320 Flexure 61, 23, 0.72 V   N30°W Banni Plain 
Budhar-
mora 
23.34291 70.19341 Lateral spread5 
Sand blows 
>400, 142, 1.35 H  
3.5, 0.5, 0.04 
N30-35°E 
N70-85°W 
Mainland 
Chobari; 
NW 
23.53676 70.29948 Fissure/graben 
Sand blows 
>100, 18.6, 0.1 V  
2.84, 1.36, 0.06 
N40°W 
N80°W 
Chang River 
Alluvial Plain 
Chobari; 
Monya-
wadi 1 
23.54176 70.34196 Fissure/graben >100, 11, 0.12 V  N20°E to 
N65°W to 
N89°W 
Chang River 
Alluvial Plain 
Chobari; 
Monya-
wadi 2 
23.57675 70.32486 Sand blows  24, 12, 0.14 N80°E Great Rann/ 
Banni Plain 
Chobari; 
Monya-
wadi 3 
23.57933 70.32578 Sand blows  60, 10, 0.13 
 
21, 8, 0.08 
 
N75°E to 
N85°W 
N60°E to 
N82°W 
Great Rann/ 
Banni Plain 
Dhrang 23.42296 69.86001 Sand blows  15, 12, 0.06 
4, 1.6, 0.03 
N65°E 
N30°E 
Banni Plain 
Gangta  
Bet 1 
23.72565 70.52915 Sand blows  10.5, 8.5, 0.03 N38-40°E  Great Rann 
Gangta  
Bet 2 
23.72041 70.54420 Sand blows  0.9, 0.7, 0.03 
0.35, 0.3, <0.03 
 
N2°E 
Great Rann 
Kandla 
Port 1 
23.02040 70.20001 Sand blows  0.9, 0.5, 0.02 N20°E Mud Flats 
Kandla 
Port 2 
23.01050 70.21160 Sand blows  15, 10, 0.2 N20-50°E Mud Flats 
Kandla- 
Subash 
Gate 
23.00796 70.22268 Lateral spread 
Sand blows 
>60, >40, 0.19 H  
20, 0.7, disturb 
~E 
N20°E to 
N40°W 
Mud Flats 
Kandla-
Salt Pans 
22.99433 70.16366 Sand blows  
 
11.5, 7.2, 0.14 
7, 6, 0.12 
N88°W 
N35°E 
Mud Flats 
Khadir 1 23.84143 70.18808 Sand blows  13.2, 11.6, 0.03 
1.4, 1.3, <0.03 
 
N-S 
Great Rann 
Khadir 2 23.84153 70.20143 Sand blows  11.6, 5, 0.05 
3, 3, <0.05 
 Great Rann 
Khadir 3 23.85141 70.23915 Sand blows  6, 6, <0.05  Great Rann 
Khadir 4 23.91048 70.53328 Sand blows  4, 2, <0.05  Great Rann 
Khavda 1 23.49433 69.66133 Sand blows  18, 12, 0.20 N20°E Banni Plain 
Khavda 2 23.51166 69.66233 Sand blows  47, 25, 0.08 N30°E Banni Plain 
Khavda 3 24.06667 69.71667 Crater  4.1, NA, 1.2  Allah Bund 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 H = horizontal displacement; V = vertical displacement 
3 Depths are for craters 
4 Slip directions are for mass movements 
5 Also interpreted as a lateral spread by Seeber et al., 2001 
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Appendix Continued. 
 
Site Name Latitude N 
(degrees) 
 
Longitude E 
(degrees) 
Type of 
Deformation 
Structure 
Length, Width, 
Amount of 
Displacement (m) 
Length, Width, 
Thickness  
or Depth (m) 
Structural 
Trend or 
Slip 
Direction 
Geomorphic 
Setting 
Kharoi 23.46510 70.38015 Tear fault; 6 
right-lateral 
 0.16 H  
0.15 V 
N30°W Chang River 
Alluvial Plain 
Lodai 1 23.40998 69.93911 Sand blows  7, 5.5, 0.07  N22°E Banni Plain 
Lodai 2 23.40333 69.94666 Sand blows  106, 8, NA7 ~E-W Banni Plain 
Lodai 3 23.40233 69.94276 Sand blows; 
alluvial fan 
 11.5, 4, 0.1 N54°E Banni Plain 
Manfara 23.47591 70.35325 Fissure/graben 
Sand blows 
>120, 12, 0.15 V  
0.5, 0.4, <0.05 
N60-80°E 
 
Chang River 
Alluvial Plain 
Rudra 
Mata 
Bridge 
23.35795 69.69386 Lateral spread 
Sand blows 
 
350, >40, 0.8 V  
2.5, 2.3, 0.08 
 
N25°E 
N15°E 
Reservoir on 
Pur River 
Suraj  
Bari 1 
23.20000 70.73333 Sand blows    Little Rann 
Suraj  
Bari 2 
23.28333 70.00500 Sand blows    Little Rann 
Suraj  
Bari 3 
23.24000 70.76000 Lateral spread   SW Little Rann 
Umedpur 23.48716 69.91600 Sand blows 
 
 
Crater 
Dry craters 
 33, 32, 0.26 
18.5, 8, 0.11 
14.5, 11.5, NA 
10, 5, NA 
2.4, 1.8, ~1.4 
1.6, 1.5, ~1.0 
N85°W 
N5°W 
 
N85°W 
Banni 
Plain/Rann 
Vigakot 1 24.14683 69.29616 Lateral spread 
Sand blows 
200, NA, 0.05 V  
1.6, 0.8, 0.2 
W 
N20°E 
Allah Bund 
Vigakot 2 24.27483 69.33316 Sand blows 
Craters 
 1.5, 0.4, 0.15 
4.5, 3.2, NA 
3, 2.5, NA 
NA Great Rann 
Vigakot 3 24.27166 69.34250 Sand blows 
Craters 
 2, 1.2, 0.06 
1.6, 1.39, 2 
N-S 
N80°E 
Great Rann 
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Chapter 5: Geotechnical Observations 
 
by 
 
Scott L. Deaton1 (Graduate Research Assistant) and J. David Frost2 (Associate Professor) 
School of Civil Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Geotechnical features including lateral spreading, sand blows, settlement and ground cracking were 
widely distributed in the free field after the earthquake.  Conversely in towns or villages, geotechnical 
related foundation failures were not commonly observed.  Typically residential and commercial 
structures in these population centers were poorly engineered and failed due to structural 
inadequacies.  However, port facilities, dams and a number of bridge components, showed significant 
damage due to geotechnical related failures.  Not withstanding the type and extent of damage 
observed, the consequences of the poor performance was, in many cases, not as significant as it might 
have been since the period of drought prior to the earthquake resulted in smaller hydraulic forces on 
many of these structures.  An overview of the geotechnical failures is included herein.     
 
2. Lateral Spreading 
 
A typical lateral spread observed near the Varahi Village is depicted in Figure 5-1.  Similar lateral 
spreads were observed adjacent to small stream channels and other gently sloping areas throughout 
the region (Figure 5-2).  However, minimal damage to manmade structures occurred due to their rural 
location.    
 
 
Figure 5-1:  Lateral spreading near Varahi Village (N23.6373, E71.4306) 
                                                 
1 SLD, 790 Atlantic Dr., Atlanta, GA 30332-0355 
email:  scottdeaton@yahoo.com 
2 JDF, 790 Atlantic Dr., Atlanta, GA 30332-0355 
email: david.frost@ce.gatech.edu 
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Figure 5-2:  Location of lateral spreads visited in earthquake zone 
 
3. Sand Blows 
 
Of the geotechnical features observed after the earthquake, sand blows observed at large distances 
from the epicenter had the most significant relevance on related studies for the mid-America region.  
Sand blows similar to that shown in Figure 5-3 were prevalent at distances up to 135 kilometers from 
the epicenter.  Locals reported water sprayed into the air up to 2 meters from sand blows in this area.  
In contrast, geotechnical related damage at this distance was non-existent and structural damage at 
this distance was very isolated.  Closer to the epicenter, very large sand blows up to a meter in 
diameter were observed as depicted in Figure 5-4. 
 
The region where many of the sand blows were observed is primarily agricultural and is located 
directly adjacent to the Little Rann of Kachchh or desert.  The extent of the sand blows in this region 
was too widespread to perform a complete mapping unless it could have been performed from the air.  
However, due to the regions close proximity to Pakistan, such an alternative was not available  
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because of the imposed “no-fly” zone.  Several sand blow locations were visited and are illustrated as 
yellow circles in Figure 5-5. 
 
Throughout this region the sand blows were typically linear features.  They ran parallel and tended to 
step laterally by as much as 10 meters.  Typically, there was no evident vertical or horizontal 
displacement for these features and there was no predominant directionality evident either.  The lack 
of directionality led us to hypothesize that the ground cracking and sand blows were attributed to 
regional subsidence or settlement of the basin.  Other examples of regional subsidence were observed 
in the Great Rann of Kachchh exhibited by extensive ground cracking with and without sand ejection 
and no consistent directionality. 
 
In this region the brackish groundwater table is located approximately 8 meters below ground surface.  
As water expelled from the blows evaporated, white salt residue was left behind, which permitted the 
identification of sand blows over large distances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3:  Linear sand blows 135 km from 
epicenter (N23.7345, E71.4278) 
 
Salt               Sand 
Figure 5-4:  Large sand blows in dry river bed 
south of Chang Dam (N23.45530, E70.43787) 
(Photo Courtesy of J.P. Bardet) 
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Figure 5-5:  Location of sand blows visited in earthquake zone 
 
4. Ground Rupture 
 
Ground rupture was also evident throughout the earthquake region.  Significant cracking was evident 
at distances up to 135 kilometers from the epicenter as depicted in Figure 5-6.  Concentrations of 
parallel ground cracks were evident in the Rann of Kachchh over distances of several hundred meters.  
These cracks originated in the vegetated area depicted in Figure 5-7 and extended out into the desert 
in multiple locations.  There was no evident directionality associated with any ground cracks 
observed as they changed directions what appeared to be randomly at multiple locations. Many cracks 
were offset vertically, with the offsets varying from 0-15 cm in this region.   
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Figure 5-6:  Location of ground rupture visited in earthquake zone 
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Figure 5-7:  Parallel ground cracking in the Rann of 
Kachchh (N23.3997, E70.2275) 
 
 
Figure 5-8:  Settlement of backfill surrounding natural 
gas pipeline (N23.6220, E71.0472) 
 
5. Settlement 
 
Significant settlement of the backfill above a natural gas pipeline was observed over many kilometers 
in a stretch of desert between the Little Rann of Kachchh and the Great Rann of Kachchh as shown in 
Figure 5-8.  It was evident the contractor simply backfilled the soil without compacting it after the 
pipeline had been placed.  The extent of settlement was between 20 and 30 cm.  In Figure 5-9 the 
settlement of the pipeline backfill is depicted.  The white residue is the remnants of brackish 
groundwater that surfaced at the time of the earthquake, indicating liquefaction may have occurred.  
The ground in the immediate vicinity of the pipeline was very soft also indicating the large quantity 
of water still present in the soil 18 days after the earthquake.  As mentioned previously, the depth to 
the brackish groundwater was reported throughout this region as approximately 8 meters.   
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Figure 5-9:  Location of pipeline settlement in earthquake zone  
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6. Dam Failures 
 
This region of Gujarat contains approximately 180 dams. At the time of the earthquake, the region 
was experiencing a severe drought and consequently the dams were retaining minimal amounts of 
water.  Typically, the dams are used to retain water and decrease the flooding during the monsoon or 
rainy season, which lasts several months beginning in July.  Even though the dams were at low pool 
states, there were numerous large dam failures throughout the region.  The most significant dam 
failures visited were Shivlakha, Chang, Fategadh, Kaswati, Rudramata, Suvi and Tapar.  The 
locations of these dams are shown in Figure 5-10 and a detailed description of the Shivlakha dam 
failure follows.  The performance of the other dams was remarkably similar.  
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Figure 5-10:  Location of dams visited in earthquake zone 
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Shivlakha Dam 
 
Shivlakha Dam slumped significantly in the upstream direction.  Extensive cracking was observed on 
the upstream face depicted in Figure 5-11.  Longitudinal cracking was evident at the crest as well as 
on the downstream slope.  A large toe bulge occurred at the upstream toe as a result of the rotational 
nature of the upstream slope stability failure (Figure 5-12).  The scarp on the upstream crest was 
approximately 3 meters in both vertical and horizontal directions as seen in Figure 5-13.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11:  Upstream slope failure at Shivlakha Dam (N23.3467, E70.6406) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12:  Toe bulge along upstream slope of Shivlakha Dam (N23.3467, E70.6406) 
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Figure 5-13:  Scarp at crest of Shivlakha Dam (N23.3467, E70.6406) 
 
7. Bridge Damage 
Damage to bridges ranged from abutment settlement and lateral spreading to lateral displacement of 
piers.   The location of the significant bridge damage is illustrated in Figure 5-14.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-14:   
Location of  
bridges visited in  
earthquake zone 
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Highway 8A Bridge 
A four-span, two lane reinforced concrete bridge on Highway 8A that was under construction at the time 
of the earthquake was severely damaged. Significant damage occurred at the east abutment to the support 
bent and wing walls as depicted in Figure 5-15.  This could be attributed to possible liquefaction near the 
abutment that resulted in overturning failure of the abutment.  A similar mechanism occurred at the first 
pier where rotation resulted also depicted in Figure 5-15.  The combination of these movements resulted 
in a span shortening of approximately 46 cm for the easternmost span.  Measurements indicated the 
eastern span had the most lateral movement as the second and third spans shortened by approximately 8 
and 10 centimeters, respectively.   
Figure 5-15:  Damage to Highway 8A bridge east abutment and first pier (N23.3039, E70.4203) 
 
Surajbari Bridges 
 
The Surajbari bridges are located across a tidal flat and provide a critical link from central India to the 
Gujarat region.  There are two vehicular bridges and one rail bridge at this crossing.  The length of these 
bridges is approximately 1300 meters.   
 
The new vehicular bridge was still under construction at the time of the earthquake and it sustained 
mostly structural damage.  However, the access road embankments and the abutment settled as much as 
70 cm (Figure 5-16).  Longitudinal cracking up to 1 meter wide was also noted on these access roads.  
Sand blows were observed throughout the tidal flats indicating significant liquefaction in the area as well.   
 
The old vehicular bridge had two predominant types of geotechnical related damage.  Significant tilting 
and/or lateral displacement of bridge piers occurred along its length.  A lateral offset in the guardrail 
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indicated that the bridge had shifted approximately 1 meter laterally after the earthquake as shown in 
Figure 5-17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-16:  
Settlement of 
abutment on new 
Surajbari Bridge 
(N23.19143, 
E70.71940)  
(photo courtesy of 
J.P. Bardet) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17:  One-
meter lateral offset of 
old Surajbari Bridge 
(N23.19461, 
E70.71702)  
(photo courtesy of 
J.P. Bardet) 
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8. Port Damage 
 
The ports in the Gujarat region suffered moderate to significant damage during the event.  Lateral 
spreading, settlement and sand blows were common causes of features observed at these ports.  The 
locations of the damaged ports are illustrated in Figure 5-18.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15-8:  Location of port facilities visited in earthquake zone 
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Kandla Port 
 
The Kandla Port was nominally damaged during the earthquake.  The tower of the port tilted due to 
lateral spreading along the waterfront.  The free-field portions of the port tended to settle uniformly with 
occasional sand blows and evidence of lateral spreading.  The most significant geotechnical damage was 
to most of the 2500 hollow reinforced concrete piles supporting a jetty.  These piles were cracked 
approximately 30 centimeters below the pile cap as illustrated in Figure 5-19.  Overall, the more modern 
pile-supported jetties performed well within minimal lateral displacement and damage to piles.  Figure 5-
20 illustrates modern hybrid steel and concrete piles which suffered minimal damage during the 
earthquake.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Navlakhi Port 
 
Navlakhi Port is a small peninsula extending from the eastern end of the Gulf of Kachchh.  The soils 
composing the peninsula are primarily soft, silty clays with interbedded sand (Bardet).  The most 
significant damage to the port was caused by large lateral spreads and slope failures along the southern 
portion of the port, although moderate ground cracking was observed along the northern edge of the 
peninsula, which eventually resulted in slope stability failures and the closure of the access road and rail 
line to the port.   
 
Once again, modern pile-supported wharfs performed well; however, a recently constructed wharf on 
shallow foundations underwent significant lateral displacement as a result of the slope failure at the end of 
the peninsula.  This failure was initiated by earthquake shaking, but was propagated at high tide (Figure 
5-21).  Approximately 2.5 meters of vertical and 2.5 meters of horizontal displacement were reported by 
J.P. Bardet for the final configuration.  Lateral spreads at the port resulted in deformations up to 6 meters 
as reported by Bardet.         
 
Figure 5-20:  No damage to modern 
hybrid piles at Kandla Port  
(N22.98824, E70.22404) 
(photo courtesy of J.P. Bardet) 
Figure 5-19:  Cracking of hollow 
reinforced concrete piles at Kandla Port  
(N22.9980, E70.2240)  
(photo courtesy of J.P. Bardet)  
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Figure 5-21:  Ground deformation at Navlakhi Port (photo courtesy of J.P. Bardet) 
 
 
9. Summary 
 
The Gujarat earthquake provided the opportunity to observe a wide range of geotechnical failures as 
indicated above. Seismic impacts on both man-made and natural earth systems were evident at distances 
of up to at least 135 km from the epicenter. The consequences of the inadequate performance in many 
cases were mitigated by: (a) the drought conditions which preceded the earthquake resulting in 
substantially lower loads on the earth structures at the time of the event; (b) the poor quality of the 
superstructure systems which resulted in structural failure prior to foundation failure; and (c) the 
remoteness of the region and thus lower potential for human losses. 
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Chapter 6: Indian Standards for Building Construction 
 
by 
 
John Nichols1 
Lecturer 
Department of Civil Engineering 
Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia 
 
1. Abstract 
The 2001 Gujarat Earthquake (moment magnitude 7.9) occurred near the Rann of Kachchh in 
northwestern India. The Gujarat earthquake demonstrates again the devastation wrought on 
buildings that are subjected to a major earthquake. The damage in the town of Bhuj was 
consistent with a felt intensity of MM X or greater. This level of energy release destroys most 
concrete, steel and masonry buildings within the meizo-seismal area. This paper reviews the 
Indian Standards for earthquake engineering, repair of buildings, plain and reinforced concrete, 
steel, and masonry construction. The Indian codes are compared to the United States codes of 
practice to determine whether any lessons can be 
learned from the earthquake in relation to these 
Indian and the United States codes of practice. The 
specific area of interest in the code review was the 
methods for estimating seismic demand and the 
seismic capacity. This earthquake falls in the same 
region as an 1819 earthquake. There was a short 
repeat time between events. Should be considered 
in code development? 
2. Introduction 
The purposes of this paper were threefold, to 
provide an overview of current codes, to illustrate 
the seismic hazard maps for India, and to show the 
methods for estimating seismic demand and 
seismic capacity within the codes.  
The late Prof. Jai Krishna of the University of 
Rookee headed the development of the earthquake 
engineering codes of practice issued by the 
statutory institution the Bureau of Indian Standards. The standards that are applicable in the 
earthquake-engineering field in India are IS 13935: 1993 Repair and Seismic Strengthening of 
Buildings – Guidelines, IS 1893: 1984 Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures, IS 
456: 2000 Plain and Reinforced Concrete Code of Practice (Fourth Revision, IS 13920: 1993 
Ductile Detailing of Reinforced Concrete Structures Subjected to Seismic Forces - Code of 
Practice, IS 800: 1984 Code of Practice for General Construction in Steel (Second Revision) and 
IS : Masonry Structures.  
                                                     
1 JN, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA, Australia 6845, 
email: nicholsj@vesta.curtin.edu.au 
Figure 6-1:  Collapse of historic wall in 
Ahmedabad  
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Figure 6-2:  Damage at Bhuj, Gujarat State 
3. Seismicity and Damage 
The interesting feature of this earthquake 
was the repeat damage to structures 
repaired after the 1819 earthquake (Figure 
6-1). Investigators have made similar 
observations after recent eastern 
Mediterranean earthquakes. This point on 
repeated damage was raised after the 1989 
Newcastle earthquake and recently for the 
Charleston, South Carolina area with the 
public buildings repaired after the 1886 
Charleston earthquake. This problem of 
the repeated damage raises the question as 
to the design life for some structures and 
the accumulation of damage in structures 
that are subjected to multiple earthquakes 
such as occur in California (Nichols, 
1999; USGS, 1977: Algermissen, 1972.)  
The town of Bhuj in the State of Gujarat suffered almost complete destruction in the 2001 Gujarat 
earthquake (Figure 6-2.) There was little doubt that this damage level represents a felt intensity 
MMI X to XII zone. The high death toll suggests that it was MMI XI+ (Shiono, 1995). 
IS 1893: 1984 Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures was the standard used for 
the earthquake design of structures in India. The Sectional Committee who prepared the standard 
made a number of observations that are relevant to this work. These observations were: 
“It is not intended with this standard to lay down regulations so that no structure shall suffer any 
damage during earthquakes (sic) of all magnitudes. It has been endeavored to ensure that as far 
as possible structures are able to respond without structural damage to shocks of moderate 
intensity and without collapse total collapse to shocks of heavy intensity.”  This condition is in 
line with the methods being developed through the Federal Emergency Management Agency for 
seismic design in the United States (FEMA 273, 1997).  
“Though the basis for the design of different types of structures is covered in this standard, it is 
not implied that detailed dynamic design analysis shall be made in every case. There might be 
cases of less importance and relatively small structures for which no analysis need be made, 
provided certain simple precautions are taken in the design… Similarly in highly seismic areas, 
construction of a type which entails heavy debris and consequent loss of life and property such as 
masonry, particularly mud masonry and rubble masonry should be avoided in preference to 
construction of a type which is known to withstand seismic effects better, such as construction in 
lightweight materials and well braced timber-framed structures.”  
This frank statement of intent of the code committee recognizes the problems of poor quality 
masonry construction in highly seismic zones. The continuing difficulty that the code committee 
grapples with is the political reality of the existing construction and the economics of future 
construction. The Code Committee had no intention of permitting the inadequate design of 
structures in the higher seismic zones, although this was not expressly stated.  
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The Committee defined the seismic zones using five categories numbered I to V. Figure 6-3 
shows the seismic zone map for the State of Gujarat reproduced from the code’s Figure 6-1 (IS 
1893: 1984, pg 7-8 and Appendix E). The key cities in the area are Bhuj that was clearly in Zone 
V, and Rajkot and Ahmedabad that were clearly in Zone III. 
 
Zone V 
Zone IV 
Zone III 
 
Figure 6-3:  Gujarat State seismic zonation 
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The committee provided the following correspondence between the Modified Mercalli Intensity 
and the Indian Zonation (Table 6-1). 
 
Table 6-1:  Definition of the Indian zonation standard 
 
Zone Mod. Mercalli 
Intensity 
Basic Horizontal 
Seismic Coefficients 
0a  
Town 
(Distance to 
epicenter) 
Seismic Zone  
factor 0F for average 
acceleration spectra 
Abrams’ Estimate 
of the MMI2 
I V or less 0.01  0.05  
II VI 0.02  0.10  
III VII 0.04 Ahmedabad 
(255) 
0.20 VI 
IV VIII 0.05 Morbi3 (100) 0.25 VII 
V IX to XII 0.08 Bhuj (40) 
Dudhai (14) 
0.4 IX at 40 kms and  
XII at 12 kms. 
The attenuation of the felt intensity for the Gujarat earthquake was not as rapid as observed in 
Tangshan for equivalent distances. The difference may be due to a difference in construction 
standards, ground conditions and at distance in Tangshan the ground has thinner sediments over 
coal bearing rock. The MMI data collated by Abrams has been plotted against the Tangshan data 
collated by Shiono (Figure 6-4). A polynomial has been fitted through the Gujarat data. The point 
at 130 kilometers will require further investigation. 
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Figure 6-4:  Gujarat and Tangshan attenuation of felt intensity 
                                                     
2 Chapter 7. 
3 Interpolation of the Indian Standard figure would appear to place Morbi in Zone IV. 
 57
Rossetto noted “that together with the increased damage potential of the ground motion due to 
possible site amplification and earthquake duration effects, bring the structures to exhibit a 
higher vulnerability than would be expected in a population of typical European buildings.” The 
difficulty in reaching conclusions based on this limited data set was in determining what were the 
problems.  
1. Are the buildings more vulnerable than equivalent European and American buildings?  
2. Has the earthquake energy attenuated at a lower rate than for an equivalent European 
setting?  
3. Did a lower attenuation rate couple with the duration of the earthquake to cause the 
increased damage?  
The rapid attenuation in the 1915 Avezzano earthquake in Italy in the east west direction 
underscores the difference in the interplate and intraplate areas (Nichols and Beavers, 2000). The 
attenuation rate in the New Madrid Seismic Zone and the Gujarat State will need to be the subject 
of further study.  
The clear conclusions that can be reached from the examination of the Indian Earthquake 
Standard are that the Code Committee has adequately addressed the question of estimating the 
likley intensity of shaking, at least from the perspective of the Modified Mercalli Scale. The code 
has addressed the issues of minor buildings in a sensible manner, although one could suggest that 
the note was subject to intrepretation. The code committee has recommended against the common 
practice of poor quality masonry construction, which conforms with the very specific and detailed 
conclusions drawn by Abrams. 
The issue of the intraplate attenuation rate that has arisen in the last few years with the research 
on the New Madrid Seismic Zone and from the Tangshan data strongly suggests that this point 
will continue to require significant and ongoing research in India, China, and the United States. 
The economic impact from failure to address this issue in the central and eastern United States 
will be significant. The Standards committee would have been unaware of the magnitude of this 
problem at the time of preparation of the standard. 
4. Seismic Code (IS 1893: 1984 Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures) 
The IS 1893: 1984 Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures has been compared to 
the requirements of FEMA 273 and 356 for the design of structures subjected to earthquake 
loading.  
Three source documents for the development of the Indian and American standards are used in 
this comparison (Newmark and Hall, 1968, 1978; Veletsos and Newmark, 1964). The original 
documents are used to confirm the applicability of the selected methods and whether change or 
additional research is warranted. The work by Veletsos and Newmark (1964) includes pulse 
waves, which are of interest in near field analysis for great earthquakes (Richter, 1958) and Fast 
Fourier transform methods (Brigham, 1988).  
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Veletsos and Newmark4 (1964) noted the limited seismic data of the time. The FFT procedure 
was not available to these researchers, although they use the Fourier mathematics in their 
analysis. 
IS 1893: 1984 provides the design criteria for multi-storied buildings that was based on the 
estimation of the equivalent static base shear: 
WKCV hB a=       (1) 
where W represents the dead load and a fraction of the live load depending on the Load Class 
being either 25 percent or 50 percent; ha was the design seismic co-efficient; C represents the 
flexibility of the structure related to the number of stories and the fundamental period T ; K  
represents the performance factor depending on the structural framing system and the ductility 
level for construction; BV  represents the base shear load on the structure. 
The fundamental period was estimated for moment resisting frames without bracing or shear 
walls using: 
nT 1.0=       (2) 
where n defines the number of storys. The equation for all other structures was: 
d
HT 09.0=       (3) 
where H represents the height of the building in meters; d  represents the maximum base 
dimension in meters in the direction parallel to the applied seismic load.5  
The equation provides an estimate that was equivalent to a Finite Element analysis of a degrading 
structure on a soil. The equation for the frequency f was: 
H
dfor
n
f 11
10
==     (4) 
Figure 6-5 presents factor C determined from the IS graph (IS 1893: 1984, pg 22).  
                                                     
4 These documents use the frequency as the standard unit for expressing dynamic structural response. This 
method will be used in this document to be consistent with the work of Newmark and to avoid the inversion 
problem associated with use of period. The seismic community records earthquakes in the time domain and 
reports results as a function of time and frequency. Inversion to period introduces a distortion to the 
graphing of the results. While the conversion is trivial, its use should be discouraged in code documents 
and in the education of young engineers, who will increasingly work directly with seismic data and Fast 
Fourier transforms.  
5 Equation (3) estimates a period for a 20-meter masonry tower with a base dimension of 4.5 meters at 0.84 
seconds or a frequency of 1.2 Hertz, and for a 15-meter structure at 0.46 seconds or 2.1 seconds. 
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Figure 6-5:  The factor C against period T 
 
The data has been expressed in terms of frequency, as that was relevant for masonry structures 
(Figure 6-6). 
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Figure 6-6:  The factor C against period F 
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This result shows that the code provides a higher base shear for shorter structures such as low 
masonry buildings.6 This results imply that: 
5637.0))(3577.0( += fLnC     (5) 
The Indian equations for determining the period can be traced to ATC 3-06 (1978) except that the 
moment resisting frame (steel and concrete) in ATC 3-06 had the equation for period of: 
75.0
nT hCT =       (6) 
where the values for TC  for ATC 3-06 and the values from FEMA 302 (1997) are presented in 
Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2:  Coefficients for the determination of period of a structure 
 
TC  Period Frequency 
Frame Type ATC 3-06 FEMA 302 Metric7  
co-efficient 
20 meter height 20 meter height 
Steel – moment 
resisting 
0.035 0.035 0.0853 0.80 1.23 
RC – moment 
resisting 
 0.030 0.0731 0.69 1.44 
Reinforced Concrete 0.025  0.0609 0.57 1.73 
Eccentrically braced 
steel frame 
 0.030 0.0731 0.46 2.16 
All other framing 
systems 
 0.020 0.0488 1.38 0.72 
Wood frame (2 to 3 
stories 
 0.060 0.1462 0.80 1.23 
 
FEMA 302 (1997) allows the use of equation (2) provided that the buildings were less than or 
equal to twelve stories and has minimum story height of 3 meters. A finite element analysis of the 
earlier detailed masonry tower provided a period of 0.46 seconds and a frequency of 2.2 Hz. This 
result represents a higher frequency or lower period than the results calculated using equation (3). 
Chopra and Goel (2000) comment in detail on the derivation of these types of equations and the 
intentions of the code committees.  
The selection of factor C depends on the calculated frequency. There is a conceptual difficulty in 
selecting a bounding function such as equation (2) or (6). The form of two equations depends on 
the researchers original data set, the selection of the type of the fitted equation and the fitting 
method8 used in the analysis. The equations give reasonably comparable answers. Chopra and 
Goel (2000) provide a range of solutions to this problem of selecting a natural frequency 
equation. The issue of building response frequency will need to be reviewed in both the IS and 
FEMA 302 based on the recent work of Chopra and Goel. 
                                                     
6 The example masonry tower would have a C of 0.6. 
7 These metric co-efficients are used in the nomenclature for the subsequent figures. 
8 The three fitting methods could be the least squares, robust or bounding functions. The least squares 
provide a mean answer that can be distorted by extreme outliers, the robust has the problem of equal weight 
for points and the bounding will introduce systematic errors as identified by Chopra and Goel. 
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Two methods are provided in the IS 1893: 1984 for calculating the design seismic co-efficient. 
The first method was the seismic co-efficient method (equation 7a) and the second is the response 
spectrum method (equation 7b).  
The forms of the equations for the two methods are: 
0aba Ih =       (7a) 
g
S
IF ah 0ba =       (7b) 
where b defines different soil-foundation systems (Table 6-3) and 
g
Sa  was defined from an 
average acceleration spectra (Figure 6-7), and I  defines the importance factor (Table 6-4). 
Table 6-3:  Values for b for different soil-foundation systems9 
Sl No. Type of soil 
mainly forming 
the foundation 
Piles passing 
through any 
soil but 
resting on 
Soil Type 1 
Piles not 
covered 
under 
Column 3 
Raft 
Foundations 
Combined 
or 
isolated 
RCC 
Footings 
with tie 
beams 
Isolated 
RCC 
Footings 
without tie 
beams or 
unreinforced 
strip 
foundations 
Well 
foundations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
i Type I  
Rock or Hard 
Soils 
1.0 - 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
ii Type II 
Medium Soils 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 
iii Type III Soft 
Soils 
1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.5 
Table 6-4:  Values for I for structures 
SL No. Structure Value of Importance Factor 
(1) (2) (3) 
i Dams (all types) 3.0 
ii Containers of inflammable or 
poisonous gases or liquids 
2.0 
iii Important service and community 
structures, such as hospital, water 
towers and tanks, schools, important 
bridges; important power houses; 
monumental structures; emergency 
buildings like telephone exchanges 
and fire stations; large assembly halls 
and subway stations 
1.5 
iiii All others 1.0 
                                                     
9 The value of b  for dams shall be 1.0. 
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Figure 6-7:  Average acceleration spectra (after IS 1893: 1984, Figure 2, pg. 18) 
K  represents the performance factor depending on the structural framing system and the ductility 
level for construction (Table 6-5). 
Table 6-5. Values for K for structures 
SL No. Structural Framing System Value of Factor Remarks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
i (a) Moment resistant frame 
with appropriate ductility 
details as given in IS: 
4326-1976 
1.0 -- 
i (b) Frame as above with RC 
Shear walls or steel bracing 
members designed for 
ductility 
1.0 
ii (a) Frame as in (i) (a) with 
either steel bracing 
members or plain or 
nominally reinforced 
concrete infill panels 
1.3 
ii (b) Frame as in (i) (a) in 
combination with masonry 
infills 
1.6 
These factors will apply 
only if the steel bracing 
members and the infill 
panels are taken into 
consideration in stiffness as 
well as lateral strength 
calculations provided that 
the frame acting alone will 
be able to resist at least 25 
percent of the design 
seismic forces. 
iii Reinforced concrete 
framed buildings (Not 
covered above) 
1.6  
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The distribution of forces in the code uses: 
å
=
=
= nj
j
l
jj
l
ii
Bi
hW
hW
VQ
1
      (8) 
where iQ  represents the lateral forces at the roof of floor i , iW  represents the dead and live load 
(portion) of the roof and any floor i ’ the weight of the walls and columns in any story is assumed 
to be shared half and half between the roof or floor at top and the floor or ground at the bottom, 
and all weights are assumed to be lumped at the level of the roof or any floor i . ih  represents the 
height measured from the base of the building to the roof or any floor i  and n  represents the 
number of stories including the basement floors, where the basement walls are not connected with 
ground floor deck or the basement walls are not fitted between building columns, but excluding 
the basement floors where they are so connected. l represents an exponent that for this IS code 
was two for all periods. 
The original development of this force distribution in ATC 3-06 (1978) has a variable for l  
(Table 6-6). 
Table 6-6:  Values for l for structures 
Period (Seconds) Frequency (Hz) Value of l  
0.25 4 1 
0.5 2 1 
1.0 1 1.25 
1.5 0.67 1.50 
2.0 0.5 1.75 
2.5 0.4 2 
5 0.2 2 
10 0.1 2 
 
The effective quasi-static limit for masonry has been estimated from experiment and a theoretical 
analysis of the errors in Newton’s equation of motion at 0.4 Hz (Nichols, 2001).  
The Average Acceleration Spectra provided in the Indian Standard (Figure 6-7) has been 
converted to the frequency spectra for the two percent damping (Figure 6-8). The relative paucity 
of points in the one to ten hertz region was considered to reflect the significant problem of 
translating the seismic data from the frequency domain into the inverted period form. The use of 
the period represents a carry-over from the twenties and electric circuit theory (Hall, 2001).10  
One earthquake that has been used in developing the seismic standards for the CEUS was the 
Nahanni Earthquake11 (Figure 6-9). This M6.8 event occurred in the Northwest Territories. The 
Nahanni earthquake has a series of spikes in the acceleration record. Veletsos and Newmark 
(1964) in the analysis of shock loading generated by bomb blast have considered the analysis of 
such pulse loading. This method is considered applicable to these large short duration pulse loads. 
                                                     
10 Hall, W. (2001) personal conversation dated 26 April 2001 on the development of the period formula. 
11 Station 1, Iverson, Canada: 23 Dec, 1985. 
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Figure 6-8:  Average acceleration spectra in frequency domain 
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Figure 6-9:  M6.8 Nahanni earthquake longitudinal time trace 
 
 
 65
The work of Atkinson and Boore (1995) for Eastern North America (ENA) provides one 
interesting seismic data set. The two specific earthquake events that were used in this work, were 
at Saguenary, Quebec (1988) and Nahanni, Northwest Territories, both located in Canada. The 
new ground motion relations provided by Atkinson and Boore cover the peak ground motions and 
response spectra for Eastern North America events in the range of M 4 to 5. Atkinson and Boore 
noted that this analysis was consistent with the data from the Nahanni and Saguenary 
earthquakes. Whilst the trace (Figure 6-9) was instructive, it does little to provide guidance as to 
the frequency relationship for the earthquake trace.  
This data on the frequency component is instructive when it is matched with building data and the 
modal frequencies. The pulse analysis technique of Veletsos and Newmark (1964) can be applied 
to the low frequency peaks in the FFT. The same trace (Figure 6-9) was transformed using the 
procedure from Numerical Recipes in Fortran12 in a program named CONVERT. The discrete 
Fourier transform programs were checked using the exponential function routine and the square 
wave routine from Brigham (1988, Chapter 9). The resultant frequency domain trace for the time-
domain acceleration trace has been competed with frequency as the dependent variable (Figure 6-
10) and using the period as the dependent variable (Figure 6-11). Note the point density 
differences in Figure 6-11, the fact that one third of the graph represents the quasi-static region; 
one third represents the region from 0.4 to 1.0 Hz and one third the region from 1.0 Hertz to the 
recorded limit. The FFT limit from typical time traces is 25, 40 or 100 Hertz.  
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Figure 6-10:  FFT of the Nahanni earthquake 
                                                     
12 Press et al.,(1994), Numerical Recipes in Fortran (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP), DFOUR Routine. 
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Figure 6-11:  FFT of the Nahanni earthquake (period) 
 
At Memphis, one has access to the work of Horton, Barstow, and Jacobs 13 who have generated 
synthetic earthquakes of varying M r combinations and stress drops for the LAMB project 
(Abrams and Shinozuka).14 Jacobs15 noted that in the production of these records that “natural 
records are always ‘holey’ or peaked and troughed, but to various degrees. This spectral 
roughness is pronounced when you make Fourier spectra or undamped response spectra, but 
diminishes of course with increasing damping of the SDoF resonator for response spectra. The 
latter is what happens really in damped structures. Occurrence of spectral roughness is a strong 
function of the site conditions: i.e. of the impedance (shear-wave velocity times density) profile 
with depth for the site. The Nahanni and El Centro records have less contrast-rich soil/rock 
profiles, while the sites for Memphis we modelled have very soft soils overlying denser sands, and 
eventually hard rock, therefore being very ringie and full of holes and peaks. We start out in the 
synthetics with a smooth Brune spectrum, which becomes a bit more ringie after the crustal wave-
propagation scattering function is applied (and the Earth does that also, that's why we mimic it); 
but once we add in the soil response we really get site-specific ‘holiness’. That is the reason why 
you sometimes get surprising damage for certain structures at certain sites: double resonance 
                                                     
13 Horton, S.P., Barstow, N., and Jacobs, K., (1997), Simulation of earthquake ground motion in Memphis, 
Tennessee, Proceedings of the Eleventh World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, June 23-28, 1997, 
Acapulco, Mexico, Elsevier Science, Paper 1302, passim. 
14  Abrams, D.P., and Shinozuka, M., (1197), Final Report Loss Assessment of Memphis Buildings, 
Technical Report NCEER-97-00, (Urbana, Illinois: UIUC), passim. 
15 Jacobs, K., Lamont Doherty Observatory, Columbia University, personal communication, November 
1997.  
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between site peak and fundamental period of the structure. The most famous case for this is of 
course the Mexico City effect in 1985 (?): 1- 2 second 10-20 story high rise buildings located on 
the clayey Old Lake bed (site resonance’s peaked near 1 - 2 seconds) collapsed, while people in 
adjacent old colonial masonry buildings 2 or 3 stories high did not even realize there was an 
earthquake (totally detuned). If you are interested in a generic study, then you must use several of 
the records from different site conditions, and average the effects, so that you never have 
structural performance for a given building height or fundamental period influenced by the peaks 
or troughs of just one site condition. I do not think that the use of artificially smoothed spectra is 
a valid substitute. Rather the smoothing of performances over real site conditions seems to me a 
more valid approach, at least if you are not only interested in the mean response, but also want to 
get a measure for the variability of response, which highly depends on whether double 
resonance’s of sites and structures do or do not occur under region-specific site conditions and 
their respective variability.” The Nahanni earthquake tolerably matches the undamped average 
acceleration spectra from the Indian Standard 1893: 1984. The Nahanni earthquake has a spike of 
1.5 g’s and a short time at about 12-15 seconds. The Gujarat earthquake was a larger, longer 
event. The Indian Standard 1893: 1984 was based on the work from ATC 3-06 (1978) that was 
largely developed at the University of Illinois by Newmark, Hall and Souzen. The current FEMA 
documents related to the design of new structures are derivatives of the ATC manual. The two 
standards IS and FEMA have diverged in the base equations that have been selected from the 
ATC work. It was instructive to compare the calculated results from the two derived documents 
for a typical range of building sizes. The building has been assumed to have three depths ten, 
twenty and thirty meters and heights ranging from three meters in increments of three meters. The 
analysis was completed for Zone V, or MMI XI-XII. The building period was determined against 
the height for the varying type of structure (Figure 6-12).16 
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Figure 6-12:  Varying building frequency for different structural systems 
                                                     
16 The IS represents the IS analysis for three building depths and the US represents the various metric 
constants used in equation (6). 
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The mean building period was determined against the height for IS and US data (Figure 6-13). 
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Figure 6-13:  Mean building frequency for IS and US systems 
 
The clear result was that the Indian standard provides a higher estimate for the frequency of the 
first mode than the United States equivalent codes. The difference was not significant for the 
taller structures, but is significant for short structures. The relationships for the two data sets are 
shown on the figure. The Indian Standard C  coefficient relates the stiffness of the structure to the 
loading from the earthquake. A stiffer structure attracts proportionally higher load (Figure 6-14). 
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Figure 6-14:  Co-efficient C versus the building height for different building depths 
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The composite factor for the Indian Standard hKCa  was calculated for the buildings (Figure 6-
15). 
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Figure 6-15:  Composite factor for the three building depths 
 
The composite factor was established for the response spectrum method (Figure 6-16). 
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Figure 6-16: Indian standard composite factor response spectrum method 
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The composite factor was established for the response spectrum method for the US data (Figure 
6-17). 
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Figure 6-17:  Indian standard composite factor response spectrum method US data 2 % damping 
The base shear equation from ATC 3-06 has the form: 
WCV sB =       (9) 
The composite Cs factor presented in ATC 3-06 Equation 4-1 was calculated assuming a Zone 7 
area (equivalent to California at the time) for a response modification factor of 8 and the 
acceleration factors both 0.4 (Figure 6-18). 
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Figure 6-18:  ATC 3-06 composite Cs factor and the ATC acceleration limit 
The two controlling features of the ATC method are the acceleration limit that for standard 
conditions was set by the developers of the method at three Hertz.17 The FFT of the Nahanni 
earthquake does not suggest that the limit was inappropriate; however, the two limiting equations 
in ATC 3-06 are extremely sensitive to the value of R and certainly the value of R selected at 
eight would appear high simply to bring the composite Cs factor into the range of the results of 
the other methods. The acceleration limiting composite Cs factor was inversely proportional to R. 
The base shear equation from FEMA 273 has the form: 
WSCCCV a321=      (10) 
Where W represents the dead load and the anticipated dead load; 1C was modification factor to 
relate expected maximum inelastic displacements to the displacements calculated for an elastic 
analysis; 2C represents the modification factor to represent the effect of stiffness degradation and 
strength deterioration on maximum displacement responses; 3C  represents D-P factor; V  
represents the base shear load on the structure and aS  represents the response spectrum 
acceleration at the fundamental frequency of the structure for that direction. The methods for 
determining the natural frequency of the buildings are based on either modal analysis, equation 
(4) or for a single story building a special purpose equation related to displacements of the walls 
and diaphragm.  
                                                     
17 Calculation using ATC 3-06 equations 4-2 and 4-3 pg. 55. 
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The New Madrid Seismic Zone is equivalent in seismic form to the Gujarat State. A review of the 
NMSZ data can assist in considering the current status of the IS and whether revisions are 
required to the American Standards. The key points to consider are the results from the Nahanni 
earthquake, the typical synthetic trace results developed for the NMSZ and the development work 
by Veletsos and Newmark on the additive impact of pulse in seismic events. The estimated 
spectral response data for the New Madrid Seismic Zone was determined from the USGS maps in 
FEMA 273 (Table 6-7). 
Table 6-7:  Spectral accelerations NMSZ 
Description Period 0.2 sec (5 Hz) Period 1 sec (1 Hz) 
MCE 5 % ? Class B 3 1.23 
2 % probability in 50 years 
5 % ? Class B 
3 1.23 
10 % probability in 50 
years 5 % ? Class B 
0.43 0.092 
The adjustment of the site class allows for the soil classes A to F. The site class in the NMSZ was 
assumed D for the purpose of this analysis (Table 6-8). 
Table 6-8:  Spectral accelerations site class adjusted NMSZ 
Description Fa Period 0.2 sec (5 Hz) Fv Period 1 sec (1 Hz) 
MCE 5 % ? Class B 1.0 3 1.5 1.84 
2 % probability in 50 
years 5 % ? Class D 
1.0 3 1.5 1.84 
10 % probability in 
50 years 5 % ? Class 
D 
1.45 0.60 2.4 0.221 
The general response spectrum can be calculated using the FEMA 273 (equations 2-8 and 2-9).  
Two response spectra are relevant for the New Madrid Seismic Zone; these are the Maximum 
Credible Earthquake18 and the 475-year return period.19 The response spectrum (Figure 6-19) for 
the NMZS MCE has developed estimated natural frequencies for the various combinations of 
building height and type. These spectral accelerations are developed from the USGS data 
contained in FEMA 273. 
                                                     
18 The two-percentile event was the MCE. 
19 The return period was used in this chapter as we are discussing characteristic or singular points in the 
probability space functions that were developed to model the probability of occurrence of the earthquakes. 
The trivial conversion for this return period was ten percent in fifty years. The difficulty at least for this 
author from this definition was the building life of five decades. The thought that structures will have a 
failure of two percent in fifty years or ten percent in fifty years fails to account for the characteristic 
earthquakes that dominate the fatality counts in earthquakes; that we have general failure in an earthquake 
of buildings as in the 1988 Spitak earthquake must be considered intolerable in this century. The anomalous 
situation that occurs in some interplate areas can be explained and the issue of fifty years in these few 
locations can be considered a trivial issue. It was not considered a trivial issue for areas with characteristic 
events and one that may fail to account for the basic life safety issues under these specific circumstances. 
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Figure 6-19:  NMSZ MCE spectral accelerations for the standard building range 
The problem that can be identified in the use of the standard spectral acceleration shape relates to 
the occurrence of a tuned structure and FFT for a particular earthquake or simply an earthquake 
with a spread of energy through the power spectrum. The results demonstrate the scatter in using 
the different building periods. The collapse of reinforced concrete buildings at a distance of 250 
km in Ahmedabad points clearly to the design issue of soft story as the cause of failure, however 
without an accurate estimate of the frequency of the building then the base shear can be in error. 
This underscores the interrelated issues of tuned buildings, systematic errors in building 
frequency and the problem of spikes in the traces of great earthquakes. The purpose of using the 
NMSZ data was to consider these issues and determine whether the existing analysis methods 
developed from the earlier work of Veletsos and Newmark (1964) requires changes for great or 
characteristic events. 
The response spectrum (Figure 6-20) for the NMZS 475 year return period has been developed 
for the various combinations of building height and type. These spectral accelerations are 
developed from the USGS data contained in FEMA 273. 
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Figure 6-20: NMSZ 475 year spectral accelerations for the standard building range 
The range in the results between the two codes was interesting. The paleo-seismological data for 
the NMSZ would suggest that the MCE and the 475-year return period event should be a great 
event as defined by Richter. Green and Hall (1994), and Krinitzsky (2000) discussed in detail the 
problem of hazard analysis methodologies. The conclusions of these authors are that there are 
shortcomings in the current analysis techniques.  
The method being developed by Kafka and Ebel (2000) provides an alternative method to 
estimate the seismicity of a regional area. The clear point is 35 percent of all seismic activity 
occurs in areas that have not recorded prior activity.  
The next step was to consider the differences between the Nahanni earthquake and the various 
spectra formula.  
Veletsos and Newmark (1964) provide the mathematical and numerical derivation of design 
spectra (shown in their Figure 2.23). The adoption of a constant velocity component to the design 
 75
spectra represents for their analysis a simple and pragmatic limit to the zero gradient on the 
spectra for the varying pulse forms. This limit was based on their analysis (Veletsos and 
Newmark, 1964, § 2.9.2 Presentation and Discussion of Results, a. Characteristics of the 
Representative Spectra) of the form of the design spectra for a range of pulse shapes.  
The choice made by Veletsos and Newmark was appropriate for their analysis, of course noting 
their lack of strong motion data for intraplate earthquakes. The limited strong motion data 
available now provide data to use the Veletsos and Newmark techniques to allow for acceleration 
spikes within a normal earthquake trace.  
The Nahanni earthquakes FFT and a number of the standard spectral shapes are plotted on Figure 
6-21. The spectral shapes include data from Newmark and Hall (1978, Figure 6-5) that were 
developed for the nuclear regulatory agency, the standard NMZS 475 year, a newly developed 
bounding spectra20 and the Newmark and Hall spectra scaled to 0.6 g’s. The frequency has been 
plotted in the range of zero to ten Hertz as this represents the region of interest for masonry and 
soft story RC structures.  
The bounding spectrum has been developed to essentially encase the NMSZ earthquakes. The 
bounding function has been scaled to twenty percent of the normal limits. The function has been 
developed for comparison purposes only and was not developed for any design purpose and 
should not be used for that purpose. 
                                                     
20 The bounding spectra has not been based on previous models. 
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Figure 6-21:  Nahanni earthquake FFT and standard spectra (0 to 10 Hz.) 
Only the bounding function does not have peaks in the FFT that exceed the design spectra. The 
Nahanni earthquake was a M6.8 event of short duration. The data have been recast in the 
frequency range of zero to two Hertz (Figure 6-22). 
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Figure 6-22:  Nahanni earthquake FFT and standard spectrums (0 to 2 Hz.) 
The Nahanni earthquake has several peaks in the FFT trace (Figure 6-22) with numerical values 
greater than the design spectra. The design spectra are based on the constant velocity region from 
about 0.2 to 2.0 Hertz (Newmark and Hall, 1978, Figure 6-5). The Nahanni FFT provides spikes 
that exceed the design spectra in the range from 0.2 to 2.0 Hertz. What are the impacts of these 
spikes? 
The study into the loss assessment in Memphis buildings had a number of synthetic traces 
prepared for the Marked Tree region in the NMSZ. The M7.25 earthquake time trace has been 
converted to the frequency domain using the standard FFT technique. The use of the M7.25 was 
purely arbitrary. The FFT trace (Figure 6-23) was approximately damped using the factors 
derived by Newmark and Hall (1978). The earthquake had a peak intensity of about 3.2g’s. 
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Figure 6-23:  M7.25 Marked Tree earthquake FFT (with damping) 
The M7.25 Marked Tree earthquake FFT and a number of the standard spectral shapes are plotted 
on Figure 6-24. The spectral shapes include data from Newmark and Hall (1978, Figure 6-5) that 
was developed for the nuclear regulatory agency, the standard NMZS MCE, the full bounding 
spectra21 and the Newmark spectra scaled to 0.6 g’s. The frequency was plotted in the range of 
zero to ten Hertz as this represents the region of interest for masonry and RC structures. The FFT 
for the M7.25 breaks the design spectra at a number of low frequencies. The NMSZ MCE will 
require significant damping in the building to ensure that demand does not exceed capacity.  
The data have been recast in the frequency range of zero to two Hertz (Figure 6-25) and with the 
dependent variable the period (Figure 6-26). The spectral shapes have been tabulated for the 
standard spectra and the estimated bounding spectra (Table 6-9). Figure 6-27 and Figure 6-28 
show the period versus frequency graph, and the various design spectra used in this report for the 
ranges of 0-100 Hz and 0-10 Hz. The purpose of showing the period graph was to demonstrate 
the rapid slope changes in this function in our region of greatest interest. 
Queste (2000) has shown a method to allow for the variation in the peaks in the SDOF operator 
for the earthquake record CH85VALP.070. The method uses a shift in the curve and the 
intersection frequency (Figure 6-29). This method for allowing for the spike represents the same 
mathematical procedure as the development of the bounding function in the frequency plots. 
                                                     
21 The bounding spectra has not been based on previous models. 
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Figure 6-24:  M7.25 Marked Tree earthquake FFT with standard spectral shapes 
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Figure 6-25: M7.25 Marked Tree earthquake FFT with standard spectral shapes 0 to 2 Hz. 
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Figure 6-26:  M7.25 Marked Tree earthquake FFT with the bounding shape 
Table 6-9:  NMSZ tabulated spectral points 
Acceleration (g) Frequency Hertz Period seconds 
Newmark 
Figure 6-5  
Newmark  
scaled 0.6 
NMSZ 
MCE 
LAMB  
NMSZ 
Bounding 
LNB (0.2) NMSZ 
475 year 
0.000 1000.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.30 0.06 0.00 
0.098 10.204 0.004 0.015 0.172 0.70 0.14 0.02 
0.293 3.413 0.030 0.070 0.514 1.50 0.30 0.06 
0.415 2.410 0.040 0.120 0.728 1.76 0.35 0.09 
0.610 1.639 0.060 0.180 1.071 2.17 0.43 0.13 
1.001 0.999 0.100 0.300 1.757 3.00 0.60 0.22 
1.709 0.585 0.170 0.500 3.000 3.00 0.60 0.38 
2.002 0.500 0.200 0.600 3.000 3.00 0.60 0.44 
2.82 0.355      0.62 
10.010 0.100 0.200 0.600 3.000 3.00 0.60 0.62 
35.010 0.029 0.170 0.500 1.580 1.00 0.20 0.38 
60.010 0.017 0.170 0.170 1.340 0.62 0.12 0.21 
100.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 1.200 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Figure 6-27:  Period versus frequency and the various design spectra 
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Figure 6-28:  Period versus frequency and the various design spectra 0-10 Hz. 
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Figure 6-29:  CH85VALP.070 Method to adjust for a spike in the record 
A number of earthquake details are provided in Table 6-10. These events are typical design 
earthquakes used in the development of standards. 
Table 6-10:  Earthquakes, location, date, magnitude, and duration 
Earthquake Location Recording Location Date of the event Magnitude Duration 
Marked Tree Arkansas Synthetic  7.25 40 
Nahanni (1) Station 1,Iverson, Canada 23 Dec, 1985 6.8 12 
Nahanni (2) St 3 Battlement Creek, Canada 23 Dec, 1985 6.8 20 
Saguenary (1) St 8 La Malbaie, Canada 25 Nov, 1988 5.4 20 
Saguenary (2) St 16 Chicoutimi Nord PQ, Canada 25 Nov, 1988 5.4 15 
Irpinia Calatrini Italy 23 Nov, 1980  70 
Newcastle Australia Synthetic 28 Dec, 1989 5.5 6 
Miramichi Loggie Lodge Canada 6 May, 1982  1 
Imperial Valley (1) El Centro, USA 18 May, 1940 7.1 30 
Imperial Valley (2) El Centro Peknold, USA 18 May, 1940 7.1 28 
Miyagi-Ken-Oki Sensai City, Japan 12 June, 1978  35 
Parkfield California  27 June 1966  20 
San Francisco Cholame St., California 22 March, 1957  10 
Kern County Taft High, California 21 July, 1952 7.6 40 
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The first peak and the maximum peak in the FFT spectra for the earthquakes listed in Table 6-10 
are shown in Figure 6-30. 
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Figure 6-30:  First and maximum peaks in the frequency spectra 
Veletsos and Newmark (1964) investigated the spectra for a variety of pulse loadings for bomb 
blasts. The research work of Veletsos and Newmark included a comparison of the results to the El 
Centro and the Eureka22 earthquake SDOF spectral shape. These two researchers commented on 
the area of constant peak velocity as being the controlling feature from about 0.3 to 3 Hertz. This 
comment was true for the interplate earthquakes that were studied at the time for their report. 
Additional data having been collated since that time (1964) provide some further guidance as to 
the controlling features in the range of 0.3 to 3 Hertz. The frequency range of real interest for our 
work was the 1 to 2 Hertz range.  
Veletsos and Newmark (1964) provide extensive guidance on handling the types of responses that 
were recorded for the Nahanni earthquake and that have been synthetically generated for the 
Marked Tree event. The first and maximum peaks in the FFT spectra have been plotted in Figure 
6-30 for the earthquakes listed in Table 6-10. The frequency range of 0 to 1 Hertz has been 
plotted in Figure 6-31 to show the large earthquakes that have a high acceleration in the 
frequency range of 0 to 1 Hertz. 
                                                     
22 Eureka earthquake of December 21, 1954 S11E Component.  
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Figure 6-31:  First and maximum peaks in the frequency spectra 0 to 1 Hertz 
While there were limited data to make any firm observations, the analysis completed by Veletsos 
and Newmark (1964) and the further data on these larger intraplate events provide some guidance 
on the applicability of the standard spectra shapes. The applicable comments are: 
1. The interplate earthquakes such as El Centro contain a range of frequencies that provide 
for a series of peaks in the spectrum for the 0.3 to 3 Hertz region creating the constant 
velocity section of the standard spectrum. Veletsos and Newmark (1964) clearly show 
that this region was dominated by the acceleration and the velocity components rather 
than the velocity component alone. 
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2. The Nahanni and similar earthquake events include large pulses in the time trace that 
dominate the spectral shape. These pulses in the Nahanni earthquake are a 1 Hertz 
underlying pulse with a non-damped acceleration of about 0.6 g’s which will not be 
significantly reduced by low damping levels (0.02 to 0.05), and a 6-Hertz pulse at about 
10 seconds with a peak acceleration of 1.5 g’s. This pulse at 6 Hertz will be damped out 
in the sample damping range (0.02 to 0.05). 
3. There are no physical reasons that the spectral shape from 1 to 3 Hertz has a constant 
velocity component and the FFT data provided in Figures 6-30 and 6-31 suggest that the 
asymptote can be reached in these larger intraplate events at 1 Hertz. The region of 
constant velocity was simply an overlapping area of asymptotes for the El Centro and 
other earthquakes. The large intraplate earthquakes may contain pulses. The analysis 
from Veletsos and Newmark (1964) for pulses provides a simple method to deal with 
pulses in an otherwise fairly standard earthquake signal. 
4. The Figure 6-5 from the Newmark and Hall report (1978) and all derivative curves 
developed since then should be reexamined in detail to consider the potential impact in 
intraplate areas of these large low frequency and higher frequency pulses. 
5. The standard curve with a constant velocity component will require modification to 
return to the asymptote form.23 
In conclusion, the Indian Standard 1893: 1984 while generally maintaining the principles outlined 
in ATC 3-06, has selected different base equations for the natural frequency of the structures; the 
IS method would appear to provide more conservative answers for the frequency of the structure. 
Estimation of the composite Cs factor that directly and linearly relates the mass of the structure to 
the base shear has been established using two methods in the IS. The two methods are the seismic 
co-efficient method and the response spectrum method. These two methods provide peak 
acceleration for Zone V of the Indian continent of 0.13 g’s for a two percent damped structure 
and about 0.38 g’s for zero damped structure.  
The Indian Standard 1893: 1984 will require amendment after the Gujarat earthquake as the 
equivalent Australian standard was amended after the Newcastle earthquake and the US 
Standards after the Northridge earthquake and to permit incorporation of the seminal work 
completed by FEMA, NSF and others in the past decade. The main amendments will need to 
include a revision to the method of calculating the composite Cs factor that for the Zone V in the 
Indian Standard would appear to provide for rapid attenuation and to require amendments to the 
spectrum response data that form the basis of the code. The US data for the New Madrid Seismic 
Zone appear the applicable data to use to supplement the data obtained from the Gujarat 
earthquake. 
That the engineering community in the United States uses period and US customary units in the 
day-to-day analysis of structures would appear in the long run to be an untenable position. In 
completing this analysis between the two standards, the translations and chances for error were 
significant simply because the base data for seismicity is collected in the SI units and is measured 
in units of seconds. This data has a linear translation to frequency, whereas the period provides an 
                                                     
23 Thanks to Professor W. Hall for suggesting where to look in this data and for the helpful comments on 
the constant velocity region of the standard spectra. 
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inverse measure that squash the collected data in an untenable form. The chance for error grows 
in this continued use of these methods and fundamentally breaches the ASCE Code of Ethics 
Canon One for preservation of life. The suggestion that the method is that preferred by the 
contractors raises an interesting argument heard frequently in this matter, which self-evidently 
fails the Code of Ethics test.  
The work of Veletsos and Newmark (1964) should be examined with the additional data to 
determine if there are suitable changes to the standard spectral shape for these larger intraplate 
events. Finally the natural frequency formula should be reviewed to determine the appropriate set 
of standard equations. The use of a method of artificially changing the frequency to provide some 
conservatism to the base shear estimates should be stopped and if further conservatism was 
warranted it should be addressed at the appropriate equations and not through the period formula. 
The use of US customary units and period should be discouraged in earthquake engineering. The 
simple reasons are to be in line with seismological practice and general world practice. 
5. Building Repair Standards 
IS 13935: 1993 Repair and Seismic Strengthening of Buildings – Guidelines The Bureau of 
Indian Standards is responsible for the preparation of the standard documents. This code provides 
practical guidelines on the retrofitting of buildings constructed prior to the introduction of seismic 
codes. The guidelines follow the standard deemed to comply provisions present in such codes in 
the US and Australia. 
6. Concrete Standards 
IS 456: 2000 Plain and Reinforced Concrete Code of Practice (Fourth Revision), and IS 13920: 
1993 Ductile Detailing of Reinforced Concrete Structures Subjected to Seismic Forces - Code of 
Practice provide limit state codes based on world wide practice. The code provides an alternative 
of using the working stress method for some designs. The principal issue to be addressed in a 
future revision of the code is the design of soft story buildings both in the retrofitting and in the 
subsequent design of new structures. Collapse of a RC concrete structure at 250 km from the 
epicenter clearly breaches the intention of the code developers. The structure is to be designed as 
stable under earthquake loads. This problem is not unique to India. 
7. Steel Construction 
IS 800: 1984 Code of Practice for General Construction in Steel (Second Revision) was 
developed in parallel with the equivalent AS 1280 Steel Structures Code from Australia. This 
code draws on an extensive body of work by Trahair and Hawkins from the University of Sydney 
in the late 1960s. The code simply requires revision to bring it in line with modern codes of 
practice. 
The code by way of example limits compressive stresses to a level determined from geometrical 
properties.  
8. Masonry Standards 
IS: Masonry Structures was not reviewed as it was not available at the time of production of the 
report. 
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9. Conclusions 
The Indian Codes of practice are generally in line with accepted practice. The seismic design 
methods will require revision to account for the new knowledge gained from the Gujarat 
earthquake and also the equivalent work being developed in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. The 
corrections required to the concrete code are minor in terms of the state of the codes 
development. The steel code should be redeveloped to be in line with recent research results from 
Californian experience.  
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Chapter 7: Building Damage  
 
by 
Daniel P. Abrams1 
Hanson Engineers Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
1. Abstract 
An overview of damage observations for building structures resulting from the 2001 Bhuj 
Earthquake in the state of Gujarat is presented.   Damage ranged from slight cracking of masonry 
buildings to complete collapse of multistory concrete frame buildings over distances exceeding 
300 kilometers from the epicenter.  Reasons for damage patterns are surmised from observations 
and interviews with locals and are the opinion of the author.  Damage observations are correlated 
with distances from the epicenter to provide a general understanding of possible attenuation 
relations, and to suggest what damage scenarios are possible for other geographical regions, in 
particular the Central United States.  
2. Introduction 
The Bhuj or Republic Day Earthquake that struck the state of Gujarat at 8:47am on January 26, 
2001 was one of the major earthquakes to occur in the world in the last few decades.  The 
moment magnitude of 7.9 indicated the energy release to be as high as the previous Alah Bund 
Earthquake of 1819 suggesting a shorter reoccurrence interval than previously thought for typical 
intraplate earthquakes in stable continental regions.  The long attenuation distances of the 
earthquake resulted in damage to the built environment as far as 300 kilometers from the 
epicenter.   
Though tragic, the spread of damage provided an interesting portrayal of the gradation of damage 
possible for varying intensities of ground motion.  Damage-distance relations for building 
structures in particular are of interest not only for the local Gujarati population, but also for 
earthquake engineers and researchers worldwide who attempt to predict performance of their 
structures located a given distance from a scenario earthquake of a given magnitude. 
Direct inferences between observed damage and distance from the epicenter of an earthquake 
cannot be drawn because individual structures vary in capacity and are subjected to variable 
seismic demand forces.  Directionality and site effects influence ground accelerations at a 
particular building site making comparisons of damage with distance difficult.  Moreover, 
individual building structures are designed with different structural configurations, with materials 
of different strengths and with a different quality of construction.  However, apparent damage-
distance relations, as presented herein, help to organize the presentation of post-earthquake 
observations and suggest what levels of damage may be likely at distances from other 
earthquakes in regions of similar seismicities as that found in Gujarat.  
                                                     
1 DPA, 1245 Newmark Civil Engineering Laboratory, 205 N. Mathews, Urbana, Illinois, 61801 USA, 
email: d-abrams@uiuc.edu 
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During a tour of Gujarat two weeks following the earthquake, the investigative team of the Mid-
America Earthquake Center visited cities, towns and villages at distances from the epicenter 
ranging from a few kilometers to over 250 kilometers.  Names of observation sites are given in 
Figure 7-1 with their approximate distances from the epicenter.  Damage is reported herein for the 
cities of Ahmedabad, Ghandidham, Bhuj and Morbi, as well as towns of Bhachar, Anjar and 
Halvad, and villages of Lodai, Dudhai and MotiMalwan.  
Extensive damage in the form of total building collapse was observed even at the largest 
distances from the epicenter, and conversely, little damage was observed in a small village just a 
few kilometers to the south of Bhuj. Because nearly all of the buildings in the state were 
constructed of reinforced concrete and/or masonry of some sort, a wealth of information is 
available on the seismic performance of such structures as well as the significance of local site 
effects, and construction quality. 
3. Features of the Bhuj Earthquake  
The epicenter of the Republic Day Earthquake was located approximately 50 km northeast of the 
city of Bhuj in the northwest Indian state of Gujarat. The epicenter was near the southern 
boundary of the Rann of Kachchh between the Kutch Mainland fault and the Katrot-Bhuj fault. 
The earthquake was the second strong motion to hit this area in the past 182 years.  Often 
regarded as the “forgotten” earthquake, the Allah Bund earthquake of 1819 occurred north of the 
town of Bhuj.  This northwestern region of Gujarat is located in the highest seismic zone of the 
country (Zone 5) per the Indian Standard Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of Structures 
(IS 1893-1984).  
The devastation caused by this earthquake was extensive.  Unofficial estimates of the death toll 
exceeded 100,000 people.  Villages within 20 kilometers of the epicenter were completely  
25 km 
50 km  
100 km 
Bhuj 
Lodai 
Anjar 
Ghandidham 
Bhachau Dudhai 
Morbi 
Halvad 
MotiMalwan 
Figure 7-1:  Distances from epicenter within northwest Gujarat  
epicenter 
Ahmedabad 
(255 km) 
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Figure 7-2:  Collapse of historic wall in 
Ahmedabad 
destroyed as nearly every stone in rubble masonry walls separated from the mud mortars.  
Complete collapse of dozens of reinforced concrete frame buildings as tall as ten or more stories 
was phenomenal in the towns of Bhuj, Gandidham, Anjar and Bachau.  Liquefaction features 
were of a similar caliber as those reported in the history books from the 1811-12 New Madrid 
earthquakes of the Central United States.  Water gushed from the soil for several hours following 
the earthquake, and in some cases with sprout diameters as large as four meters.  Fresh water 
ponds formed following the earthquake in the arid desert climate that had not seen rain for six 
months.  Examples of lateral spreading from liquefaction were prevalent within a 100-km radius 
of the epicenter.   
Relatively short, continental faults like that found in northwest Gujarat and the New Madrid 
seismic zone can produce great earthquakes, and do so within hundreds of years rather than 
thousands.  Aftershock measurements done by the Mid-America Earthquake Center in Gujarat 
helped to define the nature of the fault mechanisms with a goal to improve estimates on 
reoccurrence times and epicentral locations.  A second parallel between India and the Central 
U.S. is the spread of earthquake motions across wide exposure areas.  Because of the long 
attenuation distances possible in this region of India, the Bhuj earthquake was felt farther than 
1000 miles away in the eastern and southern parts of the country.  One is reminded of the New 
Madrid earthquake ringing church bells in Boston, a similar distance from the epicenter as Bhuj is 
from Calcutta.  
Correlations between Gujarat and the Central U.S. go farther than seismicity.  The preparedness 
of the local people in the villages and towns close to the epicenter, as well as in the city of 
Ahmedabad approximately 250 kilometers away, was nearly as poor as that of the people in Mid-
America. Little if any seismic rehabilitation was done prior to the Bhuj earthquake though this 
area of India is in their highest seismic zone.  A low number of insured properties suggested again 
the limited awareness of the public towards earthquake hazards.  
The economic loss attributable to direct damage for the Bhuj earthquake has been estimated at $5 
billion, which is an order of magnitude less than that estimated 
for a repeat of the 1812 New Madrid earthquake.  This is 
because the earthquake hit a relatively sparsely populated and 
remote area lacking the industrial facilities and transportation 
networks common to the Central United States. However, only 
about 2% of this loss, or $100 million was attributable to 
damage to insured property.  Only 10% to 12% of the 
population had earthquake insurance. 
4. Building Damage in Ahmedabad 
The city of Ahmedabad is the largest in the state of Gujarat 
with over six million people in the greater area, and the second 
largest in Western India.  The second largest textile industry in 
the country is located within this thriving city named after 
Sultan Ahmed Shah who founded the city in 1411 A.D. The 
historical center of the city faired well during the earthquake 
though there was some significant damage to ancient brick 
masonry walls (Figure 7-2) surrounding the city center.  
The only measured record of ground accelerations in the  
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Figure 7-4:  Collapse of soft-story building in 
Ahmedabad 
state of Gujarat was at the site of a new Passport Building in Ahmedabad.   Measured 
accelerations at this location were not large with a peak measured horizontal ground acceleration 
of about 0.1g. Yet 24 multi-story buildings collapsed 
and 45 more were damaged so badly that they were 
demolished.  Ironically, these were newer residential 
buildings constructed in the last decade.   
Ahmedadbad has experienced rapid growth over the 
last decade, and as a result, a large percentage of the 
city’s 20,000 buildings were constructed in the last ten 
years.  A number of new contractors have emerged in 
recent times to meet this demand with variable 
experience in construction.   
Nearly all of the 24 collapsed buildings were 
multistory residential buildings ranging in height from 
four to ten stories.  A common feature among many of 
these structures was an open base story that was used 
for parking.  The soft story at the ground level was 
dominant in Ahmedabad because of a municipal 
regulation limiting the occupancy area of a building 
relative to the lot size.  Plan dimensions of buildings 
were governed by a floor-space index, defined by the 
ratio of the sum of the total useable floor area divided 
by the lot area.  For normal lot sizes, this index was 
controlled to be less than one and did not include the area of 
the ground floor if left open for parking.  For larger lot sizes, 
the index was limited to a value of two. As a result, residential 
buildings were typically constructed with reinforced concrete 
frames that were infilled with masonry (usually burned clay 
bricks) above the ground story (Figure 7-3).   A common 
damage pattern for these building types was the collapse of 
the soft ground story.  As noted in Figure 7-4, a typical four 
plus one (i.e. four stories plus ground story) configuration in 
the background retained its integrity while the adjacent 
building, identical in architecture, collapsed.   This was a 
common observation.    
Despite the poor selection of building configuration, a good 
number of soft-story structures remained stable. Collapsed 
buildings were usually observed as isolated cases of an 
individual building surrounded by other similarly designed 
buildings that did not collapse.  This suggests that the 
configuration was not the only factor to cause collapse.  
Variances in construction quality, properties of construction 
materials or local site effects must also have played a role.   In 
some cases, building collapses were a result of adding a 
water tank or swimming pool at the roof level without 
providing the necessary strengthening of the structure to 
resist the increased inertial forces.  
Figure 7-3:  Typical residential construction with 
soft story at ground level 
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A few collapsed buildings in Ahmedabad lost 
lateral-force capacity at more than just the base 
story. Complete collapse of all five stories of a 
school building (Figure 7-5) occurred.  Forty-five 
students taking exams on the morning of Republic 
Day were killed as a result of this collapse. Reasons 
for collapse at every story are perhaps different 
than those for the single soft-story collapses. It is 
difficult to discern the exact cause of a failure 
simply by observing the stack of slabs. Obviously, 
the demand forces or displacements of the seismic 
excitation exceeded the lateral strength or 
deformation capacity of the unbraced columns.  
Again, if masonry filler walls or panels were placed 
within the plane of the lateral-force resisting 
frames, then collapse of the entire story would have 
been less likely to occur.  
A less dramatic, but relevant, form of damage than the complete building collapses was cracking 
of unreinforced clay-unit masonry buildings. As noted earlier, infill-
frame systems were by far the most predominant form of construction in 
Ahmedabad.  Masonry bearing wall construction was however used for 
older one or two-story residential construction.  These buildings did not 
collapse and therefore no lives were lost as a result of their behavior.  
However, damage in the form of cracking did present large economic 
losses for owners of these buildings. In many cases, occupants continued 
to live in damaged buildings while they were being repaired.  Cracks 
above window and door openings (Figure 7-6), in stairwells, along 
ceiling-wall interfaces and in shear walls were common.  Cracks often 
extended through the entire width of a multiwythe wall. Because 
construction of these buildings was quite similar to construction in the 
Central and Eastern United States, case study buildings in Ahmedabad 
provide an interesting example of what extents of damage may be likely 
in Mid America. St. Louis is approximately 270 km from the epicenter of 
a future New Madrid earthquake whereas Ahmedabad is about 255 km 
from the epicenter of the Bhuj earthquake.  
Visiting building sites in 
Ahmedabad two weeks 
following the earthquake 
afforded the opportunity to observe how local 
building owners and contractors were repairing and 
rehabilitating buildings.  Several examples were seen 
where an undamaged building adjacent to a collapsed 
building was being rehabilitated as a result of fear or 
paranoia on the part of building owners.  Commonly, 
unreinforced brick masonry walls were added to an 
open soft-story (Figure 7-7) to brace concrete 
columns.  Though these additional masonry elements 
may appear to be an added lateral strength, they may 
Figure 7-5:  Collapse of five-story school building     
in Ahmedabad 
Figure 7-6:  Damage to URM 
house in Ahmedabad 
Figure 7-7:  Rehabilitation of soft-
story building in Ahmedabad 
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 not possess the deformation capacity to adequately work with the flexible frame components.  
These masonry infills  
are likely to crack in the next earthquake and not brace the columns as intended. Other times, 
steel angles were placed around a concrete column to form a truss mechanism, but without the 
benefit of a structural analysis to properly size members or design welds connecting each 
member.  Still other examples included the placement of concrete jackets, or the addition of a 
mortar coating around an existing column. Reinforcement within these jackets or coatings was 
not necessarily anchored sufficiently at the top of the column, so again intended enhancements in 
lateral strength are likely not be realized in a future seismic event.  The variety of ad-hoc methods 
devised by individual contractors demonstrated the need for education of the local construction 
industry regarding sound structural engineering practices.  Such education must occur prior to the 
earthquake as a preparedness action so that repair measures may be implemented without 
hesitation soon after a disaster.  This is a lesson that can be learned by contractors in other regions 
of the world as well as India.  
5. Distribution of Building Damage across Region 
As noted in the table below, the city of Ahmedabad was 255 km from the epicenter.  Damage was 
limited to approximately 2% of the buildings in this urban area and would have been much worse 
had the earthquake struck closer.  Building collapses similar to those found in Ahmedabad were 
found in higher percentages in communities closer to the epicenter.  For example, the soft-story 
failures were predominant across the entire affected region, particularly in and around Bhuj, 
Anjar, Ghandidham and Bachau.  In addition, damage to other building types, including collapse 
of stone masonry dwellings, was coomon within a close proximity of the epicenter.   
Table 7-1:  Distance of communities from epicenter and degree of damage 
Community Type 
Distance 
from 
Epicenter 
(km) 
Degree of Damage Mercali 
Intensity 
Dudhai village 14 complete destruction XII 
Lodai village 16 complete destruction XII 
Bachau town 32 severe damage X 
Anjar town 34 destruction of city center XI 
Ghandidham city 38 collapse of buildings IX 
Bhuj city 42 severe damage IX 
Morbi town 100 destruction of city center VII 
Halvad town 119 destruction of city center VIII 
MotiMalwan village 150 destruction of city center XI 
Ahmedabad city 255 2% of buildings collapsed VI 
 
As a rough guide to the extent of damage with distance, ten communities are listed in Table 7-1 in 
order of their distance from the epicenter. The degree of damage and the apparent Modified 
Mercali Intensity scale (Richter, 1958) as given in the table are based on subjective opinion of the 
author and are given to help organize the discussion of building damage.  MMI was assessed on 
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the degree of average observed damage across a community rather than a single building.  Thus, 
the apparent MMI values in the table are higher for small villages with uniform destruction than 
for cities where collapse of individual buildings was observed.  The data given in Table 7-1 is 
shown in Figure 7-8.   
Villages of Dudhai and Lodhai close to the epicenter 
(14 km and 16 km) both suffered total destruction.   
As noted in Figure 7-9, one and two-story dwellings 
constructed of uncut stone masonry were shaken to 
rubble.  Virtually no building was spared across the 
entire community.  Peak ground accelerations 
required to cause this level of damage are estimated 
in excess of 1.0g.  Similar degrees of destruction 
were also observed in the town center of Anjar (34 
km from the epicenter) where building collapses also 
included reinforced concrete frame buildings (Figure 
7-10).  
As would be expected, damage intensity in general 
reduced with distance from the epicenter.  However, 
two points on the curve of Figure 7-8 show 
anomalies to this relation. The small village of 
MotiMalwan, 150 km from the epicenter, had severe 
destruction of buildings within its older city center 
(Figure 7-11).  Damage to this village was much 
more extensive than that observed in towns and 
villages within a third of the distance from the 
epicenter. Also, residential buildings within the 
older city center of Halvad were uniformly 
destroyed (Figure 7-12) at 119 km whereas damage 
in the neighboring town of Morbi was limited to  
Figure 7-8:  Apparent MMI vs. distance relation 
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cracking of masonry with collapse limited to a few buildings.   As noted in Figure 7-1, both 
MotiMalwan and Halvad are close to the edge of the Little Rann of Kachchh (5 km and 14 km  
respectively) suggesting that the more severe damage at these two locations was attributable to 
amplification effects at the edge of this basin. 
Perhaps the most striking examples of destruction to engineered construction were found in Bhuj, 
Ghandidham and Bachau where collapse of dozens of multi-story reinforced concrete frame 
buildings had occurred.  Several building collapses in Ghandidham of three to ten-story concrete 
buildings such as that shown in Figure 7-13 were attributable again to soft first stories though a 
variety of other structural design problems were observed including columns punching through 
slabs, poor detailing of reinforcing steel and questionable construction quality.  Similar types of 
collapses and building failures occurred in the regions of new development surrounding Bhuj 
(Figure 7-14).  One building in Bhuj (Figure 7-15) completely overturned as a result of fracture of 
column reinforcing steel from foundations.   
Figure 7-11:  Stone masonry building damage           
in Motimalwan 
Figure 7-12:  Stone masonry building damage in Halvad 
Figure 7-13:  Building collapse in Ghandidham Figure 7-14:  Soft-story collapse in Bhuj 
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Brick masonry construction was not prevalent in the area because clay deposits were not available 
locally. However, stone masonry construction was common.  Rubble stone construction was 
typical for one or two-story dwellings in villages and small towns.  Found in larger towns and 
cities, cut stone was often used at the corners of a building to confine rubble stone placed within a 
wall between the corners. This type of construction proved to be more resilient to collapse than 
the rubble construction found in the villages, though considerable damage was observed due to 
falling of rubble stones from walls. Damage to one and two-story masonry buildings was 
prevalent throughout the area, such as the damage shown in Figure 7-16 in Bhuj.  Whereas the 
death toll as a result of the damage to cut-stone masonry was less than that of rubble stone 
masonry and much less than that for reinforced concrete construction, the performance of these 
buildings was unacceptable in terms of the total economic loss. There were many examples where 
the damage was so extensive that buildings had to be demolished and rebuilt.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
The mass destruction of buildings and other forms of construction in Gujarat provides the 
background for a compelling argument that earthquakes still have the potential to cause serious 
disasters to life and property.  The large death toll of over 100,000 people indicates that life-
safety goals for building design and construction are not yet fulfilled.  Concrete buildings with 
massive slabs and overly weak lateral-force resisting elements once again were shown to be a 
major threat to human life. As well, weak unreinforced masonry construction was shown to be 
vulnerable to strong ground shaking. Without aggressive rehabilitation programs in other 
earthquake-prone areas of the world where these construction forms exist, similar damage 
statistics are likely to be repeated.  
Indian seismic codes and detailing practices for buildings are technically sound and similar in 
theory to those used in the United States.  However, without code enforcement and third-party 
review, future earthquakes will continue to result in significant losses despite advancements in 
engineering design and construction technology.    
The populace generally believes that infrequent earthquakes will take some time to strike and that 
there is plenty of time to take action to mitigate their effects.  The Republic Day Earthquake 
Figure 7-16:  Masonry damage in Bhuj Figure 7-15:  Overturned five-story building in Bhuj 
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proved this myth to be untrue. The primary lesson of the reoccurrence of this “forgotten 
earthquake” is that our time to research, prepare and mitigate future seismic hazards is limited, 
and the pace of future efforts must be accelerated.   
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Chapter 8: Performance of Engineered Buildings 
 
by  
 
S.K. Ghosh1 
S.K. Ghosh and Associates, Inc. 
 
This chapter discusses the performance of engineered construction, the post-earthquake 
strengthening of reinforced concrete buildings, as well as Indian standards and codes of practice 
regulating earthquake-resistant construction.  Seismological and geotechnical aspects of the 
earthquake are not discussed here.  The map of the affected area in Figure 7-1 of Chapter 7 is also 
not reproduced here, but needs to be referred to. 
 
1. Performance of Engineered Construction  
 
Performance of engineered construction was investigated by the MAE team in Ahmedabad, 
Morbi, Gandhidham, Bhuj, Anjar and Bhachau located approximately 250, 150, 50, 48, 40, and 
35 km away from the epicenter, respectively. 
 
2. Ahmedabad (Approximately 250 km from epicenter)  
 
The only strong motion instrument in the entire area affected by the Bhuj earthquake was in the 
basement of a multistory building in Ahmedabad.  The recorded peak ground acceleration was 
0.1g (Figure 8-1).  Ground motion of this intensity should not cause significant structural damage 
to properly engineered construction.  Yet more than 70 multistory residential buildings collapsed 
in Ahmedabad.  The reasons for such disproportionate damage were fairly apparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 SKG, 3344 Commercial Avenue, Northbrook, IL 60062 USA, 
email: skghosh@aol.com 
Figure 8-1: 
Accelerogram 
recorded at 
basement of a 
building in 
downtown 
Ahmedabad 
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3. Building Period versus Ground Motion Period 
 
Short-period components of ground motion typically die out faster than the long-period 
components of ground motion as earthquake shocks travel away from the source of an 
earthquake.  Typically, at long distances away from the epicenter, the ground motion has 
predominantly long-period components. 
 
From the copy available to the MAE Center team of the sole ground motion record, it was not 
possible to discern the predominant period.  However, it would be safe to speculate that the 
predominant periods were 0.5 sec. and longer.  This in itself would explain the lack of damage to 
shorter buildings in Ahmedabad.  The buildings that collapsed were in the ground plus four to 
ground plus ten-story height range.  Buildings in this height range, particularly considering the 
type of construction, most likely had elastic fundamental periods in the range of the predominant 
periods of the ground motion.  The consequent near-resonant response must have been, at least in 
part, responsible for much of the damage sustained. 
 
4. Soft Soil 
 
Goel has made an important observation with respect to the soils on which the collapsed 
Ahmedabad buildings were founded.  According to him, “Although a cursory analysis of location 
of building collapses would indicate no particular pattern, a careful analysis reveals that most of 
the buildings that collapsed lie along the old path of Sabarmati River….Note that the path of most 
of the buildings that collapsed in areas west of the Sabarmati River are closely aligned with the 
old path of the river…just west of the present river path.  The south, southeast of the city, 
especially the Mani Nagar area, where additional collapses were observed, falls between two 
lakes, indicating the presence of either poor soil conditions or possibly construction on non-
engineered fills.  While the evidence presented…is strong, it would be useful to further verify 
these conclusions with field testing.” 
 
5. Type of Construction 
 
Multi-story residential buildings (and most other multi-story buildings) in Ahmedabad, the rest of 
India, and indeed in much of the rest of the world, are constructed of reinforced concrete frames, 
with the openings in those frames infilled with unreinforced clay brick masonry. 
 
There is a problem inherent in the use of unreinforced masonry infills.  Initially, while they are 
intact, they impart significant stiffness to a building which, as a consequence, attracts strong 
earthquake forces.  The resulting deformations are often more than sufficient to cause cracking or 
even explosive failure of the infilled masonry.  When that happens, the period of the building 
lengthens significantly all of a sudden.  Although this usually is beneficial in terms of attracting 
less earthquake forces, depending on the nature of the earthquake ground motion, the opposite 
may be the case.  In the 1985 Mexico earthquake, with the predominant 2-second period of the 
ground motion in downtown Mexico City, a building attracted stronger earthquake forces with the 
loss of the infill.  Also, very importantly, the altered earthquake forces must be resisted 
essentially by the bare frame.  If the frame lacks that capability, severe damage or collapse may 
result.    
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Figure 8-2: Typical soft-
story residential building 
6. Stiffness Discontinuity or Soft Story 
 
In virtually all Indian cities, the multi-story residential buildings of 
the type described above, have open ground stories for parking of 
automobiles, because the small lots on which such buildings are 
typically built do not allow for open parking (Figure 8-2).  This 
means an almost total absence of infills at the ground level, thus 
creating a very distinct stiffness discontinuity or a soft story.  
Virtually all the earthquake-induced deformations in such a 
building occur in the columns of the soft story, with the rest of the 
building basically going along for a ride.  If these columns are not 
designed to accommodate the large deformations, they may fail, 
leading to catastrophic failure of the entire building, as was the 
case with many buildings in Ahmedabad and elsewhere. 
 
7. Discontinuity of Vertical Load Path 
 
The local municipal corporation in Ahmedabad imposes a Floor 
Surface Index (FSI), which restricts the ground floor area of a building to be no more than a 
certain percentage of the lot area.  It is, however, permitted to cover more area at upper floor 
levels than at the ground floor level. The same is the situation in many other Indian cities as well.  
Thus, most buildings have overhanging covered floor areas at upper floors, the overhangs 
frequently ranging up to 5 feet or more.  The columns on the periphery of the upper floors do not 
continue down to the ground level.  The columns at the ground floor level also may or may not 
align with the columns at the upper levels.  Significant vertical discontinuities are therefore 
caused in the lateral-force-resisting system. 
 
8. Non-Ductile Detailing 
 
Goel has reported:  “The columns for low-rise residential buildings, up to ground plus four stories 
(G + 4), rest on shallow isolated footings located about 5 ft (1.52 m) below the ground level.  For 
taller buildings, say up to ground plus ten stories (G + 10), the column foundations are still open 
footings located at a depth of 8 to 10 ft (2.44 to 3.05 m); sometimes the foundation may also have 
tie beams.  The column sizes for low-rise buildings (G + 4) are about 9 x 18 in. (230 X 460 mm) 
with ties consisting of mild steel smooth No. 2 (6 mm dia.) bars at a spacing of about 8 to 9 in. 
(200 to 230 mm).  The beams tend to be much deeper to accommodate large spans and 
overhangs, giving rise to strong beam-weak column construction.  The column sizes for taller 
buildings tend to be a little bigger, usually 12 inch by 24 inch with No. 3 (10 mm dia.) deformed 
steel ties at a spacing of 8 to 9 in. (200 to 230 mm).   The beam size in taller buildings may be 
similar to the column size.  These ties always end up with 90-degree hooks. 
 
Such nonductile detailing of reinforced concrete construction is common around the world, 
including pre-1973 reinforced concrete construction in California, although details vary from 
place to place and depending upon the age of a building.  In addition to all of the above, column 
reinforcement is typically spliced right above the floor levels; splice length in columns as well as 
beams is often insufficient; continuity of beam reinforcement over and into the supports is often 
also insufficient. 
 
The large deformations that take place in soft story columns also impose extreme shear demands 
on them.  The meager lateral reinforcement described above not only provides poor confinement 
 102 
the shear strength available is also quite low.  As a result, many ground floor columns failed in a 
brittle shear mode, or in a combined shear plus compression mode, bringing down the supported 
building (Figure 8-3).  Many times in columns that had not failed, diagonal shear cracking was 
evident. 
 
 
 
9. Torsion 
 
The typical soft-story residential building described above is torsionally quite flexible at the 
ground floor level.  If appreciable eccentricities between the center of mass and the center of 
rigidity are introduced because of asymmetric placement of walls or other reasons, significant 
torsional motions may result.  These may subject columns on one side of a building to excessive 
deformations.  If not adequately designed to accomodate such deformations, the columns may 
fail, contributing to building collapse.  According to Goel, “deformations due to torsion may have 
contributed to failure of at least one building” in Ahmedabad. 
 
10. Detailing of Shearwall core and connection to remainder of Structure 
 
The typical soft-story residential building described above relies upon the shearwall core(s) 
around stairwell(s) and/or elevator shafts to resist most of the lateral load at the ground floor 
level.  Up the height of the building, the shearwalls do unload increasing percentages of story 
shears onto the frames, providing the floor diaphragms connecting them are rigid enough in-plane 
to impose equal displacements on the shearwalls and the frames.  Several deficiencies were 
observed. 
 
The ratio of cross-sectional area of shearwalls to plan area of building was often quite low.  The 
shearwalls are typically “about 4 to 6 inches thick with very light reinforcement consisting of two 
layers of mesh formed with No. 3 or 4 bars at vertical and horizontal spacings of about 18 inches.  
Such detailing was often insufficient to resist the lateral loads at the ground floor level; severe 
shear cracking of shearwalls at the ground level was often observed. The shear cracking often did 
not extend above the ground floor level, reflecting reduced shear demand on the walls. 
The shearwall core was often connected to the rest of the building only through the floor slabs, 
with no beams framing into the shearwalls.  The anchorage of slab reinforcing into the elevator 
core was often insufficient.  As a result, the shearwalls sometimes just pulled out from portions of 
the building, leaving them devoid of much lateral resistance. 
 
 
 
Figure 8-3: Non-ductile detailing of column 
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11. Material Quality 
 
There were indications that deficient material quality might also have contributed to structural 
damage, or even collapse.  Goel, in his recent paper, showed the bottom of a column in a partially 
collapsed building.  “The concrete has simply disintegrated within the reinforcement cage, when 
touched, the concrete felt sandy with little cement.  Also note that the 90-degree hooks have 
opened up, which leads to little or no confinement of the concrete.  Many of the times, the 
concrete cover to reinforcement was noted to be less than half-inch, most of the cover was 
provided by the plaster used to smooth the column surface. It is worth noting that most of the 
water supply in the outer part of the city is through ground water which is salty in taste.  Usually 
the same water is used in preparing the concrete for construction.  Therefore, the presence of salts 
may have also affected the concrete quality.” 
 
12. Morbi (Approximately 150 km from Epicenter) 
 
Morbi has a number of ceramic tile factories on its outskirts.  Vertical cracking was observed in a 
tall masonry chimney in one of those factories (Figure 8-4).  Another chimney had apparently lost 
several feet at the top.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-4: Cracked masonry chimney outside Morbi 
 104 
One notable structure in the town of Morbi is Mani Mandir, a huge, two-story stone masonry 
building of four continuous wings along the four faces, with a large courtyard in the middle.  In 
the inner courtyard is a stone masonry temple.  Except for some parapet damage, both the outer 
structure and the inner temple appeared to be in good shape (Figures 8-5, 8-6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was significant damage to major masonry buildings in the center of the town of Morbi.  
These buildings included the old palace of the former ruling family (Figure 8-7).  The damage 
appeared to be due to loss of parapets, but also to the roof pulling out of masonry walls, 
indicating insufficient anchorage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-5: Mani Mandir – outer 
structure, Morbi 
Figure 8-6: Mani Mandir – 
inner temple, Morbi 
Figure 8-7: Old palace of the former ruling family, Morbi 
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13. Gandhidham (Approximately 50 km from Epicenter) 
 
Gandhidham has a large number of multistory commercial as well as residential buildings of 
infilled reinforced concrete frame construction that suffered severe damage or collapse. 
 
Figure 8-8 shows two adjoining commercial buildings in the business district of the city.  The 
ground stories of both buildings have collapsed.  Interestingly, the ground-level columns of the 
corner building punched through the slab at the first suspended level (Figure 8-9).  This particular 
phenomenon has rarely been observed in past earthquakes. 
 
There was another interesting case of the shear core of a building having totally separated from 
the building itself (Figure 8-10).  The right wing of the building had collapsed, while the left wing 
was still standing up in a damaged state.  The shear core itself was more or less intact. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-8: A pair of adjoining commercial 
buildings with soft-story failure, Gandhidham 
Figure 8-9: Pushing of ground-level 
column through slab 
Figure 8-10: Core separated from rest of building 
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Figure 8-11: New palace of the 
former ruling family, Morbi 
 Figure 8-14: Overturned building,   
 Bhuj 
14. Bhuj (Just under 50 km from Epicenter) 
 
The old, walled city of Bhuj, with a population of 160,000, was the city closest to the epicenter.  
Engineered buildings in the older parts of town, including the business district, were of masonry 
or infilled reinforced concrete frame construction.  Newer engineered buildings were mostly on 
the outskirts of the city and were predominantly of infilled reinforced concrete frame 
construction.  The infill in modern buildings can be unreinforced concrete block masonry, as well 
as clay masonry. 
 
There was extensive damage to all types of engineered 
construction.  The business district was virtually 
deserted two and a half weeks after the earthquake and 
few buildings stood unscathed.  In the heart of the city 
are palaces that once belonged to the former ruling 
family.  The “new” palace, a massive three-stories tall 
well-engineered, well-constructed, cut-stone masonry 
building had performed admirably well.  About the 
worst damage  was some parapet loss in one area of the 
building (Figure 8-11).  The old palace of the same 
height, which stood on the same grounds, of rubble stone 
masonry construction, by contrast, had sustained 
extensive damage (Figure 8-12).  Repairs to the old 
palace will be too expensive to be practicable. 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
A relatively new upscale apartment complex on the outskirts of town had extensive damage, 
including collapse of ground-level soft stories over much of the complex (Figure 8-13). 
 
A rare case of a building having overturned was also found at Bhuj (Figure 8-14).  The reason 
could not be definitively established, although there was speculation that the cause might have 
been differential settlement of the foundations. 
 
               
 
Figure 8-12: Old palace of the 
former ruling family, Morbi 
Figure 8-13: Recently 
built apartment complex 
in Bhuj with soft-story 
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15. Anjar (Approximately 40 km from Epicenter) 
 
The town of Anjar was almost totally destroyed (Figure 8-15). It was not possible to distinguish 
between engineered and non-engineered buildings. Here and there, a few multistory buildings 
stood after a fashion, with their soft bottom stories invariably gone. 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Bhachau (Approximately 35 km from Epicenter) 
 
The town of Bhachau was a scene of almost total destruction.  There were unmistakable signs of 
significant ground displacements.  Figure 8-16 shows a fountain of concrete that is broken into 
pieces.  The failure of such a structure of no significant height would typically be the result of 
ground displacements, rather than earthquake forces.  The base of the utility pole in the 
foreground of Figure 8-17 also showed significant recession of the ground. 
 
The building of Figure 8-17 and two nearly identical neighboring buildings facing the same street 
were each two stories tall at the front (the side facing the street) and three stories tall at the back, 
because of a sloping site; each building suffered a soft-story failure in the basement or the lowest 
level.  The street-level story of the neighboring building had sunk by nearly a story height.  The 
building neighboring that one had suffered almost total collapse.  It can be said with assurance 
that all multistory buildings in town with soft stories had suffered soft story failures. 
 
     
 
Figure 8-15: Complete collapse of buildings, Anjar 
Figure 8-16: Cracked reinforced concrete 
fountain, Bhuj 
Figure 8-17: Utility pole and building with 
soft-story failure below street level, Bachau 
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17. Post-Earthquake Strengthening of Reinforced Concrete Buildings  
 
The multi-story residential buildings sustaining significant earthquake damage or suffering 
collapse in Ahmedabad were mostly in upscale neighborhoods of the city.  Owners of repairable 
buildings and even of buildings that did not undergo any significant damage were anxious to get 
repair or strengthening done, which they obviously could afford.  A surprising amount of repair 
and strengthening work was well underway only two and a half weeks after the earthquake.  
Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of such work appeared to make little engineering 
sense.  There appeared to be hardly any engineering involvement; the owners appeared to be 
dealing directly with builders and contractors.  The following were observed: 
 
1) In perhaps the simplest of repairs, damaged infilled unreinforced masonry walls were 
being replaced with the same unreinforced (mostly) clay brick masonry (Figure 8-
18).  Properly done, this, of course, would neither enhance nor lower the seismic 
resistance of the buildings concerned. 
2) Unreinforced masonry walls were being added at the ground level, where they did 
not exist before, either between existing columns, or sometimes with an existing 
column only at one end of a wall (Figure 8-19).  In the absence of careful 
consideration to the layout of these walls, particularly with reference to the layout of 
walls in the upper levels, this particular strengthening strategy appears to be 
questionable. 
3) Existing reinforced concrete columns had been or were being jacketed by reinforced 
concrete, with additional reinforcing bars in the jacket.  These bars in the jacket, 
however, did not continue down to the column footing.  At the upper end, the 
reinforcing bars were not made continuous with the reinforcement in the members 
framing in (Figures 8-20a, b).  These jackets will simply “peel way”- at the beginning 
of the next earthquake, not adding to the seismic resistance of the building 
presumably strengthened by them.  
4) Clay brick masonry columns with light steel framing around, with the masonry and 
the steel encased in concrete, were being added (Figure 8-21).  The author is not 
aware if such columns have been tested and their behavior under simulated seismic 
loading studied.  In any case, the light steel framing which was the only 
reinforcement, did not continue down to the footing, or made continuous with 
reinforcement in the framing members at the top. 
5) The same light steel framing was being installed around existing reinforced concrete 
columns with the plaster often not removed from the concrete (Figure 8-22), with the 
existing column and the steel framing encased in new concrete.  The remarks made 
under Item 4 above also apply to these columns. 
6) Sometimes a clay brick masonry column or a steel I-column had been installed 
against an existing concrete column, the two lightly tied together (Figure 8-23), with 
the whole thing to be apparently encased in concrete.  The added column might 
continue down to the footing at the lower end.  There definitely was no continuity at 
the top.  These again appeared to be untested measures of questionable benefit. 
7) Corner columns had been added to buildings at the ground level where no such 
column existed before (Figure 8-24).  While this would appear to be a sensible thing 
to do, in the absence of continuity at the top and the bottom, these columns are likely 
to be ineffective as well. 
 
Ironically, at least in one case, more attention appeared to have been paid to the continuity of 
steel columns acting as temporary supports, than to the continuity of permanent columns.  The 
plate welded to the top of the I-columns in Figure 8-25 had a reinforcing bar hook welded on top, 
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which in turn had been welded to the bottom reinforcement in the reinforced concrete member 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
                    
Figure 8-18: Damaged infilled 
unreinforced masonry walls being replaced 
Figure 8-19: Unreinforced masonry walls 
being added at ground level building 
 
                         Figures 8-20a & b: Reinforced bars in jacket not made continuous with  
reinforcement in members framing in 
Figure 8-21: Added clay brick masonry 
columns with light steel framing around 
Figure 8-22: Light steel framing 
installed around existing reinforced 
concrete column 
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       Figure 8-23: Clay brick masonry column 
       installed against an existing column 
 
 
      Figure 8-24: Corner column added to  
      building at ground level 
 
 
18. Indian Codes and Standards  
 
India has, for quite some time now, had sophisticated codes and standards.  The three documents 
relevant to this discussion are: 
 
1. IS 1893:1984 – Indian Standard Criteria for Earthquake Resistant Design of 
Structures (Fourth Revision). 
2. IS 4326:1993 – Indian Standard Earthquake Resistant Design and Construction of 
Buildings – Code of Practice, and 
3. IS 13920:1993 - Indian Standard Ductile Detailing of Reinforced Concrete Structures 
subjected to Seismic forces - Code of Practice 
 
IS 1893 states: “It is not intended in this standard to lay down regulations so that no structure 
shall suffer any damage during earthquake of all magnitudes.  It has been endeavored to ensure 
that, as far as possible, structures are able to respond without structural damage to shocks of 
moderate intensities, and without total collapse to shocks of heavy intensities.” 
Figure 8-25: Continuity at top end of steel column 
acting as temporary support 
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IS 1893 contains a seismic zoning map.  The object of this map is to classify the area of the 
country into a number of zones in which one may reasonably expect earthquake shock of more or 
less the same intensity in the future.  The modified Mercalli Intensity associated with the various 
zones is V or less, VI, VII, VIII, and IX and above for Zones I, II, III, IV, and V, respectively. 
 
It may be noted that Bhuj is in Seismic Zone V, while both Ahmedabad and Mumbai (Bombay) 
are in Zone III. 
 
IS 4326 is intended to cover the specified features of design and construction for earthquake 
resistance of buildings of conventional types.  In case of other buildings, detailed analysis of 
earthquake forces is required.  Recommendations regarding restrictions on openings, provision of 
steel in various horizontal bands and vertical steel in corners and junctions in walls and at jambs 
of openings are based on extensive analytical work.  Many of the provisions have also been 
verified experimentally on models by shake table tests. 
 
IS 4326: 1976 ‘Code of practice for earthquake resistant design and construction of buildings,’ 
while covering certain special features for the design and construction of earthquake resistant 
buildings, included some details for achieving ductility in reinforced concrete buildings.  With a 
view to keeping abreast of the rapid developments and extensive research in the field of 
earthquake resistant design of reinforced concrete structures, the decision was made to cover 
provisions for the earthquake resistant design and detailing of reinforced concrete structures 
separately. 
 
IS 13920 incorporates a number of important provisions not covered in IS 4326: 
 
a) As a result of the experience gained from the performance in earthquakes of 
reinforced concrete structures that were designed and detailed as per IS 4326:            
1976, many identified deficiencies were corrected in IS 13920. 
b) Provisions on detailing of beams and columns were revised with an aim of  
                   providing them with adequate toughness and ductility so as to make them  
      capable of undergoing extensive inelastic deformations and dissipating 
      seismic energy in a stable manner. 
c) Specifications on seismic design and detailing of reinforced concrete shear 
walls were included. 
 
The other significant items incorporated in IS 13920 are as follows: 
a) Material specifications are indicated for lateral- force-resisting elements of 
frames. 
b) Geometric constraints are imposed on cross-section of flexural members.   
Provisions on minimum and maximum reinforcement have been revised.  The 
requirements for detailing of longitudinal reinforcement in beams at joint faces, and 
splices, and anchorage requirements are made more explicit.  Provisions are also 
included for calculation of design shear force and for detailing of transverse 
reinforcement in beams. 
c) For members subjected to axial load and flexure, dimensional constraints have 
been imposed on the cross section.  Provisions are included for detailing of lap 
splices and for the calculation of design shear force.  A comprehensive set of 
requirements is included on the provision of special confining reinforcement in those 
regions of a column that are expected to undergo cyclic inelastic deformations during 
a severe earthquake. 
d) Provisions have been included for estimating the shear strength and 
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flexural strength of shear wall sections.  Provisions are also given for detailing of 
reinforcement in the wall web, boundary elements, coupling beams, around openings, 
at construction joints, and for the development, splicing and anchorage of 
reinforcement. 
 
While the common methods of design and construction have been covered in IS 13920, special 
systems of design and construction of any plain or reinforced concrete structure not covered by 
this code may be permitted on production of satisfactory evidence, regarding their adequacy for 
seismic performance by analysis or tests or both. 
 
It is interesting to note that the provisions of IS 13920 apply to reinforced concrete structures that 
satisfy one of the following conditions: 
 
a) The structure is located in seismic zone IV or V; 
b) The structure is located in seismic zone III and has an importance factor of greater 
than 1.0; 
c) The structure is located in seismic zone III and is an industrial structure; and 
d) The structure is located in seismic zone III and is more than 5 stories high. 
 
Thus, the residential buildings in Ahmedabad with ground + 4 stories are exempt from the 
requirements of IS 13920. 
 
The above codes, as noted earlier, are quite sophisticated.  IS 13920:1993 is, in fact, greatly 
influenced by ACI 318-89.  However, code enforcement practically does not exist in India.  
Central and State governments would at times require code compliance for buildings owned by 
them.  For other buildings, code requirements are seldom, if ever, enforced.  Local jurisdictions 
typically do not have a mechanism in place to enforce code requirements.  This not only explains 
much of the damage observed to engineered buildings, but also indicates that the promise of a 
bright future is not on the horizon. 
 
19. Possible Areas of Code Improvement  
 
The legal building codes of most legal jurisdictions (cities, counties, states) within the United 
States are based on one of three so-called model codes.  The Uniform Building Code (UBC), 
typically adopted in the western half of the country, roughly speaking; the BOCA National 
Building Code (BOCA/NBC), usually adopted in the northeastern quarter of the country; and the 
Standard Building Code (SBC), mostly adopted in the southeastern quarter of the country.  These 
three were expected to be replaced by one unified model code for the entire country: the 
International Building Code(IBC), the first edition of which was published in April 2000.  The 
IBC is slowly being adopted in various jurisdictions around the country.  A competing model 
building code, NFPA 5000, being developed by the National Fire Protection Association based in 
Quincy, Massachusetts, is expected to be published in 2002.  A new edition of the UBC, the 
BOCA/NBC as well as the SBC used to be published every three years.  The IBC is expected to 
maintain the same schedule.  The seismic design provisions of the UBC have traditionally been 
based on the Recommended Lateral Force Requirements  (Blue Book) published by the Structural 
Engineers Association of California (SEAOC).  The seismic design provisions of the latest 
editions of the BOCA/NBC and the SBC are based on the 1991 NEHRP Provisions.  Both allow 
seismic design by the ASCE 7 Standard Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other 
Structures, 1995 edition, which has its seismic design provisions based on the 1994 NEHRP 
Provisions.  The seismic design provisions of the 2000 IBC are based on the 1997 NEHRP 
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Provisions.  The seismic design provisions of NFPA 5000 are expected to be based on ASCE 7-
02, which in turn will draw its seismic design provisions from the 2000 NEHRP Provisions. 
 
The treatment of soils in seismic design changed drastically in the 1994 edition of the NEHRP 
Provisions. A four-tier soil classification was replaced by a six-tier classification.  Instead of one 
soil factor, there were now two site coefficients: an acceleration-related or short-period 
coefficient and a velocity-dependent or long-period coefficient.  While the traditional soil factor 
was only a function of the soil type at the site, each of the two new site coefficients, in addition to 
being a function of the same, was additionally a function of the seismicity at the site.  For the 
same soil type or site class (as it is called now), the site coefficients are typically higher in regions 
of low seismicity and lower in regions of high seismicity.  Finally, while the maximum value of 
the traditional soil factor was 2, the maximum values of the new short-period and long-period site 
coefficients are 2.5 and 3.5 respectively.  The new scheme is adopted into the 1997 UBC, the 
1995 and 1998 editions of the ASCE 7 standard and the 2000 IBC.  The author believes that this 
new scheme is worth looking into whenever an update of IS 1893 is undertaken. 
 
The 1988 edition of the Uniform Building Code introduced a table of vertical structural 
irregularities and a separate table of plan structural irregularities. If a building became classified 
as structurally irregular by the criteria in one of the tables, depending on the type of irregularity, 
restrictions applied to the building. It might be limited in height on regions of significant 
seismicity, or dynamic analysis might be required as the basis of design, and so forth. These 
provisions were adopted into the 1991 NEHRP Provisions, are thus part of the BOCA/National 
Building Code and the Standard Building Code, and with minor modifications are also to be 
found in the 1997 NEHRP Provisions and the 2000 IBC. These provisions would also be 
worthwhile considering for an update of IS 1893. 
 
United States building codes have not allowed the use of unreinforced masonry in regions of 
moderate and high seismicity since the early to mid-seventies. Such a ban would be impractical 
for India.  However, one idea that may be worthwhile exploring is in fact practiced in Mexico. 
They brace the frame bays to be infilled with unreinforced masonry, as shown in Figure 8-26. 
This has the benefit of lowering the deformations that would be imposed on the unreinforced 
masonry. More importantly, loss of unreinforced masonry is likely to be over smaller areas at a 
time and is thus likely to be more gradual and smaller in overall impact. For instance, such 
bracing would automatically become required if it is mandated that no more than 1 m2 (11 sft) of 
masonry can be left unreinforced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8-26: Bracing of frame bays infilled with unreinforced masonry 
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1. Overview 
 
The state of Gujurat is one of the most industrialized of the country. The region is served by 
several major ports on the Gulf of Kachchh and by highways, railroads and airports. Pipelines and 
powerlines also cross the region. The most urbanized part of the state is the Ahmedabad-
Vadodara (Baroda) industrial belt, east of the most-heavily shaken epicentral region. Although 
performance of these facilities often was very good, damage did occur. Locations of significant 
damage, described in the following, are indicated on the map of Figure 9-1. 
 
2. Transportation Structures and Networks 
 
The epicentral region is served by national and state highways, railroads, and three airports. 
Disruption of the transportation system occurred primarily because of damage to bridges and 
culverts. No major highway bridges collapsed; use of one major river bridge was impeded due to 
damage, and two minor reinforced concrete slab culverts collapsed. Only one railroad bridge was 
reported to be damaged. The Ahmedabad airport remained operational and the Bhuj airport was 
restored to service the same day of the earthquake.  
 
Highways 
The state of Gujarat contains approximately 69,000 km of surfaced roads (excluding city streets), 
with National Highways comprising 1877 km and  State Highways comprising 19518 km. 
Extensive damage to roadways was not observed during the reconnaissance. Damage to highway 
pavements was reported only near Rapar, as a result of lateral spreading. 
 
Bridges 
The most disruptive damage to the highway system was the loss of bearing support at the 
Surajbari Creek Bridge, located on the heavily-traveled National Highway 8A. Two reinforced 
concrete slab culverts collapsed, on a minor road northeast of Bhuj, due to the failure of 
unreinforced masonry abutment backwalls. Other bridges sustained minor damage at expansion 
joints, bearings, masonry piers, and reinforced concrete deck railings. Minor bridge damage 
occurred as far as 250 km east of the epicenter in Ahmedabad and 70 km north of the epicenter, 
toward the Pakistani border. This damage is described below. 
 
3. Bridge Damage in the Epicentral Region 
 
Surajbari Creek Bridge 
 
The Surajbari Creek Bridge (Figure 9-2) is a two-lane bridge that provides passage over the Little 
Rann of Kachchh on National Highway 8A, joining the Rajkot and Kachchh Districts.  
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Constructed in 1968, the reinforced concrete balanced cantilever bridge has 35 spans totaling 
1204 meters in length. The superstructure is a two-cell box girder, having main spans of 32.92 m 
in length, with cantilevers of 8.38 m and suspended spans of 10.06 m in length. The 
superstructure was supported on steel rocker and roller bearings. The bearings are supported on 
reinforced concrete cellular piers that are 4.5 meters in height. The abutments are reinforced 
concrete. Caissons provide support to the piers and abutments. The caissons have an outside 
diameter of 9.80 m and extend 17.37 m below the piers to competent soils.  
 
The bridge was closed to traffic following the earthquake due to lateral movement of the 
superstructure. It was reported that all bearings supporting the superstructure spans were 
damaged. Significant movement took place at the expansion joints at the abutments (Figure 9-3); 
movement at the south abutment left the superstructure approximately 3 inches lower than the 
abutment, with the expansion joint open approximately 8 inches. Liquefaction was widespread in 
the area, with numerous sand blows evident in the vicintiy; workers reported water spouts as high 
as 1.5 m. The bearings were replaced with temporary wood and masonry block supports (e.g. 
Figure 9-4), allowing a single lane of traffic to be restored two days after the earthquake. Reduced 
capacity continued until March 2, when traffic was diverted to a new bridge that was under 
construction at the time of the earthquake, just east of the existing bridge. 
 
New Surajbari Creek Bridge 
 
Figure 9-5 shows the new Surajbari bridge under construction at the time of the earthquake.  
Reinforced concrete blocks provided to restrain transverse movement of the deck reportedly were 
damaged in the earthquake, and expansion joints were damaged by pounding in the longitudinal 
direction. Workers reported that the fills at the southern approach to the bridge settled 3 m during 
the earthquake. Ground cracks of several inches width extending approximately parallel to the 
roadway were visible at several locations just south of the bridge (Figure 9-6), with liquefaction 
evident at the lower portions that were not filled (Figure 9-7). 
 
 
Figure 9-1:  Locations of damaged lifelines and industrial facilities 
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Figure 9-2:  View to northeast of Surajbari 
Creek Bridge 
Figure 9-3:  Movement of superstructure and 
loss of bearing support at the south abutment 
 
  
Figure 9-4:  Temporary wood and masonry 
bearing blocks at southern abutment  
Figure 9-5:  The new Surajbari bridge, under 
construction 
 
  
Figure 9-6:  View of the southern approach to 
the new Surajbari bridge. Settlement of 3 m 
was reported. Ground cracks on the order of 3 
inches in width were aligned parallel to 
roadway 
Figure 9-7: Ponded water and salt deposits 
remaining from liquefaction visible in the 
foreground; the southern approach to the new 
Surajbari bridge is in the background  
Khari River Bridge 
 
The Khari River Bridge is located on State Highway 45 approximately 12 km north of Bhuj near 
the town of Rudramata (Figure 9-8). The two-lane bridge was constructed in 1966 and spans a 
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total of 168 m. The superstructure and piers are reinforced concrete, and the abutments are made 
of coursed stone masonry. Each slab-girder span is 16.8 m in length and is supported on mild 
steel plate bearings. The piers consist of reinforced concrete trestles; each trestle is founded on a 
single circular caisson 8 m in diameter and 10.1 m deep below the cap.  
 
Damage to the bridge consisted of minor spalling of concrete near the base of pier 5 (Figure 9-9), 
some diagonal cracking and spalling of concrete in the girder webs, near the bearings (Figures 9-
10 and 9-11), and damage at the expansion joints, particularly at the north abutment (Figure 9-
11). Extensive ground cracking in the area appeared to be the result of lateral spreading (Figures 
9-12 and 9-13). Rocks and brush were placed on either side of the bridge approach to restrict 
traffic to one lane at the center of the bridge. 
 
  
Figure 9-8:  View of Khari River Bridge to the 
northwest. Note extensive ground cracking 
visible in the foreground 
Figure 9-9:  Spalling of concrete at the base of 
the columns of the trestle at Pier 5 
 
 
 
Figure 9-10:  Diagonal crack in the girder web 
emanating from the bearing on the left, at Pier 
8 
Figure 9-11:  Broken railing at the north 
abutment and spalling of the girder web 
concrete at the bearing of Pier 1 
 
 119 
  
Figure 9-12:  View to southeast from bridge 
deck, showing ground cracking indicative of 
lateral spreading 
Figure 9-13:  View to southwest from bridge 
deck, showing extensive ground cracking 
 
Culvert Damage 
 
Only a small fraction of the many culvert crossings in the region suffered damage significant 
enough to affect traffic flow. Two reinforced concrete slab culverts collpased, on a minor road 
approximately 25 km northeast of Bhuj (Figure 9-14). The abutments were made of coursed stone 
masonry. In these cases, the stone backwalls collapsed, causing collapse of the supported slabs. 
At other locations throughout the epicentral region, the stone abutment sidewalls collapsed, 
jeopardizing support for the adjacent roadway. At these locations traffic was restricted to a single 
lane away from the area of the collapsed sidewall. Drought conditions allowed traffic flow to 
continue on hastily made temporary routes around the minor culverts that were taken out of 
service. 
 
4. Bridge Damage in Outlying Areas 
 
India Bridge 
 
Access to the northern portion of the Rann of Kachchh was restricted by the military. Members of 
the MAE Center team observed a 10-span reinforced concrete slab-girder bridge that crosses a 
small arm of the Great Rann just north of the town of Khavda on State Highway 45. The deck 
moves some 10-15 cm; pounding at expansion joints caused concrete to spall and damage at the 
abutments. No girders lost bearing support, however. 
 
Falku Bridge 
 
The Falku Bridge is a two-lane 10-span reinforced concrete bridge spanning a total of 200 m. The 
reinforced concrete slab-girder superstructure is supported on coursed stone masonry piers 
(Figure 9-15). Longitudinal pounding at the expansion joints caused damage to the expansion 
joints and the reinforced concrete railing (Figure 9-16). Cracks also developed in the masonry 
piers and spread footings (Figure 9-17). The bridge remained open to traffic. Similar railing 
damage was observed at other bridges that also remained open to traffic. 
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Figure 9-14:  Collapsed reinforced concrete slab culverts 
 
  
Figure 9-15:  Overview of the Falku Bridge Figure 9-16:  pounding of expansion joints 
caused damage to concrete deck railing 
 
  
Figure 9-17:  cracking of masonry piers and damage to masonry foundations 
 
Nehru Bridge 
 
The city of Ahmedabad is built on the banks of the Sabarmati River. Seven major bridges cross 
this river. While most of these bridges were not damaged in this earthquake, the presence of any 
damage is significant given that the epicenter was approximately 250 km from the city. 
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Figure 9-18:  Overview of Nehru Bridge Figure 9-19:  Repaired expansion joint of 
Nehru Bridge 
 
The Nehru Bridge is an 11-span reinforced concrete bridge spanning 442 meters over the 
Sabarmati River, built in 1959. The superstructure is a hollow-cell box girder, consisting of 
balanced cantilever and suspended spans (Figure 9-18). The concrete gravity piers are supported 
on two groups of 8 caissons.  Damage to the bridge consists of minor pounding of expansion 
joints; a repaired joint is shown in Figure 9-19. 
 
5. Railroads and Rail Bridges 
 
The state has nearly 5300 route kms of railways in broad, meter, and narrow gauges. The rail 
system withstood the earthquake with relatively little damage. Trains to Ghandidam resumed 
service on January 29, but temporary repairs and speed restrictions caused delays. Service to Bhuj 
had been suspended prior to the earthquake for gauge conversion, and resumed on February 3, 
four days later than originally scheduled. 
 
Lateral spreading and subsidence along the approach to the Navlahki Port caused the main access 
road and railroad track to drop below sea level (Figure 9-20). The superstructure of a major steel 
plate girder bridge just east of the Surajbari Creek bridges displaced, affecting the track 
alignment. A number of old masonry arch railroad bridges also sustained damage, but none 
collapsed. The railroad station building at Ratnal, approximately 25 km southeast of Bhuj, 
suffered a partial collapse (Figures 9-21 and 9-22). 
 
Figure 9-20:  Damaged road and track at Navlahki Port 
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Figure 9-21:  Railroad station at Ratnal; partial collapse 
hidden from view 
Figure 9-22:  Partial collapse of 
railroad station building 
 
6. Port and Harbor Facilities 
 
Major port facilities are located along the Gulf of Kachchh, with the largest port in India being 
located at Kandla. Kandla handles 40 million metric tons of cargo per year, or about 17% of the 
nation’s cargo. Forty smaller ports in the state of Gujarat handle a total of 25 million tons per 
year, with 10 of these being all-weather ports. Substantial damage occurred to the Kandla and 
Navlahki ports. The Mundra port, constructed one year prior to the earthquake with private 
assistance, was reported to have no significant damage.  
 
Kandla Port (Figure 9-23) suffered damage to five older wharfs and to its warehouses and 
operations buildings. None of the gantry cranes derailed. The port was closed for one week 
following the earthquake. Operations resumed on February 3 at about 30-40% of capacity. The 
port was operating at about 40-50% of capacity on February 14. Repair costs are expected to 
amount to $30 million.  
 
Damage to the five older wharfs is reported to consist of flexural and shear cracking at the tops of 
the reinforced concrete piles, possibly related to ground failure at the site. The newer wharfs, 
supported on larger diameter piles, were undamaged. Five warehouses had structural damage. 
Figure 9-24 shows shear failures that developed in a large number of short reinforced concrete 
columns that were provided to accommodate ventilation grilles in a warehouse. Where column 
lengths were larger, column damage was less severe (Figure 9-25). A water tank supported on the 
reinforced concrete framing of a warehouse structure was damaged (Figure 9-26). The shear 
failure in the beam and damage to the column appear to have been induced by the presence of the 
eccentric stairs. Damage to the corrugated asbestos roofing of another warehouse occurred at the 
connection to the roof truss (Figure 9-27). A two-story office building at the port collapsed 
(Figure 9-28). The pile-supported control tower was leaning significantly (Figure 9-29), as was an 
office structure at the gate (Figure 9-30). Liquefaction in this area has been reported, and the 
ground surface was disrupted. 
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Figure 9-23:  Undamaged tower cranes at 
Kandla Port 
Figure 9-24:  Shear failures of short reinforced 
concrete columns, Kandla Port 
 
 
 
Figure 9-25:  The influence of column clear 
length on severity of shear failure 
Figure 9-26: Damage to a water tower at 
Kandla Port 
 
  
Figure 9-27:  Damage to corrugated asbestos 
roofing at roof truss, Kandla Port 
Figure 9-28:  Weak-story collapse of an office 
building, Kandla Port 
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Figure 9-30:  Leaning entry gate building, Kandla Port 
Figure 9-29:  Leaning control tower, 
Kandla Port 
 
 
 
Figure 9-31:  Collapsed stone wall on road to Kandla Port, indicating acceleration to the northeast 
was strong enough to collapse one wall to the southwest 
 
A masonry wall on the main road to Kandla Port failed to the southwest, suggesting that ground 
accelerations were strongest toward the northeast (Figure 9-31). 
 
Significant damage also occurred at the Navlahki port. A road and rail line serving the port were 
built on fill that was placed approximately 100 years ago. Lateral spreading to the south and 
subsidence caused over a kilometer of the main access road and railroad track to drop, with 
portions inundated during high tide (Figure 9-20). Soil failure caused a wharf to tilt several inches 
toward the north (Figure 9-32) and caused a sea wall to move several meters to the south (Figure 
9-33). Warehouses at the port also collapsed (Figures 9-34 and 9-35). 
 
SE (to Kandla) 
NW 
NE SW 
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Figure 9-32:  Failed wharf, Navlahki Port Figure 9-33:  Failed seawall, Navlahki Port 
 
  
Figure 9-34:  Collapsed warehouse, Navlahki 
Port 
Figure 9-35:  Collapsed warehouse, Navlahki 
Port 
 
7. Industrial Facilities 
 
Major industries in the epicentral region produce salt, fertilizer, ceramics, and petrochemicals. 
The Kachchh district reportedly produces 70% of the world’s salt supply. Many multistory and 
large-span single-story buildings in the epicentral area were damaged or partially collapsed 
(Figures 9-36 to 9-38). 
 
Western India Sea Brines Salt Plant 
 
A six-story salt processing building collapsed (Figure 9-39) just west of Bhachau, killing 9 
people. The plant was in operation 24 hours per day. Damage to adjacent warehouse building 
(Figure 9-40) consisted of cracking of unreinforced masonry infill (Figure 9-42), cracking of 
masonry supports for steel roof trusses (Figure 9-41), and damage to asbestos corrugated roofing 
and separation of the roofing from the perimeter walls (Figure 9-42). Sand blows indicated 
liquefaction had occurred at the site, and water continued to seep out nearly 3 weeks after the 
earthquake, on February 15. 
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Figure 9-36:  Damage to a warehouse near 
Kandla Port 
Figure 9-37:  Damage to warehouses near 
Bhachau 
 
  
Figure 9-38:  Damaged industrial buildings in the vicinity of Bhachau 
 
  
Figure 9-39:  Collapsed 6-story salt processing 
plant 
Figure 9-40:  Damaged warehouses at the salt 
plant 
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Figure 9-41:  Damage to masonry pedestals 
supporting the steel trusses and masonry walls 
Figure 9-42:  Separation and damage to the 
joint between corrugated asbestos roofing and 
the masonry walls 
 
The ceramics industry in Morbi manufactures roofing tiles and washbasins. The chimneys of 
numerous small plants dot the landscape; most remained standing. Damage to the chimney at one 
plant is shown in Figure 9-43; cracking of the masonry occurred in those locations where 
circumferential steel bands were not present. The unreinforced masonry walls of the kiln suffered 
partial collapse (Figure9-44), disrupting production. 
 
  
Figure 9-43:  Masonry chimney cracked where 
circumferential steel bands were not present, 
Morbi 
Figure 9-44:  Collapsed unreinforced masonry 
wall at ceramic roofing tile kiln, Morbi 
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8. Utility Lifelines 
 
Electrical Power 
 
Over a dozen substation buildings were reported to have collapsed and about 45 were damaged, 
immediately causing power outages in the epicentral region. No power plants are located in the 
immediate epicentral area. Only minor damage was reported at a coal-fired plant at Panandhro, 
approximately 180 km from the epicenter. Transmission towers and high-voltage transmission 
lines appeared to be undamaged, but local distribution was affected by falling power poles and 
collapsing buildings (Figure 9-45). Interaction between a transmission tower and its supporting 
soils appeared to induce liquefaction, just south the Surajbari Creek Bridge and adjacent to other 
areas that had liquefied (Figure 9-46). 
 
  
Figure 9-45:  Electrical power distribution 
system was vulnerable to damage from 
building collapses 
Figure 9-46:  Transmission tower induced 
liquefaction adjacent to an area that had 
liquefied. The southern approach to the new 
Surajbari Creek Bridge is in the background 
 
Water  
 
Extensive damage was reported to the water pumping and pipeline transmission system. Five 
elevated water tanks constructed of reinforced concrete were reported to have collapsed in the 
Malia-Morbi region, of several hundred such tanks in the epicentral region. Two elevated water 
tanks in the village of Lodai were not heavily damaged, despite their location close to the 
epicenter (Figure 9-47). Some well casings were reported to be bent or had collapsed, or had sand 
intruding through the perforated walls. Changes in the dissolved solids content of groundwater 
affected potable water quality. Standing water in Anjar risked public health and safety (Figure 9-
48).  
 
Communications 
 
Telephone communications were disrupted by the failure of reinforced concrete infill walls in 
central offices and switching facilities. A fiber optic cable was reported to have been severed. 
Where disrupted, telephone service was available within several days to a week after the 
earthquake. Cellular service was reported to be available once electrical power had been restored.  
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Figure 9-47:  One of the two reinforced 
concrete water tanks in Lodai, near the 
epicenter  
Figure 9-48:  Standing water in Anjar posed a 
risk to public health and safety 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
Lifelines and industrial facilities performed reasonably well in the Mw 7.7 Republic Day 
Earthquake, considering both the magnitude of the earthquake and the performance of non-
engineered construction. Specific observations are as follows: 
 
1. Although there were no collapses of significant bridges, movement at expansion joints and 
damage to bridge bearings was sufficient to affect alignment, causing reductions in traffic 
capacity.  
 
2. Unreinforced masonry abutment walls were prone to collapse. The collapse of backwalls 
caused the collapse of roadway spans, while the collapse of sidewalls required that traffic be 
routed away from the failed walls, reducing capacity. 
 
3. Liquefaction, lateral spreading, and settlement appeared to play a significant role in damage 
to wharfs, seawalls, railways, roadways, buildings and industrial facilities.  
 
4. The collapse of structural and nonstructural components of buildings used to house 
equipment, people, or goods was critical to the continued operation of the ports, industrial 
facilities, and telephone system, as well as the transmission and distribution of electric power. 
 
It appears that those structures and facilities that performed reasonably well were designed 
explicitly for seismic actions (e.g. bridges, elevated water tanks, and some port facilities). This 
suggests that institutional measures to ensure that good seismic design practice is achieved, such 
as requiring the use of seismic codes, third party review, and special inspection, were successful 
when applied. Components that did not appear to have been designed for seismic actions, such as 
unreinforced masonry buildings and substations, bridge abutments, and retaining structures, often 
created vulnerabilities in the systems and facilities in which they were used. To improve the 
performance of lifelines and industrial facilities in the future, the design of all critical components 
should consider seismic actions and the potential for ground failure.  
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Chapter 10: Seismic Vulnerability Predictions for Reinforced Concrete Structures 
 
by 
 
T.Rossetto1 
Graduate Research Assistant 
Imperial College of Science Technology and Medicine 
 
1. Abstract 
 
Extensive structural damage to both rural and modern reinforced concrete constructions 
resulted as a consequence of the Bhuj Earthquake on the 26th January 2001. This paper 
describes a vulnerability study that was carried out for the major towns in the Gujarat region 
with the aim of assessing whether the observed severity and distribution of damage could 
have been predicted prior to the earthquake.  A procedure for the seismic assessment of 
populations of reinforced concrete structures is presented, which adopts empirical 
vulnerability curves derived from an extensive database of worldwide observational post-
earthquake statistics of building damage.  Through a comparison of the vulnerability 
predictions with available data on RC building damage in Ahmedabad, conclusions are made 
as to the effect of site conditions, earthquake duration, local design and construction practice 
on the seismic vulnerability of the structures.  
 
2. Preamble 
 
At 03:16:41 UTC on the 26th January 2001 a strong earthquake shook the ground in North 
West India.  The Bhuj earthquake was of magnitude Ms7.92, with epicenter at 23.33N 70.32E 
in the vicinity of Bhachau. Extensive structural damage was seen to occur in towns and 
villages within a radius of 110 km from the epicenter3.  Total collapse was observed in 
461,5934 rural houses of rubble masonry construction, with weak mortar or mud mortar 
bonds, in the Gujarat area.  Many block-masonry and reinforced concrete structures were also 
severely affected by the ground shaking, with the collapse of several newly built multi-story 
reinforced concrete frame buildings being observed in the city of Ahmedabad, 230 km from 
the epicenter.  This paper aims to assess whether or not such a severity and spread of damage 
could have been predicted if a vulnerability study had been carried out prior to the event. The 
assessment is carried out for reinforced concrete constructions in different locations, through 
the use of vulnerability curves.  These curves describe the variation in the probability of 
exceedence of a series of damage limit-states with increasing ground motion severity.  A 
comparison is then made between the predicted and observed damage distribution in RC 
buildings in Ahmedabad.  
 
3. The Vulnerability Curves 
 
The vulnerability curves used to carry out the damage distribution prediction were developed 
by the author as part of a study financed by the SAFERR research-training program5. The 
vulnerability curves were originally generated with a view to their application in the 
assessment of European constructions, but include data regarding 99 observations of post-
earthquake damage distributions in populations of reinforced concrete buildings, made for 19 
earthquakes worldwide.   
                                                
1 TR, London SW7 2BU UK. 
email: tizi.rossetto@ic.ac.uk 
2 US Geological Survey. 
3 Field observations made by the Mid-America Earthquake Center reconnaissance team. 
4 Data as of 02/27/01 obtained from www.gujaratindia.com. 
5 Tossetto T., “Vulnerability Curves for Seismic Assessment of Reinforced Concrete Buildings”, PhD 
Thesis. 
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Table 10-1:  Typical building damage associated with the Homogenized RC Damage Scale 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10-2:  The approximate correlation between the HRC Scale and other damage 
scales. 
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The vulnerability curves use the Homogenized Reinforced Concrete (HRC) damage scale to 
assess structural performance.  This damage scale consists of seven limit states ranging from 
“no damage” to “collapse”, each described in terms of the typical damage to be expected in 
four main reinforced concrete structural systems (Table 10-1).  The damage scale is 
approximately correlated to other existing damage scales through comparison of the relative 
damage state descriptions (Table 10-2).  Each damage state is further associated with an index 
value (DIHRC) which is related experimentally to the structural response parameter of 
maximum inter-story drift ratio (ISDmax%).  Four equations are proposed relating ISDmax% and 
DIHRC for different structural systems: 
 
39.39)(89.34 max,% += ISDLnDI HRC      , R
2 = 0.991    for non-ductile MRF 
88.66)(49.22 max,% += ISDLnDI HRC      , R
2 = 0.822   for infilled frames 
98.52)(31.39 max,% += ISDLnDI HRC      , R
2 = 0.985   for shear-wall 
36.56)(89.27 max,% += ISDLnDI HRC   , R
2 = 0.760   for general structures 
 
The relationships are derived from a total of 105 experimental observations obtained from 
dynamic tests published in technical reports and have been further verified against the results 
of pseudo-dynamic tests on large-scale structures carried out as part of the European Union 
funded PREC8 and ICONS research networks.  The relationships are used to define the HRC 
damage-state limits in terms of ISDmax% (Table 10-3).  These values are then used to derive 
the limit state exceedence probabilities from the collected damage distributions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10-3:  ISDmax%  limits defining the HRC damage limit states 
 
The resulting vulnerability curves are shown in Figure 10-1, for the case where peak 
horizontal ground acceleration (pga) is used to represent the ground motion severity.  The 
90% confidence bounds are also shown in this figure and are determined from t-distributions 
fit to the scatter of the observed exceedence probabilities over pga intervals of 0.1g. 
 
 
ISD (%) All Structures MRF Infilled Frames Shear-Walls 
No Damage < 0.13 < 0.32 < 0.05 < 0.26
Slight < 0.19 < 0.43 < 0.08 < 0.34
Light < 0.56 < 1.02 < 0.30 < 0.72
Moderate < 1.63 < 2.41 < 1.15 < 1.54
Extensive < 3.34 < 4.27 < 2.80 < 2.56
Partial Collapse < 4.78 < 5.68 < 4.36 < 3.31
Collapse > 4.78 > 5.68 > 4.36 > 3.31
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  Vulnerability Curve Parameters 
 
Relationship  
 
Mean 
 
Lower90% 
 
Upper90% 
 
Damage State 
 
b 
 
a 
 
a 
 
a 
 
Slight 
  
1.6  
  
1.5654  
  
0.1210 
  
3.8140  
 
Light 
 
1.8 
 
0.9216 
 
0.1430 
 
2.5630 
 
Moderate 
 
3.0 
 
0.2300 
 
0.0590 
 
0.9140 
 
Extensive 
 
4.0 
 
0.0929 
 
0.0010 
 
0.2320 
 
Partial Collapse 
 
5.8 
 
0.0097 
 
5e-5 
 
0.0270 
 
Collapse 
 
8.0 
 
0.0005 
 
5e-6 
 
0.0065 
 
       Figure 10-1:  Empirical vulnerability curves for reinforced concrete  
                    structures, Rossetto T. PhD Thesis 
 
4.  Ground Motion Estimation 
 
No ground motion recording instruments were located in the epicentral region at the time of 
the earthquake.  From macro-seismic data, the Bhuj earthquake was assigned magnitudes 
Ms7.9 and Mw7.76, with an estimated epicenter at 23.33N 70.32E and focal depth of 23.6 km. 
No surface rupture was observed for the fault, however, from aftershock observations, the 
Center for Earthquake Research and Information, (CERI, Memphis), predicted the fault to be 
of ENE-WSW trend, with a Southward dip of 45-50º and with a fault surface rupture 
projection of 23.70N±0.10, 70.00-70.60E.  The location of the nearest ground motion 
recording instrument was at Ahmedabad approximately 230 km from the epicenter.  A pga 
value of 0.11g was determined from this accelerogram, but the record was otherwise unusable 
due to instrument mis-calibration. In the absence of instrumentation, attenuation relationships 
are looked at here to describe the ground motion distribution associated with the event. 
   
The fault activity within the Kachchh region can neither be associated with the Himalayan 
seismic belt nor with the Makran subduction zone, but is rather an intra-plate phenomenon.  
Little is known about such tectonic environments and no attenuation relationships have in the 
past been developed specifically for this location.  Hence four attenuation relationships, 
derived for different locations and tectonic environments, are investigated to describe the 
                                                
6 US Geological Survey, California. 
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attenuation of peak ground acceleration in the Gujarat region of India.  The characteristics of 
these relationships are summarised in Table 10-4.  
 
 
Relationship 
 
Event 
 
M 
 
Distance 
 
Area 
 
Ambrasseys et 
al. (1996)7 
  
Shallow  
 
Ms 
 
dfault 
Europe & 
Middle East 
Joyner & Boore 
(1988)8 
 
Shallow 
 
Mw 
 
dfault 
 
USA 
Sharma (1998)9 
 
 
Subduction 
 
Mw 
 
dfault 
Himalayas, 
India 
Youngs & Chiou 
(1997)10 
 
Subduction 
 
- 
 
dhypo 
 
Worldwide 
 
 
 
The ability of the relationships to describe the ground motion for both far and near field 
conditions is assessed through a comparison with pga values recorded at Ahmedabad and 
deduced from field-measurements of a statue movement in Bhuj, respectively.  The 
mentioned statue, shown in Figure 10-2, underwent a permanent displacement of 5cm in the 
E32°S direction, (thus indicating that the predominant direction of ground motion at Bhuj was 
N58°W).  A lower-bound pga of 0.8g was determined through consideration of the forces 
required to overcome friction. The permanent displacement of the statue results from the 
cumulative effect of all peaks exceeding this acceleration value in the record. An upper bound 
estimate of 1.05g is obtained from the empirical relationship of Ambrasseys and Srbulov 
(1994)11, which relates pga to permanent displacement through the analysis of a sliding block 
subjected to 937 strong motion records from 76 shallow events. 
 
        Figure 10-2:  Measurement of the permanent displacement of the statue of Sardar  
        Ballabhai Patel in Bhuj 
 
A comparison of the pga attenuation with source distance predicted by the four relationships 
is given in Figure 10-3.  In all cases soft soil conditions were assumed, with the epicentral 
location and preliminary fault solution determined by USGS and CERI respectively, being 
used for the ground motion calculation.     
                                                
7 Ambrasseys, N.N., Simpson, K.A., Bommer, J.J., (1996),” Prediction of horizontal response spectra 
in Europe”, EqEng & StrDyn, Vol. 25, pp 371-400. 
8 Boore, D.M., Joyner, W.B., Fumal, T.E., (1997), “Equations for estimating horizontal response 
spectra and peak acceleration from Western North American earthquakes: A summary of recent work”, 
Seismological Research Letters, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp 128-152. 
9 Sharma M.I., (1998), “Attenuation relationship for estimation of PGHA using data from strong 
motion arrays in India”, Bull. Of Seis. Soc. Of Am., Vol. 88, No. 4, pp 1063-1069. 
10 Youngs, R.R., Chiou, S.-J., (1997), “Strong ground motion attenuation relationships for subduction 
zone earthquakes”, Seismological Research Letters, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp 58-73. 
11 Ambraaeys, N., Srbulox., (1994), “Attenuation of earthquake induced displacements”, EqEng & 
StrDyn, Vol. 23, pp 467-487. 
E32S 
23.256°N  69.676°E 
 
  Table 10-4:  Comparison of the considered attenuation relationships 
 
 136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Distance (km) 
Distance (km) 
 
Figure 10-3:  Comparison of the considered attenuation relationships 
 
 
 
Error (%) Ahmedabad (0.11g) Bhuj (0.8g) 
Relationship µ (µ+s) (µ+2s) µ (µ+s) (µ+2s) 
 
Ambrasseys et al. (1996) 
 
-63 
 
-34 
 
+17 
 
-76 
 
-57 
 
-23 
 
Joyner & Boore (1988) 
 
-90 
 
-82 
 
-66 
 
-80 
 
-63 
 
-33 
 
Sharma (1998) 
 
+43 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-56 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Youngs & Chiou (1997) 
 
-53 
 
-9 
 
+79 
 
-67 
 
-35 
 
+28 
 
Table 10-5:  Comparison of error in pga prediction (%) given by the attenuation relationships 
 
Table 10-5 summarizes the error in pga prediction for the Ahmedabad and Bhuj sites for the 
mean (µ), (µ + s ) and (µ+2s ) relationships.  From these comparisons it can be concluded that 
the Youngs and Chiou (1997) attenuation relationship gives the optimum representation of the 
near and far-field motions with the (µ + 1.3s ) curve giving the best fit to the validation data, 
(error of +11% Ahmedabad and –20% for Bhuj).   
 
5.  Vulnerability Prediction 
 
Using the attenuation relationship of Youngs and Chiou (1997) for (µ + 1.3s ) it is possible to 
estimate the ground motion severity for all the major towns in Gujarat, and hence predict the 
expected damage distribution at each.  In the case of Ahmedabad and Bhuj however, the 
measured pga value of  0.11g and representative pga value of 0.9g respectively, are used for 
this purpose.  In all cases, bare RC frames are assumed as the predominant structural type and 
the results of the vulnerability estimation are illustrated in Figures 10-4 and 10-5. 
 
A post-earthquake survey was carried out by the Indian Government to identify damaged 
buildings in Ahmedabad.  The results of the survey showed that out of approximately 50,000 
RC buildings in Ahmedabad, 152 collapsed or are to be demolished, 27 were heavily 
damaged and 90 were moderately damaged by the earthquake.  The spatial distribution of 
these buildings is shown in Figure 10-6 and the predicted mean and upperbound damage 
distributions for Ahmedabad are compared to the observed statistics in Figure 10-7. 
 
It is evident from Figure 10-7 that the damage observed as a consequence of the earthquake is 
much higher than that predicted, even in the case that the upper-bound vulnerability curves 
are used.  Consequently, the discrepancy in prediction may not be due to the general inability 
of the vulnerability curves to predict damage, but could be caused by a number of factors that 
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distinguish both the earthquake ground motion and the local building stock from that typical 
in Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 (a) Mean vulnerability prediction                    (b) 90% Confidence bounds for 
                                                                                           predicted vulnerability 
 
Figure 10-4:  The RC building vulnerability predicted using the HRC-Scale and empirical 
curves  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10-5:  Prediction of RC building vulnerability distribution in Guharat for the Bhuj 
Earthquake 2001 
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       Figure 10-6:  Observed RC building damage in Ahmedabad after the Bhuj Earthquake 
2001, maps courtesy of Mr A.Parikh, Multi Media Consulting Engineers, Ahmedabad, India 
 
 
 
Site effects and the extended duration of the ground motion are thought to have contributed 
significantly to the observed damage.  From Figure 10-6 it is evident that the damage is 
highly localized, being restricted to the West and South Zones of the city.  It is known that in 
the past Ahmedabad had many lakes which were infilled for construction purposes.  The 
location of these is not known; however, field observations revealed evidence of prior 
settlement in certain damaged building locations.  Hence it is possible that local amplification 
  
(a) Comparison with mean prediction (b) Comparison with upper 90% confidence 
bound prediction 
Figure 10-7:  Comparison of the observed and predicted damage distributions for Ahmedabad 
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of the ground motion may have taken place due to the presence of soft soil or poorly 
consolidated fills beneath the buildings.  
 
The Gujarat earthquake was of long duration, the main shock reported to have lasted 85 
seconds at Bhuj.  The degree of stiffness degradation and cumulative damage caused by an 
earthquake of this duration is not accounted for by the vulnerability curves used herein.  This 
is due to their being derived mainly from data concerning European earthquakes, which are 
typically of smaller magnitude and shorter duration.  This factor is seen to contribute 
significantly to the underprediction in vulnerability obtained from the curves.   
 
A field mission to the epicentral region gave the opportunity for first-hand observation of the 
typical construction practice and structural failure modes in Ahmedabad.  Most of the 
collapsed buildings were multi-story reinforced concrete moment resisting frames built in the 
last 5 years. . Though Ahmedabad is categorized as a high seismic risk area by the Indian 
Code, these buildings were not designed for earthquake loading. In the vast majority of cases, 
building failure occurred as a result of soft ground story collapse.  This was caused by the 
presence of stiffness discontinuities in elevation between the ground story (typically void of 
either infill or shear walls), and the floors above. Due to inadequate reinforcement and 
connection between stairwells or elevator cores and the rest of the frame structure, these 
elements were not seen to contribute to the lateral resistance of the building. The use of 
individual column footings (usually untied) as foundations is also thought to have been an 
additional source of structural instability.   
 
A further major cause of building collapse was mass eccentricity due to the construction of 
unplanned extensions and the placement of large water tanks on building roofs.  In the latter 
case, the tanks were often supported on columns which failed during the earthquake event and 
consequently induced additional damage through impact onto the roof. The detailing 
deficiencies typical of gravity design, (e.g. short lap-splices, positioned at column ends with 
non-staggered termination, lack of adequate confinement reinforcement, 90° hooks and lack 
of reinforcement in joints), were observed in the damaged buildings and are thought to have 
further limited the deformation capacity of members and hence precipitated failure.  The 
problem of reduced deformation capacity was further agravated by poor material quality.   
Corroded reinforcement steel was observed in many locations as well as the presence of weak 
concrete within joint areas (born through addition of water to increase workability).  
The typical building configuration, construction practice and materials are therefore thought 
to be the main cause of the high vulnerability observed in the buildings of Ahmedabad 
compared to that predicted by the fragility curves for European structures.  The predominance 
of a soft-story mode of failure is furthermore expected to be one of the main causes of 
descrepancy between the observed and predicted vulnerabilities. This is due to the fact that 
the vulnerability curves are based on observations made of heterogeneous structural 
configurations and failure modes, and hence are not able to account for the predominance of a 
single collapse mechanism. 
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Figure 10-8:  Soft-story failure of the 
Ashardeep Buildings, Ahmedabad 
Figure 10-9:  Example of tank-induced 
damage in Ahmedabad 
 
6.  Summary 
 
Vulnerability predictions for reinforced concrete buildings affected by the Bhuj Earthquake 
2001, were carried out for the major cities of Gujarat using fragility curves generated for 
European constructions.  Comparison of the predictions with the observed distribution of 
damage to RC buildings in the location of Ahmedabad showed large discrepancies.  The 
underprediction in building vulnerability is attributed to a number of factors.  The typical 
configuration and construction practice in the buildings in Ahmedabad were seen to cause 
premature structural collapse via soft-story mechanism formation at the ground story. Post-
construction extensions and roof-top watertanks further contributed to the structure instability. 
It is concluded that these factors, together with the increased damage potential of the ground 
motion due to possible site amplification and earthquake duration effects, bring the structures 
to exhibit a higher vulnerability than would be expected in a population of typical European 
buildings for the same ground motion parameter values.  
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Chapter 11: Socio-Economic Aspects 
 
by 
 
Sue E. Dotson1 
Administrative Manager of the Mid-America Earthquake Center 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
1. Abstract 
 
An overview of public perception and reaction to the January 26, 2001, Bhuj Earthquake in the 
state of Gujarat is presented, incorporating societal, economic and insurance issues.  Although 
located in an area where devastating earthquakes have occurred in the past, the site of the 2001 
Bhuj Earthquake found a population unaware of its seismic vulnerability, a government with 
limited disaster recovery planning in place, and an insurance industry that offered earthquake 
coverage only as a supplement to other policies, with a special premium rate.  As a result, a 
shocked and grief-stricken population was faced with frustrating bureaucratic delays in rescue 
operations and devastating personal financial losses while the nation faced losses of tens of 
thousands dead, hundreds of thousands injured and an economic loss of an estimated $2.2 billion 
in revenue. 
 
2. Introduction 
 
When a major earthquake shattered the Indian state of Gujarat on January 26, 2001, seismologists 
were not surprised.  Since 1956, India has experienced five such intraplate earthquakes, the worst 
of which killed as many as 9000.  The Bhuj earthquake, named after the desert city located 20 km 
away from the epicenter, sits in an area which has historically experienced devastating 
earthquakes.  An earthquake of similar size struck the area in 1819 killing about 2000 people.  As 
recently as 1956, a 6M event was centered nearby at Anjar.2 
 
Like the New Madrid Seismic Zone in the U.S., this area of the Indian subcontintent is one of 
low-frequency high-consequence earthquakes.  As a result, residents of Gujarat were unaware and 
unconcerned with the seismic hazard.  This was not true of the government.  In the mid-1990s, 
the Union Urban Development Ministry’s Building Materials and Technology Promotion Council 
conducted extensive surveys of natural disaster risks in every part of India.  The resulting two-
volume Vulnerability Atlas of India was published in 1998 and recommends appropriate safe 
building practices for every region of India.  Also in place is the National Building Code of 1983 
that offers guidelines in terms of safe seismic design.  But four out of five Indian homes are 
designed by the home owners themselves and there is no licensing system for engineers.  Safety 
laws are in place but rarely enforced. 
 
The nation of India regularly faces a wide array of natural disasters, including earthquakes and 
cyclones.  Disaster plans designed by the national government’s Crisis Management Group are in 
place, but they provide primarily for the movement of medical and military personnel into 
affected areas.  Search and rescue technology is limited and disaster drills are not practiced.  India 
has no evacuation or disaster mitigation plans in place.  Effectively transporting relief supplies is 
a major obstacle. 
                                                          
1 SED, 1243 Newmark Civil Engineering Laboratory, 205 N. Mathews, Urbana, IL 61801 USA 
email:  sdotson@uiuc.edu 
2 Science, February 2, 2001. 
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Until 2000, only one insurance company, General Insurance Corporation (GIC), a state-owned 
monopoly, offered earthquake coverage as part of its standard policy.  Following a series of 
earthquakes in the early 1990s, however, GIC followed private insurance practice and 
discontinued this coverage as part of a standard package; it was offered only with payment of an 
additional premium.3   
 
While the state of Gujarat 
refines 55% of India’s petroleum 
products and produces 45% of 
its pharmaceuticals, the Gujarat 
earthquake struck an area where 
most of its inhabitants live 
primarily from handicraft 
production, refining salt, fishing 
and agriculture.4  Some livestock 
remains that survived both last 
year’s devastating drought and 
the recent earthquake.  For those 
who earn their livings primarily 
through handicrafts, the 
immediate future is bleak.  The 
Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) estimates it 
will take two to five years for 
these artisans to reestablish their 
livelihoods.5  The estimated 
economic loss to the nation 
(excluding building replacement 
costs) is $2.2 billion; India’s 
annual gross domestic product is about $500 billion.6                        
 
 
3. Public Reaction 
 
In the hours immediately following the Gujarat earthquake, the Indian government was unable to 
respond quickly and effectively to the emergency.  Occurring amid national celebrations of 
Republic Day, the earthquake shed light on the deficiencies of Indian disaster relief efforts.  More 
than five-and-a-half hours elapsed after the earthquake before officials in Delhi held a meeting to 
discuss the crisis. A governmental rescue effort took almost twenty-four hours to organize.  
Thirty-six hours after the disaster, cranes and earthmoving equipment still were not in place to 
help in rescue efforts, despite the knowledge that the first forty-eight hours after a disaster are 
critical in saving lives, and despite the fact that Gujarat is the second most industrialized state in 
India.  
 
                                                          
3 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
4 International Herald Tribune, February 7, 2001. 
5 Www.OxfamAmerica.org. 
6 International Herald Tribune, February 7, 2001. 
Figure 11-1: States of India 
imapindia.com 
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Because the earthquake occurred on a day of national celebration, the majority of people were in 
their homes; most of the collapsed buildings were apartment buildings and private homes. The 
shock and grief of survivors quickly gave way to desperate efforts to rescue victims.  Household 
tools, sledgehammers and bare hands were used to try to rescue survivors.   
 
Providing medical care to survivors proved a daunting task.  With many hospitals in ruins, 
medical treatment was often carried out in tents or even in open-air operating “rooms,” surgeries 
performed using local rather than general anesthesia.  Army field hospitals were set up as 
volunteers struggled to deliver emergency medical supplies.   
 
Against the backdrop of this desperate rescue effort were the practicalities of survival.  Hundreds 
of thousands were left homeless at a time when evening temperatures dropped to near freezing.  
Aftershocks produced panic among survivors and those whose homes were still standing were 
often too frightened to return to them.  Slow distribution of relief supplies only added to feelings 
of panic and despair; distribution of tents, food, and water to survivors came more quickly from 
private relief agencies than from the Indian government.   
 
The psychological toll on survivors has been harsh.  Some lost their entire families.  As rescue 
efforts gave way to recovery of victims, family members often performed last rites for family 
members themselves, crafting funeral pyres from dry wood and available debris.  Many victims 
will never be recovered.  In a follow-up study in Latur after the deadly 1993 earthquake there, it 
was estimated that 40% of the population had considered suicide and 60% suffered from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder; similar statistics are expected in Gujarat.  The Nehru Foundation for 
Development (NFD) is coordinating the task of providing counseling and rehabilitation for the 
affected residents of Gujarat.  A booklet titled Coping with Earthquakes: A Citizens’ Handbook 
has been compiled by NFD to help answer questions about health, home repair, sanitation, and 
psychological trauma.  NFD is also coordinating information dissemination about governmental 
programs available for victims.7 
 
Children have been particularly traumatized by the 
earthquake and aftershocks.  A widespread effort to 
disseminate information about recognizing and dealing with 
shock in children is underway.  Psychologists have warned 
that if treatment for these children is overlooked, the effect 
of the earthquake may have a lifelong impact on the 
children.  Fear, insecurity and grief now may lead to 
anxiety, panic and depression in adulthood.8  The Gujarat 
Council for Educational Research and Training has 
organized special programs aimed at dealing with 
psychological stress in children.  These programs will be 
focused on primary schools in earthquake-affected areas. 
 
As shock gave way to anger, two primary targets emerged: the government and builders.  
 
4. Government Recovery and Relief Efforts 
 
While scientists in Delhi located the epicenter within minutes after the earthquake struck, the 
information was not transmitted to the central government until about six hours later due to a 
                                                          
7 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
8 Ahmedabad Times, February 9, 2001. 
Figure 11-2: Young earthquake 
survivor. Oxfam America 
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Figure 11-3: Survivors amid rubble.  
Red Cross 
failure of telecommunications links. Despite  claims of regular testing, cell phones that had been 
distributed to each district revenue collector in Gujarat did not function and could not be used to 
transmit information at the time of the earthquake.   
 
While both the army and the civilian Rapid Action Force (RAF) were on the scene relatively 
quickly, they had neither the training nor the equipment to deal with the situation.  The 
government was very inefficient in directing recovery and relief supplies to needed areas.  In 
Gandhidham, for example, heavy machinery took days to arrive despite the fact that nearby 
Kandla Port, though damaged, was partially operational.  After struggling for three days to bring 
heavy equipment into Ahmedabad, the railways, which had suffered damage but were running, 
were finally asked for assistance.  Volunteers talk of supplies lying on roadsides and of 
emergency equipment sitting idle because there was no one to operate it.  There were no road 
maps to provide to volunteers attempting to deliver relief supplies or to teams of doctors trying to 
reach interior villages. 
 
Governmental relief efforts did become more organized over the days following the earthquake.  
The Gujarat State Electricity Board assigned 1500 workers to round-the-clock duty to bring 
electricity back to Bhuj which had lost its entire power 
grid.  This effort was accomplished in just three days.  
Tents, food, water and medicine began to arrive in the 
affected areas within four days.  The 22,500 army 
troops deployed to the area are credited with working 
nonstop to provide relief.9  
 
Still, most of the credit for rescue, recovery and relief is 
being given to the population of the affected areas, to 
local organizations and to private groups, both domestic 
and international.  Condemnation of the government’s 
inefficiency and lack of response to one of India’s 
worst natural disasters has shaken public confidence in 
the government.  After citing examples of heroic relief 
efforts underway by private citizens, one of India’s 
leading news magazines, India Today, stated “Now if only 
the slothful Government could march in tune with the 
dynamism of its own society.”10 
 
5. The Building Industry 
 
The collapse or near-collapse of 171 buildings in 
Ahmedabad that led to more than 700 deaths is being 
popularly blamed on the government’s willingness to turn a 
blind eye toward unscrupulous builders as well as the 
builders themselves.  Official complaints from residents 
about poor construction techniques are coming to light and 
may bring about mandatory building guidelines.11 
 
In one instance in Ahmedabad, a ten-story apartment 
                                                          
9 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
Figure 11-4: Survivors search 
for victims. Oxfam America 
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building collapsed. Although the Bureau of Indian Standards code specifies that a building of any 
size should have a separate frame to support major utilities, the building’s stairs, elevators, and 
water tank were all supported by four central columns that were also supporting the building 
itself.  Evidence shows that steel rods used in the beams and columns were undersized and the 
foundation was not planned to take into account the unplanned addition of a penthouse level and 
swimming pool on top of the structure.  Thirty-three people died in the collapse.12  
 
In another case, a new apartment building, already occupied but uninspected by the local building 
authority, gave way under the weight of illegal construction and insufficient support for the 
building’s utilities, loaded on an already cracked beam-column frame.  Twelve died in that 
collapse.13   
 
A further survey showed that only ten of Ahmedabad’s 1,000 high rise buildings had permission 
for occupancy, or what is called building use (BU).14   While there is currently a freeze on all 
construction activity in Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Surat, Rajkot, Bhavnagar and Jamnagar, 
speculation abounds that the state government will revoke all construction freezes to appease the 
powerful building lobby.  The state of Gujarat had only recently revised rules permitting 
construction of buildings as tall as thirteen stories in Ahmedabad, Badodara and Surat and 
allowing eleven-story construction in Rajkot, Bhavnagar and Jamnagar; the previous limit had 
been ten stories.  Charges have now been lodged against one builder, one architect, and one 
structural engineer in connection with deaths resulting from a collapsed apartment building.15   
 
 
 
Good design, good construction, and good materials can create buildings able to withstand strong 
seismic force and still remain stable.  If guidelines for earthquake-resistant construction, available 
since 1970, are followed, widespread devastation is avoidable.  The Gujarat Housing Board’s 
30,000 low-income apartments not only withstood the earthquake but suffered relatively little 
damage.16  However, in a country where 80% of the homes are designed by home owners and 
                                                          
12 The Times of India, February 9, 2001. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The Times of India, February 13, 2001. 
15 The Sunday Times of India, February 11, 2001. 
16 The Times of India, February 13, 2001. 
Figure 11-5: Destroyed buildings in Rapar. GEES 
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engineers are not licensed, it is difficult to foresee a time where most dwellings can be considered 
to have been built safely.17   
 
The issue of safety is affecting the housing market.  Fearful of returning to apartment buildings 
now considered unsafe, former residents are demanding accommodations on lower floors.  The 
demand for apartments in low-rise buildings has skyrocketed, along with prices.  Rents for small 
apartments on the lower level of a building have risen 30%-40% since the earthquake and 
demand for single story homes is more than twice the available supply.  In areas not directly 
affected by the earthquake, such as Mumbai, apartments available on upper floors of high-rise 
buildings are sitting empty and resale of apartments in older buildings has fallen dramatically.18   
 
The manufacturing sector has also been affected.  Many diamond workers in Surat have refused 
to return to the job fearing entrapment in their small workspaces with narrow, limited exits, which 
are kept locked for security reasons.19  While factories throughout Gujarat are intact, the 
earthquake has caused widespread panic and exodus among immigrants who worked the 
assembly lines.  It may take months before full production will be able to resume.  Those laborers 
who do remain have raised their wage demands threefold.20 
 
In view of the widespread devastation that struck throughout Gujarat, the government in Delhi 
has announced that it plans to make building safety guidelines mandatory.  Lying on four fault 
lines, Delhi is considered particularly vulnerable to catastrophe; experts believe at least 50% of 
Delhi’s buildings are not earthquake-resistant.  Other earthquake-prone metropolitan areas like 
Mumbai are also a cause of concern.21   In Kataria, a small town in North Gujarat, India Railways 
plans to replace its damaged railroad station with an earthquake-resistant construction, the first in 
India.  Railroad managers are also contemplating rebuilding residential quarters for railway 
workers using these same techniques.22  Proposals were being considered by the government to 
rebuild 80,000 housing units throughout the affected areas for those people living below poverty 
level using earthquake-resistant design.23   
 
6. Insurance Industry 
 
The financial cost of the Gujarat earthquake will be borne primarily by the government and by the 
victims themselves.  Following the devastating 1993 earthquake in Maharashtra which left 10,000 
dead and 25,000 homes destroyed in Latur, the governmental Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) 
excluded earthquake coverage from the standard policy offered by the stated-owned General 
Insurance Corporation.  Taking effect in 2000, the tariff revision offered exclusions for several 
risks, including earthquakes, floods and riots, at discounts of up to 30% on the overall premium.  
The owners of most large buildings chose to insure at the lowest rates possible excluding many 
hazards, while individual households seldom have any policy at all.24   
 
One TAC member estimates that only “about 5 per cent”25 of the households under the standard 
policy have opted for earthquake coverage.  The insurance industry’s biggest liability from the 
                                                          
17 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The Times of India, February 9, 2001. 
20 Ibid., February 13, 2001. 
21 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
22 The Times of India, February 9, 2001. 
23 The Sunday Times of India, February 11, 2001. 
24 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
25 Ibid. 
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Figure 11-6:  Collapsed House in Bhuj.  Red 
Cross 
 
Gujarat earthquake will result not from property losses but from pay outs of life insurance 
policies.  It now appears that less than 2% of insurance company’s liability from the earthquake 
will result from property losses; the remainder will result from loss of human lives.26  This 
imbalance emphasizes just how grossly underinsured property is.   
 
As private insurers analyze risks, the 
cost for earthquake coverage will 
undoubtedly rise.  The Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority 
has begun work on a new map of the 
country to better assess earthquake risks, 
with a proposal to bring the entire state 
of Gujarat into the highest risk 
category.27 
 
Public awareness of the need for all 
types of insurance has been heightened 
following the Gujarat earthquake.  In 
Ahmedabad applications for life 
insurance policies have increased by 
12%.  A sharp increase in applications 
for optional earthquake coverage is also 
reported there.  But the actual increase in 
the number of policies being issued as a result of such applications is less than 20%.  Stringent 
processing requirements and the mandatory acquisition of a structural engineer’s certificate for all 
post-earthquake property policies has slowed new coverage to a trickle.28 
 
The effect is being felt outside the immediate earthquake site as well.  Acceding to public 
demand, builders in at least one city, Vadodara, have started including natural disaster insurance 
on behalf of residents on all its constructions.   The Jayraj Group, an insurance company that has 
branched into the construction business, is now obtaining a ten-year policy on its constructions; 
of the total premium amount, residents will pay for two years and the company will pay for the 
remainder.29   
 
7. Economic Impact 
 
In terms of immediate overall impact to the Indian economy, earthquake losses are less than 
might be expected.  The major industrial sectors in Gujarat were strong enough to survive the 
earthquake.  India’s largest refinery at Jamnagar and a 450-megawatt nuclear power station 
survived almost unscathed, although all the privately owned salt refineries were damaged and 
nonfunctional following the earthquake.  Excluding replacement costs for property, it is estimated 
that economic loss will reach $2.2 billion.  That figure could top $5.5 billion, however, if 
factories are unable to reach pre-earthquake production levels within a few weeks.30   
 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 The Sunday Times of India, February 11, 2001. 
28 Ibid., Feb. 11, 2001. 
29 The Gujarat Age, February 12, 2001. 
30 International Herald Tribune, February 7, 2001. 
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Kutch, the worst-affected district, is one of the least industrialized in the nation.  Surat, too, has 
reported very little damage to industrial infrastructure.  In Ahmedabad damage has been largely 
confined to residential buildings.  The damage to the port of Kandla, Gujarat’s largest, which 
accounts for 17% of maritime cargo in the entire country, will undoubtedly have long-term 
economic repercussions.31   
 
Table 11-1:  Gujarat’s Economic Impact on the Domestic Economy 
 
Petroleum Refining 55% 
Pharmaceutical Production 45% 
Cotton Production 31% 
Textile Manufacture 24% 
Industrial Investment 20% 
Shipping 17% 
Industrial Output 13% 
Industrial Facilities 10% 
Total Exports 33% 
Gross Domestic Product 11% 
 
Worker absenteeism is adversely affecting economic recovery.  Personal tragedies as well as fear 
of recurrence of another earthquake have caused suspension of production and shutting of 
businesses that might otherwise be operational.  Production of diesel pumps in Rajkot came to a 
complete halt when line employees stopped coming to work.  Some hotels have shut because 
managers, waiters and cleaning staff no longer show up to care for guests.32  Retail sales in 
Gujarat have plummeted.  Inventories lost in the earthquake have yet to be replaced but, 
moreover, a shift of purchasing power among consumers, especially the middle class, has 
occurred, as spending is now concentrated on building and repair of property rather than on 
consumer goods.   
 
If businesses can weather the short-
term effects, however, an upturn is 
predicted within a few months.  
Reconstruction of buildings should 
spark a revival of consumer 
spending as these labor-intensive 
activities provide employment and 
pump money back into the Gujarati 
economy.  Demand for consumer 
goods, both as replacement items 
and new acquisitions, is anticipated.  
It is speculated that fear of living in 
high-rise buildings will trigger 
widespread growth in new suburban 
areas.33    
     Figure 11-7:  Port of Kandla lies idle.  Geoinfo.usc 
 
                                                          
31 India Today, February 12, 2001. 
32 Ibid., February 12, 2001. 
33 Ibid. 
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The Gujarati banking industry has formulated a relief package that would provide loans at below-
market rates and waive penalties on payback of existing loans for two years in earthquake-
affected areas.  A committee set up to deal with the emergency is offering these loans to small 
businesses, the self-employed and start-up ventures in an effort to restore and rehabilitate 
business throughout Gujarat.  Loans at below-market rates may also be offered for repair or 
construction of houses and small shops.34 
 
Until the earthquake, Ahmedabad had a growing reputation of providing excellent opportunities 
and good living conditions for India’s professional sector.  Companies had begun to relocate there 
or had opened branch offices specifically to take advantage of Ahmedabad’s growth and 
reputation.  Compared to other urban areas like Delhi or Mumbai, Ahmedabad offers minimal 
commuting time, a wide array of entertainment and cultural activities and a safe living 
environment, particularly appealing to female professionals.  Now companies are worried that 
thousands of non-Gujarati professionals will seek opportunities elsewhere, especially since most 
had not yet bought property and have no compelling reason to remain.  Many corporations are 
trying to reassure their professional workers by offering to house them in low-rise or single 
family dwellings.  Given the shortage of such accommodations, however, and the dramatic 
increase in price in those that are available, it is unclear if this effort will prove successful.35 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The catastrophic earthquake of January 26, 2001, in the state of Gujarat has focused sharp 
attention on the seismic vulnerability of India.  While recommendations are in place to guide 
interested builders and home owners in creating structures that may withstand strong seismic 
force, adherence is voluntary; building codes are often ignored.  Faced with widespread 
devastation, tragic loss of life and large economic loss, the central government in Delhi is 
considering making building guidelines mandatory throughout the country while working to 
revise its slow and inadequate disaster response procedures.   
 
The population’s increased interest in acquiring coverage to insure against natural disaster losses 
and losses of life has risen since the earthquake.  An expected revision to India’s seismic risk map 
that will place the entire state of Gujarat in the highest risk category will undoubtedly bring about 
an increase in the cost of earthquake coverage.  Whether this rise in premiums will deter 
prospective policy holders remains to be seen. 
 
The state of Gujarat’s active and growing economy faces recovery and restructuring following the 
earthquake.  Because the industrial infrastructure there survived with relatively little damage, it is 
not anticipated that much shift will occur in production capabilities other than in the short-term. 
Workers who fled the area in fear following the earthquake are expected to return, lured by the 
growing economy.  There is some speculation that relocation among non-Gujarati professionals 
may hamper economic recovery in the state.   
 
The natural resilience and community spirit of the Gujaratis themselves will form the basis for 
recovery efforts there.  Known for a sense of enterprise and self-sufficiency, the Gujaratis are 
viewed as an inspiration.  Their tragedies may inspire a national reawakening to important issues 
such as building guidelines and disaster recovery.   
 
 
                                                          
34 The Times of India, Feb. 10, 2001. 
35 The Sunday Times of India, February 11, 2001. 
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Figure 12-1:  The Reelfoot rift of 
Mid-America (top) and the Kutch 
rift of western India (bottom), both 
at the same scale. Outer rift flanks 
are shown in blue; prominent 
thrust faults in green. Both rifts 
experienced their most recent 
episode of major extension in the 
Mesozoic era but both currently 
are under compression (black 
arrows). For Reelfoot the 
compression is oblique to the rift 
so strike-slip (black) as well as 
thrust (green) faulting results. But 
as in the Kutch rift the major thrust 
faults form normal to the 
prevailing horizontal compressive 
stress 
Chapter 12: Correlations with Mid-America 
 
by 
 
Arch C. Johnston1 
Director, Center for Earthquake Research and Information  
The University of Memphis 
 
1. Geology and Seismology 
 
The main rationale for deploying the MAE Center Disaster Investigation Team to India in the 
wake of the Bhuj earthquake was the striking parallel between the Kutch region of western India 
and the Reelfoot rift of Mid-America (Figure 12-1). To extend the comparison, both regions have 
experienced very large earthquakes in prehistoric and historic times. The 26 January 2001 Bhuj 
earthquake afforded the unprecedented opportunity to examine with modern techniques and 
instruments, a similar earthquake to the great 7 February 1812 earthquake in the New Madrid 
seismic zone. 
 
 
 
The classification of the Kutch region as a “stable continental region” or SCR is not without 
controversy because Kutch lies much closer to an active plate boundary zone than does the 
Reelfoot rift (see Table 12-1). However, Gordon (1998) did not include the Kutch peninsula in 
                                                 
1 ACJ, CERI, Box 526590, Memphis, TN 38152, USA 
email: Johnston@ceri.memphis.edu 
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his update of “diffuse” plate boundaries, and L. Kanter in Johnston et al. (1994) mapped Kutch as 
part of the Indian SCR because it was separated from the Chaman transform plate boundary with 
Asia by at least 200 km of thick, relatively undisturbed sediments of the Indus alluvial basin. The 
Indus sediments are deposited on the Proterozoic crust of the North India craton. Hence, the 
Kutch rift is well characterized as a failed (ie, did not open to new oceanic crust) intracontinental 
rift imbedded in the Indian SCR. It is currently being reactivated or compressed under the north-
south compressional stresses generated by the India plate’s collision with Asia along the 
Himalayan front. The Reelfoot rift of Mid-America is a similar failed continental rift imbedded in  
 
Table 12-1. Comparison of the New Madrid and Bhuj Earthquakes 
Attribute 
 
New Madrid, USA 
7 February 1812 
Bhuj, India 
26 January 2001 
Host geologic structure Failed intracontinental rift: 
Reelfoot rift 
Failed intracontinental rift: 
Kutch rift or graben 
• Age of rifting Precambrian (with major re-
activation in the Mesozoic) 
Mesozoic (Jurassic) 
• Rift orientation to regional 
tectonic stress regime 
Oblique, angle ~30° - 40° Perpendicular, angle ~90° 
• Regional crustal class Stable Continental Region Stable Continental Region 
• Crustal thickness ~40 km ~40 km 
• Regional crustal age Proterozoic (0.9 – 1.6 b.y.) Proterozoic (0.9 – 1.6 b.y.) 
• Distance from plate 
boundary or ATR 
1,200–1,500 km to Rocky 
Mts. or Caribbean P.B. 
300 – 400 km to Chaman 
transform (Asia-Pakistan) 
Source Fault: type Reelfoot fault: thrust Unnamed: blind thrust 
• Orientation to regional stress ~ Perpendicular (see Fig. 1) ~ Perpendicular (see Fig. 1) 
• Length 70 – 90 km 35 – 55 km† 
• Dip/down-dip width 30° – 40°/45 km# 40° - 50°/30 – 45 km† 
• Surface rupture Probably (3-7 m, sharp fold) Probably not 
• Prior large earthquakes Yes, at least two Unknown 
• Prior large earthquakes in the 
rift fault system 
Yes, ~1400 AD, 900 AD, and 
500 AD 
Yes, in 1819 (Allah Bundh) 
and ~1100 AD 
Mainshock: Seismic Moment 10x1027 dyn-cm (Mw 8.0)# 4x1027 dyn-cm (Mw 7.7) 
• Body-wave magnitude mb = 7.4  (estimated) mb = 6.9 
• Liquefaction field Large and severe Large and severe (see chpt. 3) 
• Maximum intensity (MMI) XI –XII XI – XII 
• Intensity felt limit > 2000 km > 2000 km 
• Aftershock sequence Robust, at least 4 Mw = 6.5 Weak, Mw = 5.8 largest 
† from aftershock hypocenter locations                # modeled or estimated in Johnston (1996) 
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the North American SCR and currently undergoing transpressional reactivation, although at a 
probable slower deformation rate than Kutch is experiencing. 
 
The occurrence of the 2001 Bhuj earthquake provides two additional reasons to regard Kutch 
earthquakes as comparable to New Madrid SCR earthquakes rather than representing diffuse plate 
boundary seismic activity. One reason is the type of fault motion that occurred during the Bhuj 
mainshock. The other concerns the source scaling relation between the mainshock size (seismic 
moment or Mw) and the dimensions of its source fault and the duration of slip on the fault. 
 
If the Bhuj mainshock was part of the diffuse plate boundary of the Chaman transform zone in 
Pakistan, it should serve to accommodate the northward movement of India relative to Asia. The 
mainshock, however occurred on an east-west oriented thrust fault that dips to the south (see 
Chapter 2). The mainshock rupture was nearly pure thrust so that its slip vector is nearly north-
south. This results in the northern block 
(the footwall) moving southward and under 
the southern, hangingwall block. Hence the 
footwall’s displacement is exactly opposite 
the velocity vector of India’s motion 
relative to Asia. Rather than 
accommodating India-Asia plate motion, 
the Bhuj mainshock appears to have 
contributed to the north-south 
compressional shortening of the Indian 
craton, much as Bilham and England 
(2001) recently showed for the great 1897 
Assam earthquake of northeastern India. 
The Reelfoot rift is also being compressed 
but because it is oblique to the east-west 
compression, the New Madrid faults 
exhibit a mixture of right-lateral strike-slip 
as well as thrust faulting (Figure 12-1). 
 
The scaling relationship between the Bhuj 
mainshock seismic moment or energy 
release and its source fault may be the most 
important lesson of all for its seismic 
hazard implications for Mid-America. The 
precise hypocentral locations obtained by 
the MAE Center’s seismic instrument 
deployment (Chapter 3) define the 
mainshock’s fault dimensions as roughly 
40-50 km length and 30-45 km down-dip 
width. This is shown in Figure 12-2 as a 
fault area of 1500 km2 with an uncertainty 
range of 1200 – 2500 km2. Even with this 
large uncertainty it is clear that the Bhuj 
mainshock fault is much smaller than 
expected for an upper magnitude 7 
earthquake in active tectonic regions. Why 
this difference occurs between active and 
Figure 12-2:  Fault size versus earthquake 
size (seismic moment) for active tectonic 
regions like California (red) and stable 
continental regions like Mid-America 
(blue). The slope of the blue source-scaling  
line was specified only by assuming self-
similarity between small and large SCR 
earthquakes. However, the fault area from 
precise Bhuj aftershock locations, validates 
the self-similarity assumption. This 
removes a large source of uncertainty in 
seismic hazard assessments in SCRs 
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stable continental crustal regions is one of the outstanding questions in seismology, one that a 
rigorous study of the Bhuj earthquake and the Kutch tectonic setting will surely help to answer.  
 
The implications of a distinct source scaling for SCR earthquakes for Mid-America’s seismic 
hazard are great. Simply put, Figure 12-2 shows that in stable continental regions like Mid-
America we can expect to have larger earthquakes on smaller faults than is true in active regions. 
Because the thicker crust of SCRs permits a greater down-dip width, Mid-American SCR faults 
can be much shorter than those in the western U.S. to generate the same size earthquake. 
Moreover, since the seismic energy is released over a smaller area, duration of slip is less but 
magnitude of slip is greater, leading to high-to-very-high rates of moment or energy release 
relative to large earthquakes in active regions. This is just another way of expressing power or 
rate of energy release/work done during an earthquake rupture. The relative power level relates 
directly to the amplitude of generated ground motions: the more powerful the earthquake the 
greater amplitude ground motions it produces. The hope is that the research to be carried out on 
the data from the Bhuj mainshock and aftershocks will lead to much more realistic models of 
seismic sources in Mid-America and other SCR regions subject to low-probability-but-high-
consequences events exemplified by the Bhuj earthquake. 
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